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Abstract 
 This thesis argues for the establishment of a new legal system with regard to 
contracts of adhesion. Contracts of adhesion are currently the most common form of 
contracting. However, because they are drafted by economic organizations and imposed 
on the consumer without any kind of judicial control, these contracts contain 
tremendously unfair clauses. Finding a new format for this type of contract is urgent. 
First, they should not be entirely considered in the scope of private law, which regulates 
relations between individuals. Economic organizations should not,in any way, be treated 
as individuals. Second, because consumers are, at the outset, in a handicap ratio, their 
protection matters greatly.        
 It is, therefore, important to establish a suitable framework for the protection of 
consumers’ interests against the authoritarianism of the economic organizations. 
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contract; consent; judicial risks; legal certainty; progress; new legal system. 
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Resumo 
 Esta tese tem o objectivo de clarificar a necessidade de um novo sistema legal no que 
diz respeito aos contratos de adesão. Os contratos de adesão, são hoje em dia, a forma mais 
vulgar de contratar. No entanto, pelo facto de serem redigidos por organizações económicas e 
impostos ao consumidor sem qualquer tipo de controlo judicial, estes contratos podem incluir  
clausúlas injustas.           
 É por isso urgente uma nova formatação para este tipo de contratos. Em primeiro lugar, 
não devem ser considerados inteiramente no âmbito de Direito Privado, pois este regula 
relações entre individuais. As organizações económicas não devem, nem podem, de forma 
alguma, ser equiparadas a um individual. Em segundo lugar, pelo facto de os consumidores 
estarem, logo á partida, numa relação de desvantagem, deve ser dada grande relevância á 
protecção destes. 
 Importa, por isso, estabelecer um quadro legal adequado para a protecção dos interesses 
dos consumidores contra o autoritarismo das organizações económicas. 
 
Palavras-chave: contratos de adesão; clausulas contratuais gerais; justiça contratual; liberdade 
contratual; riscos jurídicos; certeza jurídica; progresso; novo sistema legal. 
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Methodology 
 The methodology used in this master’s thesis research is based on a legal dogmatic 
descriptive method, particularly in Chapter I and II. The subsequent Chapters (III and IV) are 
result of a descriptive method followed by a conceptual analysis method. Then, a evalution 
method is put in practice to determine whether the current legal system is appropriate for the 
present reality. Also, a comparative approach is used throughout this thesis.  
 The Chapter I contains a introduction to contracts of adhesion in general. What is a 
contract of adhesion, to whom it applies, who enjoy their use, and others, are questions 
answered in this chapter. Then, Chapter II exposes the opinions of three notorious scholars. 
Kessler, Rakoff, and Slawson specially address the problem of contracts of adhesion and their 
impact on the today’s society, more precisely the US society. Their perspective is helpful to a 
full understanding of the practice.        
 In Chapter III, a case-law analysis describes the state of adhesion’ practice in the EU as 
well as its legal framework. Their fast spread and tricky usage gave rise to many legal problems, 
which happen until today. The EU and the ECJ consider that contracts of adhesion, which are 
normally consumer contracts, have some particularities that mislead the consumer, for instance 
some unfair contract terms. For that reason, the EU has released the Directive 93/13/EEC on 
Unfair Contract Terms., its enforcement is visible within the case-law analysis.  
 Lastly, the Chapter IV respects to the Conclusions and Recommendations acquired 
during this research work, in which a critical analysis is made.  
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Introduction 
Since the first moment I studied Standard Form Contracts or Contracts of Adhesion, a 
question always came to my mind: How can such unfairness not be fought?  
 The most popular tyoe of contract in our time is that of adhesion, especially in consumer 
transactions. They are preprinted forms containing non-negotiated provisions, that are offered 
to the consumer on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. The terms are normally presented in fine print, 
and are drafted by and on behalf of one of the parties to the contract, normally the one with 
superior bargaining power, that is, business organizations.      
 With the expansion of the worldwide market, the transactions had to become 
standardized, or else it would have been impossible to keep the market running. The contracts 
are standardized for many reasons: first, they are used to supply mass demands for goods and 
services; second, they are drafted for an infinite number of persons; third, they promote the 
efficiency of the trade, reducing transaction costs; and fourth, they strengthen the power of the 
organizations that enjoy their use.         
 Surely, these contracts are helpful to some extent but they are also deceiving. They are 
deceiving because the consumer cannot even negotiate. He either accepts or not. If all consumer 
commercial transactions are made through these contracts what can the consumer choose other 
than a imposition? This imposition of terms on the consumer is, in fact, the power of “making” 
law by the organizations. If contracting is a form of lawmaking between two private parties 
then, if the same contracting is imposed by one of the parties, that party is effectively making 
law. Moreover, the organizations impose various types of unfair clauses that, for many reasons, 
the consumer, is not aware of.        
 Powerful business enterprises distort the principles of contract law to achieve their own 
goals. For this reason, is my belief that the law regarding contracts of adhesion must be 
separated from the “ordinary” contract law. The contractual relationship is no longer equal, 
because one of the parties has much more power than the other. Also, I believe that if 
organizations are capable of “making” law, they must be subject to any kind of  “democratic 
control”. The consumer is not yet sufficiently protected against the abuses of this practice. 
 The path to achieving contractual justice is one of determining the appropriate sphere in 
which contracts of adhesion are contained. They are not contracts stricto sensu, so why are they 
still governed by principles of contract law? More precisely why are they still governed by 
private law if they have all the characteristics of a “public” contract?   
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 Contracts of adhesion must have the direct intervention of the State. Otherwise 
organizations will keep imposing all kinds of unfair terms, with no fear of being discovered. 
 We must take a look at the reality that surrounds us. These days, organizations do not 
even think about any legal consequences, because the law regarding this problem is full of 
contraditions. Moreover, they prepare their “contracts” to be close to the threshold of legality, 
because they have the power and the means to do so. In the other hand, the consumer is facing 
the “world” alone. He does not have the means, most of the time, for a reasonable defence 
against these organizations. Besides, he has been deceived in the first place, because, unlike 
these organizations, he did not have all the information in the beginning of the transaction. 
 How can this still happen in the twenty-first century? How can the law itself admit such 
injustice?            
 In this thesis I will analyse American jurisprudence by comparing decisions taken both 
in American and European Union courts. Furthermore, I will show that the decisions are 
beginning to be in accordance with the public law approach to contracts of adhesion 
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CHAPTER I 
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT STANDARD FORM CONTRACTS 
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Standard form contracts are the type of contracts that are most used in today’s modern 
economy.  That is due to the reality of mass production and the consumer economy in which 
we live. The birth of these contracts was inevitable to keep the market functioning. Mass 
production leads to mass consumption, and in order to facilitate it, businesses tend to use 
standard form contracts. Then, what is a standard form contract? Most people have already 
contracted this way. Opening a bank account, taking out insurance, buying a car, getting the 
house fixed or even taking a shirt to the laundry are examples of standard contracts. They are 
essentially consumer contracts that use standardized, non-negotiated terms, usually in pre-
printed forms. These contracts may also be known as “boilerplate contracts”, “contracts of 
adhesion” or “take-it-or-leave it” contracts. The terms written in fine print, are drafted by or on 
behalf of one party to the transaction, normally the party that has more bargaining power. The 
terms are not even negotiated by the consumer. This standard form contracts also play an 
important role in the efficiency of mass distribution of goods and services. They reduce costs 
by eliminating the need of negotiating every detail and this reflects in reduction of prices, from 
which the all society benefits.         
 Consumer adhesion standard form contracts and the proliferation of unfair supplier-
biased terms are characteristic of the modern day consumer market1. Many countries have been 
enacting legislation that aims at providing a general framework to deal with the possibly unfair 
terms in these contracts. Examples include in Germany, the Standard Terms Act2, in 1976, in 
Israel the Standard Contract Law, in 1964,3 in Sweden, the Improper Contract Act, in 1977 4 
and in the United Kingdom the Unfair Contract Terms Act, in 19775. Most of them have been 
rectified by now, this may be because of the implementation of the Unfair Contract Terms 
                                                             
1 It is estimated that about 98 per cent of all written contracts made in USA are made on standard forms: see Slawson, “Standard Form Contracts 
and Democratic Control of Law Making Power” (1971) 84 Harv. L. R. 529. That may not be the case in other countries. Yet, due to the highly 
internationalized marketing methods used in today’s world, it’s tempting to believe that Slawson comment is not too far from reality. 
2 See Sandrock, “The Standard terms Act 1976 of West Germany” (1978) 26. Amer. J. Comp. L. 551, Alpa, “Protection of Consumers against 
Unfair Contract Terms: Legislative Patterns of Controlling Adhesion Contracts in Europe” (1976) 105 Willamette L. R. 267, 274-276.   
3 See Diamond, "The Israeli Standard Contracts Law, 5729-1969" (1965) 14 I.C.L.Q. 1410, Gottschalk, "The Israeli Law on Standard 
Contracts" (1964) 81 L.Q.R. 32, Hecht, "The Israeli Law on Standard Contracts" (1968) 3 Is. L.R. 586, Comment, "Administrative Regulation 
of Adhesion Contracts in Israel (1966) 66 Colum. L.Rev. 1341, Lando, "Standard Contract: A Proposal and a Perspective" (1966) 10 Scan. 
Stud. L. 129, Jacobsen, "The Standard Contracts Law of Israel" (1968) J. B.L. 325, Berg, "The Israeli Standard Contract Law 1964: Judicial 
Control of Standard Form Contracts" (1979) 28 I. C. L.Q. 560.  
4 See “Consumer Protection and Standard Contracts: The Swedish Experiment in Administrative Control” (1974) 22 Amer. J. Comp. L . 17, 
Bernitz “Consumer Protection and Standard Contracts” (1973) 17 Scan. Stud. L. 11, Id., “Consumer Protection: Aims, Methods and Trends in 
Swedish Consumer Law (1976) 20 Scand. Stud. L. 11, King. Consumer Protection Experiments in Sweden (New Jersey: 1974). 
5 See, Treitel, The Law of Contract (London: 1979) 179-193, Cheshire and Fifoot, Law of Contract (London: 1981) 159-173, Coote, "Unfair 
Contract Terms Act", (1978) 41 M.L.R. 312, Sealey, "Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977" (1978) 37 C.J.L. 15, Adams, "An Unfair Look at the 
Contract Provisions of the Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977" (1978) 41 M.L.R. 703. 
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Directive by the EU countries, in one side, or, the sign that there is the need to adapt to the new 
circumstances of the market and law, in the other side. By the same token, in the US the Section 
211 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, entitled “Standardized Agreements” treats 
contracts of adhesion.           
 The conceptual base from which most of the legislation derives is the classical theory 
of contract as bargain resulting from agreement between parties to contracts of adhesion and 
the conclusion that unfair terms in these contracts result from breakdown in the classical 
contract bargaining process.         
  
1.1. Standard forms or adhesion contracts? 
A. Introduction to the term “contracts of adhesion” 
The term “contract of adhesion” is widely used in the context of contemporary 
contract’s6, though the expression has not yet attained any accurate legal meaning. When 
referring to these contracts there is the possibility of mistake its significance. For example, the 
term is sometimes used to mean all standard form contracts. It may also refer to a broad range 
of contracts where the bargain is absent and, at other times, to refer only to consumer type 
contracts.           
 Due to their deceiver meaning, contracts of adhesion must be looked closely at, more 
specifically, their core characteristics.      
 Henry Maine was one of the first to note the impact that standard form contracts would 
have in the future. In 1861, he observed that “the movement of the progressive societies has 
hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract”7.     
 What Maine meant was that the society was moving away from the stratification based 
on fixed classes, as with feudalism, and was moving into the much revered “Freedom of 
Contract Era”, where the people were free to transact with, and become obligated to, whomever 
they wished.           
 Nonetheless, just about a century ago, Nathan Isaacs speculated about whether the 
standard form contract phenomenon would be opposite to that transformation.  That is, Isaacs 
become aware of the possibility that the rising of this type of contracts could lead to the re-
                                                             
6 See, eg., Kessler, "Contracts of Adhesion: Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract" (1943) 43 Colum. L.R. 629, Bolgar, "The contract of 
Adhesion: A Comparison of Theory and Practice" (1972) 20 Amer. J. Comp. L. 53, Lenhoff, "Contracts of Adhesion and Freedom of Contract" 
36 Tul. L.R. 48, Schuman,"Consumer Credit by Adhesion Contracts" (1962) Temp. L.Q. 125, 281 
7 Henry Sumner Maine, Ancient Law 170 (Transactions Publishers 2002) (1861) 
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classification of the contracting masses into two categories: the dominating lords (the 
corporations using such contracts) and the subservient vassals (the consumers subject to such 
contracts). Hence, his observation was not totally incorrect as the rise of this standard form 
contracts revealed the growing disparity in bargaining power between industry and consumers8.
 The first time that the contract of adhesion was referred to as a transaction type was in 
1901, by the French jurist Raymond Saleilles, who identified what he called “contracts 
d’adhesion”9. Saleilles stated that these contracts consist of pre-formulated stipulations in 
which the will of one party dominates the transaction. This dominance lies in relation, not only 
to a single individual, but also to an entire group of individuals who may at any time wish to 
participate in such transaction10. Some illustrations of this type of contract are collective labour 
contracts in large industries and railway transportation contracts11. Saleilles asserted that these 
contracts are similar to legislative enactments and should be interpreted “in the interests of the 
collectivety to which they are addressed… in the sense called for by both good faith and 
economic relations involved12.        
 The topic that Saleilles most discussed in differentiating contracts of adhesion from 
other contracts was the need to adopt a different method of interpretation. According to him, 
contracts of adhesion differed from ordinary contracts in that the juridical basis of the latter 
type was not consensus (or consent), but was adhesion to one party’s stipulations. For this 
reason, Saleilles suggested a diverse interpretation technique.    
 Then, in 1919, the expression contracts of adhesion entered into the Anglo-American 
vocabulary, at the hands of Professor Patterson, who embraced the Saleilles thesis. In an article 
on life insurance contracts, Patterson said that “contract is drawn up by the insurer and the 
insured, who merely adheres to it, has little choice as to its term”13. Patterson, as Saleilles, used 
this analysis to show why contracts of adhesion should be interpreted differently from ordinary 
contracts. When classifying a contract as an “adhesion contract”, it means that this contract 
should be interpreted in a particular method.      
 Another important contribution in this discussion was made by Friedrich Kessler14, who 
                                                             
8 See Nathan Isaacs, The Standardizing of contracts, 27 Yale L. J. 34 (1917) 
9 See Saleilles, De La Declaration de Volonte (1901) 
10 See Patterson, "The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts" (1964) Colum. L.R. 833, 856 and Amos and Walton, Introduction to French 
Law (London: 1966) p. 152. 
11 Saleilles, supra note 9 at 230. 
12 Ibid. 
13 See Patterson, “The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy” (1919) 33 Harv. L. R. 198.  
14 Kessler, supra note 6 
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still has one of the leading articles regarding the contract of adhesion15. In it, he broadened the 
idea of the adhesion contract. For Kessler, the arrival of this type of contracts was inspired by 
the need to encourage business activity and mass production16 and is so different from ordinary 
contracts that totally new legal principles are necessary to regulate these contracts. Kessler 
wrote: 
It is not even profitable to spend the energy of the counsel, the money of clients and the time 
and analysis of the judges in discussing the problems presented by contracts of adhesion in terms 
established legal principles and to proclaim that recovery is contrary to the well settled principles of 
contract law. 
It is perceivable that Kessler, more than calling for a different mode of interpretation, 
also called for a new set of legal principles.      
 Kessler was quite persistent in referring that the adhesion contract is a distinct, 
legitimate transaction type which is capable of generating separate legal principles. This lead 
to the curiosity of modern commentators, which started to collect the various distinguishing 
features between an adhesion contract and an ordinary contract.     
 One of these commentators was Arthur Lenhoff17, which collected some features of the 
contracts of adhesion and then, enumerated their five main characteristics: 
1. The contracts are based on standard forms. 
2. They are used to supply mass demands for goods and services. 
3. They are drafted, for the public, that is, for an infinite number of persons, rather than 
a single individual. 
4. Their use is entangled with the superior bargaining power of the stipulator which is, 
to a certain extent, a monopolistic body. 
5. The individual customer has no bargaining power; he must either adhere to the 
contract or refuse the contract all together18 . 
                                                             
15 Leff refers to this article as “the most elegant and powerful discussion of the adhesion contract”: See Leff, “Contracts as Thing” (1970) 19 
Amer. U. L. R. 131, 142. 
16 “The effect of mass production and mass merchandising is to make all consumer forms standard, and the combined effect of economics and 
the present law is to make all standard forms unfair. Mass production and mass merchandising work to make all forms standard because 
nonstandard form is characteristically just as expensive for a seller to make and sell as is a nonstandard tangible product.” : See Slawson, 
“Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power” (1971) 84 Harv. L. R. 529.  
17 See Lenhoff, supra note 6. 
18 Ibid. at 481-482 
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This description, however, doesn’t fit perfectly in all this types of contracts. Because of 
that, it is imperative to clarify some notions. Lenhoff states that adhesion contracts are based 
on standard forms, but all of the contracts based on standard forms may not mean exactly the 
same as some commentators tend to incorrectly state. There are some differences between the 
adhesion contract and another type of standard form contract, namely the commercial standard 
form contract19.           
 The commercial standard form contract takes place between parties who are engaged in 
trade, business or commerce and who are of relatively equal bargaining power. There is a case 
that addresses this issue 20 and which states that: “The clauses of these (contracts) have been 
settled over the years by negotiations by representatives of the commercial interests involved 
and have been widely adopted because experience has shown that they facilitate the conduct of 
the trade…” An example of this sort of contract is standard form building contract.  
 The adhesion type standard form contract, oppositely, is concluded between parties, of 
relatively unequal bargaining power, on a standard form produced by, or on behalf of, the party 
with the stronger bargaining position. In the case referred above, Lord Diplock make a 
description of these type of contracts, where he held the following: 
The terms of this kind of standard form have not been the subject of negotiation representing 
the interests of the weaker party. They have been dictated by that party whose bargaining power, either 
exercised alone or in conjunction with others providing similar goods or services, enables him to say: 
’If you want these goods or services at all, they are the only terms on which they are obtainable. Take it 
or leave it’.21  
This unequal bargaining is possible due to the existence of relative market power by one 
party to an adhesion contract. Lenhoff was of the opinion that the use of adhesion contracts was 
implicated with monopoly power. As matter of fact, he goes too for in this issue when he 
suggests that the adhesion contracts indicate the absence of competitive markets. It is quite 
possible for firms in a given industry, finding it economical to use standard form contracts, to 
refuse to negotiate with purchasers, but nevertheless to have competitive terms in standard 
forms22. Hence, adhesion contracts may be found in workably competitive markets and they do 
not need to be any monopoly as such to create and maintain an adhesion situation. Though, 
such a situation can be created where contracts are offered on substantially nearly identical 
                                                             
19 See Sales, “Standard Form Contracts” (1953) 16 M.L.R. 318. 
20 Schroeder Music Co. Ltd v. Macaulay [1974] 3 All E. R. 616, 624, per Lord Diplock 
21 Schroeder Music Co. Ltd v. Macaulay [1974] 3 All E. R. 618, 624, per Lord Diplock 
22 See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (Tononto: 1977) 
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terms by competitors who dominate the market23. When Lenhoff referred the “monopoly 
power” it must be understood in this former sense.       
 There is another Lenhoff’s description referring to the adhesion contracting process 
which deserves attention. He mentions that the weaker party “adheres” to the contract, or else 
no contract can result. This is not enough to emphasize one of the most distinguishing features 
of the contract of adhesion, which is that the contract involves a disqualification of the element 
of bargaining over terms. The contract procedure is much simpler than the classical contract. 
When using this contracting “via”, the weaker party is presented with a form, where it simply 
has to sign or not. So, the contracting process is, actually, a co-operative act by the weaker party 
done in agreement, rather than by way of making an agreement. 
 
B. The Genesis and Expansion of Standardized Contracting 
The standardization of contracts can already be found in primitive societies, such as 
Greco-Roman societies24. The conclusion of a contract, the transference and establishment of 
property rights were usually viewed as sacred acts, where a priest had to be present. Over the 
years, the priest had collected some of the sacred words spoken at these occasions, which later 
were given to the public notaries. Until now, most public notaries have had at their disposal 
books of forms, in which most current legal acts have been standardized.   
 Another important factor in the development of standard form contracts is the advent of 
model insurance policies in the 16th and 17th century. Insurance in the 16th century was a rather 
new institution, unprovided for by Roman law and outside of the scope of the guilds. With the 
increase of the number of insurance contracts it became worthwhile to cover specific events 
that rarely arise in the policies. Similarly, the need for standardized clauses was felt. These were 
grouped in model policies.         
 Then, in the late 18th and the 19th centuries, after the decline of the guilds, for example, 
in France, the state or either the manufactures themselves started to proclaim “codes of factory 
discipline”. Given that trade unions weren’t allowed, these codes became very one-sided, hence 
containing extremely onerous clauses. Applying these clauses to the labourer, or not, was up to 
the manufacturer. In fact, this system proved to function so well that it was also applied to other 
branches where one party had an economically dominant/superior position, namely sales of 
                                                             
23 See, eg., Henningsen v Bloomfield Motors Inc. 161A 2d. 69 (1961). 
24 E. H. Hondius, Standard contracts and adhesion contracts according to Dutch law, LL.B Leyden 1965, M.C.L. Columbia 1966 
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goods to consumers, railway transport, water, electricity and gas delivery, and many other 
services.           
 In England, the origin of the adhesion contracts return to, at least, the latter part of the 
18th century, with the expansion of large railway companies25. As carriers, these railway 
companies were not only obliged to carry goods offered to them at a proper and reasonable 
charge, but were also under a strict liability, especially for any loss of goods entrusted to them26. 
In order to escape this strict liability, the railway companies, through the end of the 18th  century 
and increasingly during the 19th century, began to post public notices excluding certain types 
of liability, especially that for loss or for theft27. In the Riley v. Horne the validity of this clauses 
was sustained. During this trial, the president of the Court of Common Pleas, Best CJ, observed 
that the major part of the people who send their goods by carriers were entirely ignorant of what 
they could do to insure their goods. By 1830, the problem of public notices, which Best CJ 
noticed, had become grave enough to attract the attention of the English literature. In this year, 
the Carriers Act was approved. One of its many features was the disallowance of the reliance 
on public notices, where the goods being carried were worth less than £10, unless the carrier 
could prove a “special contract”. This requirement of “special contract” was that it had to meet 
the standard of “justice and policy”, which Best CJ stated in the Riley v. Horne. This “special 
contracts” were the predecessors of the modern adhesion contracts. With the view to prevent 
the effect of the Carrier Act, railway companies started to constitute “special contracts” with 
consignors and passengers by giving them tickets or notices containing extremely broad 
exclusion clauses28. This tickets were invented by large railway corporations with the intention 
of controlling the potential limitless liability. This way they were dealing with large sections of 
the public, instead of with a restricted number of contractors.    
 The expansion of the adhesion contract was also marked by the progress of the big 
enterprises and their need to control liability in a mass market environment. One good example 
of this were the English quasi-public corporations like the Gas Corporation and the Water 
Board. This mass suppliers started to use adhesion contracts containing wide exception clauses. 
Another example were insurance companies, the earliest private companies to use adhesion 
contracts. It is important to refer that these were companies that also supplied people on a mass 
                                                             
25 Atiyah, The rise and fall of freedom of contract (Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1979), pp. 555-560. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 For useful discussion on the use of these tickets see the “ticket cases”, eg., Parker v. South Eastern Railway (1877) 2 CPD 416, Walker v. 
York and North Midland Ry (1853) 2 E & B 750, Harris v. Great Western Ry (1876) 1 C & B 515, McManus v. Lancaster & Yorkshire Ry 
(1859) 4 Hurlst & N 327 
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basis. One of the various reasons why the adhesion contracting is so used nowadays is the 
unstoppable traffic of goods and services that increases from day to day. This made this method 
of contracting dominant in our days.        
 When analyzing the background of the contract of adhesion it is understandable that it 
is used, mainly, to achieve an efficient method of mass contracting. Their use has increased 
while the trade of goods and services has become more and more standardized, leading to the 
enlargement of the consumer markets.       
 We actually could name these contracts, market contracts. 
 
C. The social and economic reasons for the endless use of standardized contracts 
I. Social 
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the transformation of the 
contracting process was eased by several changes in the social market conditions29. The first 
important change was the fact that commercial enterprises became aware of the power of 
standard form contracts to increase their profitability30, which made them use the contracts 
daily. Indeed, if a business is large enough to engage multiple transactions, the most advisable 
thing it can do to save transaction costs is to use one standard form for all transactions of a kind.
  Other change was that, due to the newly high standards of living, many goods and 
services began to be required. So, in order to acquire these goods it was imperative to enter in 
a contract31. Allied to the contract itself are its legal implications, which have grown at the same 
speed as its transactions. Hence, the complexity of products became to be a problem in the sense 
that one transaction may give arise to many problems. In other words, if a product/service has 
problems, this problems must be prevented or repaired, consumers must have a warranty. This 
leads to other “problem” which is the substantial growth of the law regarding this problem. This 
law grows so rapidly that the consumer can’t keep the pace with it. In effect, the average 
consumer is uniformed. So it became implicit to expand some duties, like for example, the duty 
of good faith and fair dealing in which concerns contractual situations.    
 An important, if not the most important, key point to this development was the rise of 
mass commercial communications. Newspapers, magazines, radio, television and more recently 
                                                             
29 Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: The transformation of contracts law by Standard Forms, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 21 (1984) 
30 Ibid at 24. 
31 Ibid. 
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the internet, were an important factor for the growing expectations of the consumers. 
Nowadays, we don’t even need to leave our homes to be aware of all kinds of products and 
their characteristics, which are constantly advertised everywhere. This resulted in: too much 
consumption, because we are everyday harassed to buy more and more, even if we don’t 
actually need to; and then, due to this exaggerated supply, the creation of exacerbated 
expectations about the goods we’re about to buy, or that we intend to buy.   
 This vast range of products and its associated legal implications made it nearly 
impossible to collect all the possible outcomes arising from future transactions. The parties 
don’t want to, or simply are not interested in wasting their time, reading and understanding the 
contract document. Due to this consumer “passivity”, businesses were in a position to take 
advantage of drafting their own standard forms, which they use to create any legal implications 
they wish, and as they draft their forms long before they use them, they can predict what are 
the legal implications that best serve their interests.      
 Under those circumstances, if a company is capable of drafting its own standard forms, 
it is also capable of drafting its terms. That’s exactly what businesses do, they draft their own 
forms in order to escape to their possible liability. Thus, the contract terms became more 
uniform between businesses that deal with the same products or services, which normally are 
mass production and distribution companies. Moreover, the use of this standard contracts may 
make both sellers and buyers better off, because it is presumed, in a perfectly functioning 
market with a complete information, that contracts will contain only efficient terms and the 
seller’s contract terms will benefit buyers as a class32. Again, the evident practical importance 
of the use of standard contracts by sellers or firms is self-protection or minimization of possible 
risk, as I mentioned earlier, to escape their liability. While drafting their contracts, the firms 
normally, through their legal offices, will try to prevent others from interfering into the interests 
of the firms, and will only consider how the firms’ businesses interests are to be effectively 
protected33. This is true with respect to firms/businesses of all kinds and sorts: banks, insurance 
companies, and delivery companies, distribution companies, production companies of all 
sectors and the list could go on. The most important factor in the rise of adhesion contracts was 
their efficiency. Hence, how could the market function so well, when it offers so many goods 
and services, to so many people, in a globalized arena?      
 To put it other way, the terms are controlled by the stronger party, the business, and this 
                                                             
32 Russel Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1208, 1216 (2003) 
33 See Edwin Richards, Drafting Licenses to Guide Whether Potential Disputes Lie in Contract or Infringement, 7 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. 
J. 45 (2003) 
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terms might relate with, for example, the goods to be delivered, the date of delivery, the identity 
of the party that bears the risk of an accident during the shipment, or, might also refer to terms 
that release the seller from its obligation if a strike or a similar events occurs. A hypothetically 
complete contract would describe all the possible eventualities, but transaction costs, including 
the cost of negotiating and writing down the terms, renders all contracts incomplete. Coupled 
with this, the parties choose some terms or avoid others for strategic reasons, in order to exploit 
superior bargaining power and information asymmetries. Ultimately, parties will rely on 
custom, trade usage, and, in the end, the courts to fill the terms of the contract. The terms that 
usually appear in contracts depend on what the parties are trying to accomplish, on their shared 
understandings about the relevant industry, transaction costs, general characteristics of their 
interaction such as asymmetric information and unequal bargaining power and its background 
legal regime.  This legal regime respects to what rules of contract law would best serve the 
parties. 
In the meantime started the decline of the individualism in the U.S society. In the late 
19th and early 20th centuries, the dominant view of the society was that it consisted of numerous 
individuals whose principal relationships with each other were competitive. Life was a struggle 
in which only the fittest survived34. Imagine, for example, a “jungle” in which only the strongest 
would survive. This means that the people were so suspicious about each other, that thy felt the 
need to control every transaction “point-by-point”. In this atmosphere of thinking, the normal 
was to consider that any transaction, the one person that could take an advantage, would 
certainly do it. If a party bound himself to terms he never read or did not understand, this was 
his choice, and the law, within wide limits, did nothing to excuse him from the risks he had 
supposedly voluntarily assumed.        
 People have become more dependent on each other and started to live in a society based 
on the confidence between individuals. In the contemporary world, there is no time to make 
each contract a struggle in which one extracts every possible advantage. Nor does anyone today 
know enough about all the implications of every contracts one makes to understand every 
advantage one might obtain. The result is that the contracts are made on trust.   
The decline of individualism has brought up another issue, the collectivism. If people 
started to be more dependent on each other, this means they are living in a collectivist society. 
The word society itself means collectivity. Society is regarded as “a large group of people who 
                                                             
34 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) 
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live together in an organized way, making decisions about how to do things and sharing the 
work that needs to be done”. Still, individualism is the one to blaim on  Free Market Capitalism, 
which is deeply rooted, historically and culturally in the idea “Everybody for himself” that 
supposedly would lead to the highest common good, according to Adam Smith. The loss of 
individualism arises when smaller businesses are substituted by larger ones because larger 
businesses tend to be more administrative, both for their employees and for the people who deal 
with them, and bureaucracy is averse with individualism. Mass communications are also averse 
to individualism because they tend to eliminate individual differences and create a mass 
culture35, which is substantially the same for all those whom includes. The current technique of 
contracting through standard forms is less individualist than the old one, because it gives to a 
particular contract a social character. An insurance contract such as burglary, theft and robbery 
insurance is deemed to provide the rights and duties that are commonly associated with the 
concept of burglary, theft and robbery insurance in the society which the contract was made. 
Unless the parties agree differently, which they practically never do (despite what the insurer 
may say in its standard forms), it is the social meaning that practically always controls. It is the 
insurance industry as a whole, not just the particular insurer selling the insurance in the case at 
hand, that has given the insured the meaning of burglary, theft and robbery insurance by the 
kinds of protection that it has sold over the years under the name burglary, theft and robbery 
insurance. In addition, both “burglary”, “theft”, “robbery”, and “insurance” are concepts 
commonly understood to carry certain meanings in our society.  
II. Economic 
In a mass production economy it is essential to standardize the terms for exchange of 
goods or services in some method, as the cost of individual negotiation is high. For this reason, 
many who participate in the market on a regular basis find it worthwhile to standard forms that 
set out in print the terms upon which the drafter proposes to do business36. This empowers them 
to take advantage of economies of scale in determining the terms that maximize their surplus 
from the transaction and in drafting the written agreement that embodies those terms. 
 If standard forms are to economize on negotiation costs, each individual exchange 
cannot provide the occasion for reopening the terms of bargain. At least, written terms must be 
regarded as presumptively nonnegotiable, but this presumption may be impossible to surpass. 
                                                             
35 Slawson, supra note 29 at 29. 
36 Katz, Your terms or mine? The duty to read the fine print in contracts, The RAND Journal of economics, Vol. 21, no 4 (1990), pp. 519-537 
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As matter of fact, actual forms contracts often provide that the negotiating agent lacks authority 
to vary the written terms37. Yet, the fact that certain terms are not negotiable doesn’t mean that 
there is no negotiation at all. Generally, in the forms, blank spaces are left to be filled in with 
essential terms actually dickered, such as price, quantity and price of shipment.   
 In the event that standard forms are equally understood by both parties, there would be 
presumably no strong welfare concerns regarding their use, apart from any second-best 
considerations arising from interactions with other market imperfections such as monopoly. If 
both sides knew the terms of the contract and bore all costs of negotiation, they would use form 
contracts whenever the savings in negotiation costs outweighed the advantages of tailoring the 
bargain to their individual circumstances38.        
 Even though their advantages are many, form contracts have been received by courts 
and legal scholars with uncertainty and on occasions with suspicion. Partly, this is so because 
some have assumed that such contracts reflect the presence of market power39. The take-it-or-
leave it element that form contracts display with regard to non-dickered terms has been 
analogized to the power a monopolist has over the price. This is way the form contract have 
become more popularly known as “contracts of adhesion” and understood as inherently 
coercive40.           
 The law’s hesitation toward form contracts goes beyond the fact that a party faced with 
a form offer is unable individually to negotiate all terms with the offeror. More important is 
that contracting parties often purport to accept form offers without knowing and understanding 
the terms within. This is rationally intelligible, since the cost of reading and considering each 
term is high, and many of the terms deal with improbable possibilities. Few consumers try to 
read all the terms of their leases, insurance policies or automobile loan contracts, for instance, 
though they may occasionally deceive people of doing so in order not to appear unsophisticated. 
Few of those who do try understand what they read, since terms are often written in fine print, 
to save on the costs of paper and handling, and are expressed unclearly or in legal or technical 
                                                             
37 The aforesaid disclaimers are presumably intended to address the agency problem the drafter of the contract faces with regard to his sales 
force. For example, since compensation contracts of insurance agents typically give them an incentive to write policies insur ing excessively 
poor risks, the fine print of the insurance application forms commonly provides that the policy is subject to the ultimate approval of the insurer’s 
home office. 
38 Ibid. at 520. 
39 Economically addressed, this analogy has been poorly grounded, as Katz stated: “the fact that several firms in an industry include similar 
terms in their standard forms has been regarded by some courts as prima facie evidence of conspiracy or oligopoly. Furthermore, legal 
commentators have generally assumed incorrectly that sellers with market power will choose non-price terms that are excessively or 
inefficiently favourable to themselves, by supposed analogy to the effect of market power on price”  
40 See supra note 1 and supra note 6. 
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jargon to save on the expenses of drafting. This situation is not confined to the consumer setting. 
Purchasing agents do not read non-essential terms of price quotation sheets, and sales agents 
do not read the terms of purchaser’s orders, it simply not worth their time and effort to do so, 
Furthermore, some of the terms of the standard forms are included primarily for purposes of 
internal organizational control, and only secondarily for their effects on bargain. Most times, 
even agents of the drafting party are not aware of the content of their own forms.  
 As Todd Rakoff stated in his “Contracts of adhesion: An essay in reconstruction”, the 
standard form contracts are beneficial, if not essential, to the market economy: “Firms create 
standard form contracts (…) in part to stabilize their external market relationships, and in part 
to serve the needs of a hierarchical and internally segmented structure”. 
Form documents promote efficiency within a complex organizational structure. First, the 
standardization of terms, and of the very forms on which they are recorded, facilitates coordination 
among departments. The costs of communicating special understandings rise rapidly when one 
department makes the sale, another delivers the goods, a third handles collections, and a fourth field 
complaints. Standard terms make it possible to process transactions as a matter of routine: standard 
forms, with standard blank spaces, makes it possible to locate rapidly whatever deal has been struck on 
the few customized items. Second, standardization makes possible the efficient use of expensive 
managerial and legal talent. Standard forms facilitate the diffusion to underlings of management’s 
decisions regarding the risks of the organization is prepared to bear, or make it unnecessary to explain 
these matters to subordinates at all. Third, the use of form contracts serves as an automatic check on the 
consequences of the acts of wayward sales personnel. The pressure to produce may attempt salesman to 
make bargains into which the organization is unwilling to enter; the use of standard form contracts to 
state the terms of the deal obviates much of the need for, and expense of, internal control and discipline 
in this regard.41 
 The economists who deal with this issue, call this last situation the agency problem42. 
In firms, agents are inescapably entering into transactions with third parties that will bind their 
firm. So, how does the firm constrain the ability of agents to serve their own interests? By 
offering excessive terms of which even their directors will inevitably be unware. Thereby, it 
binds both agents and third parties to the (unwaivable) terms in a form contract.  
 To do business on a scale that benefits everyone would simply be impossible if firms 
were unable to control the terms their agents could offer to third parties by using form 
contracts43. Since they are so many terms contained in any single contract, the small probability 
of the term being invoked in some future court case, combined with the relatively low risks of 
                                                             
41 Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An essay in Reconstruction, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1174 (1983). 
42 See, e.g.. Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and Theory of the Firm, 88 J. Pol. Econ. 288 (1980). 
43 Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 627 (2002) 
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many such contracts, makes it irrational for form-receiving parties to spend time reading, much 
less understanding, the terms in the forms they sign44. 
For most consumer transactions, the close reading and comparison needed to make an 
intelligent choice among alternative forms seems grossly arduous. Moreover, many of the terms 
concern risks that in any individual transaction are unlikely to eventuate. It is notoriously 
difficult for most people, who lack legal advice and broad experience concerning the particular 
transaction type, to appraise these sorts of contingencies. And the standard forms – because 
they are drafted to be long and complex, even if each term is plainly stated. Once form 
documents are seen in the context of shopping (rather than bargaining) behavior, it is clear that 
the near-universal failure of adherents to read and understand the documents they sign cannot 
be dismissed as mere laziness. In the circumstances, the rational course is to focus on the few 
terms that are generally well publicized and immediate concern, and to ignore the rest. 45 
 
As previously stated by Kessler: “The stereotyped contract of today reflects the 
impersonality of the market”. Hence, the uniformity of terms is useful for businesses due to the 
fact that they are very influential in the exact calculation of risks. Risks that are difficult to 
calculate can be excluded altogether. An example that standard forms are the most striking 
illustrations of successful attempts on the part of business enterprises to select and control risks 
assumed under a contract, are the ones included in insurance policies.    
 So, the motivating factor to the use of standard forms is the desire to avoid juridical 
risks. This was proven by the use of exemption clauses46. Warranty clauses, arbitration clauses 
or exculpatory clauses are examples of that.       
 As mentioned above, this contracts are typically used by enterprises with strong 
bargaining power. The weaker party, in the need of goods and services, is frequently not in 
position to shop around better terms, either because the author of the standard contract has 
monopoly (natural or artificial) or because all competitors use the same clauses. This 
contractual intention is nothing more than a subjection more or less voluntary to terms dictated 
by the stronger party, terms whose consequences are often understood in an ambiguous manner. 
 The enterprises use their power to control their risks and impose their will, but they also 
do that in order to control and regulate the distribution of goods from producer all way down to 
the ultimate consumer. Hence, enterprises regulate external market relationships through 
mechanisms that will build up and strength their industrial empires.  
 
                                                             
44 Ibid. at 631. 
45 Rakoff, supra note 41 at 1226. 
46 This issue will be discussed later. 
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1.2. Public nature of contracts of adhesion 
There is a very important aspect in the contracts of adhesion that commentators, since 
Saleilles have neglected, which is its public nature. It is clear that contracts serve the public 
rather than specific individuals. So, the most distinctive aspect of the adhesion contracts, and 
what characterizes them as a type, is its public nature.      
 Curiously, this idea of “public contract” was not discussed in any of the leading theories 
of Contract Law. This may be because it has always been seen as being a private matter that 
regulated private individuals in their private matters, in which the public has no immediate 
interest.           
 Patrick Atiyah, the author of The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (an important 
text on the changes in the concept of freedom of contract), has, however, demonstrated that the 
private contracting has never been wholly accepted as the only form of contracting47. He 
indicated a number of areas which were legislatively and judicially detached from the area of 
private contracts and subjected to legal rules which set out guidelines and standards of 
contracting48. In these areas, the individual’s freedom to enter into agreements on whatever 
terms they wish is taken away from them and the law has established standards which 
individuals must observe if their contracts in those areas are to have legal effect. This 
development, that is the removal of vast areas from private contract, was necessary because it 
is impossible to organize society on the basis of private contracting alone49.  
 Thus, there is an area that is outside of the private sphere of the contract, where the 
public interest is best served by restrictions and regulations on the individual’s private right of 
freedom of contract. However, contracts may affect an extensive and indiscriminate range of 
persons in the society either directly, because people become parties to the contracts, or 
indirectly, because the operation of the contracts could disturb fundamental social and 
economic rules. In this sense, an adhesion contract should be understood as being a public 
contract.            
 The adhesion contract is used, typically within consumer transactions, as it is 
observable, and its trace is easy to find: the superior bargaining position of the supplier; the use 
of pre-drafted standard forms; the absence of real bargain and consent; the non-discrimination 
between different contracting members of the public, are all signs of a consumer deal. 
                                                             
47 Atiyah, The rise and fall of freedom of contract (Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1979) 
48 Ibid. 
49 See Reiter, “The Control of the Contract Power” (1981) 1 Oxford J. Leg. Stud. 347, 348-349 
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 In fact, another important contribution was made by Professor Rakoff50 when he 
described and updated possible attributes of this commercial practice. In his opinion, there were 
seven characteristics that could show us that we would be in the presence of a standard form 
contract: 
1) It is a printed form, containing several clauses;   
2) It is drafted unilaterally by one of the parties to the agreement, normally a business 
entity; 
3) The business engages in many of the same types of transactions on a routine basis; 
4) The business often presents the form to the consumer on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis; 
5) The consumer typically signs the form contract after whatever negotiation occurs; 
6)  The consumer does not engage in many transactions of that type, especially 
compared to the volume of such transactions engaged in by the business; 
7)  The primary (and only) obligation of the consumer is the payment of the price. 
Thus, when comparing Rakoff’s analysis with Lenhoff’s, not many differences are 
visible. This because the core characteristics are essentially the same, only in different 
terminology.            
 The use of standard form contracts shifted the transactional process. Contract law was 
largely developed around the traditional model, which consisted in the bargaining between two 
individuals after a period of dickering over terms. Therefore, all of the terms were broadly 
discussed, negotiated and understood by the contracting parties, which is no longer the case 
today. Due to this fact, the contract as we used to know it (individually negotiated) should not 
be regarded as such nowadays. There is a new type of contract (if we can still call it contract) 
and a new way of contracting.  
 
1.3. The Basis of Standard Form Contracts 
Even though standard form contracts are daily used in most of commercial transactions, 
their “making” is not yet clearly understood. Many contracts law scholars tried to do so, but 
                                                             
50 Supra note 41. 
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none of them, until this day, reached a “general accepted solution”. Arthur Leff, described the 
U.S law regarding consumer form contracts as “a disaster”. He wrote “the consumer-purchase 
transaction is still stumbling about, a diagnosed disease seeking a nostrum”51. According to 
some authors, during the years, contract law has died52 and been resurrected53, reconstructed54 
and transformed55. Doctrinally, contract law is being reshaped over, and over again: doctrines 
of adhesion56, reasonable expectations and unconscionability have become known. The truth 
is, the contract itself adapted to this new economic reality, whether one wants to call it adhesion 
contracts or forms contracts or whatever it may be. The contract law, despite several attempts, 
has not yet reached, concluded or clarified even one of the paths it has been trying to.  
 Standard forms, as was mentioned earlier, started to be used in the insurance field. The 
insurance companies’ support on forms was the declaration of departure from the traditional 
view of a negotiated contract. Otto Prausnitz, author of “The Standardization of Commercial 
Contracts in English and Continental Law”, the book reviewed by Karl Llewellyn (in which 
he first detailed his own view of form contracts), acknowledges this departure: 
No longer do individuals bargain for this or that provision in the contract … the       
control of the wording of those contracts has passed into the hands of the concern, and the 
drafting into the hands of its legal advisor… In trades affected it is henceforth futile for an 
individual to attempt any modification, and incorrect for the economist and lawyer to classify 
or judge such arrangements as standing on an equal footing with individual agreements.57 
There is a current debate, in which some economists and lawyers continue to associate form 
contracts with the negotiated, “individual contracts”58. Others, instead recognize that consumer 
form contracts are expected to create special risks and problems59. In general, these issues have 
                                                             
51 Supra note 15. In 1983, Rakoff continues to refer that “although there is a quite general perception that different law must be applied to 
contracts of adhesion, there is a little agreement on what principles should control. The currently applicable law is characterized by lack of 
intelligible doctrine and a lack of consistent results”, see supra note 41. 
52 Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract (1974). 
53 Colin K. Kaufman, The Resurrection of Contract, 17 Washburn L. J. 38 (1977) 
54 Rakoff, supra note 41 at 1176. 
55 Slawson, supra note 29. 
56 Supra note 6.  
57 Otto Prausnitz, The Standardization of Commercial Contracts in English and Continental Law 11 (1937), at 18 (“It is the freedom of contract 
theory pushed to its extreme, thus reaching its climax and resulting in fetters to one of the parties concerned.”)  
58 See Richard A. Posner, supra note 22; Stephan J. Ware, A Critique of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1461-
1467; Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 
U. PA. L. REV. 630, 652-655 (1979)  
59 The term “consumer form contract” in this context includes more than merely contracts associated with the purchase of consumer goods and 
services. Many, though not all, form contracts create similar problems concerning informed assent. The same covers form contracts in relation 
to agreements between employers and employees as well as between large and small businesses, where the situation indicates to the reasonable 
contract drafter that the other party has not assented to unread or unexpected terms. 
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been associated with problematics such as, the unequal bargaining power, the failure to 
negotiate contract terms, the “take-it-or-leave-it” basis of the transaction and finally, to the fact 
that unavoidably most terms remain unread.       
 One of the points in which the form contracts collide with the objective theory of 
contracts is the presumption of assent. This presumption that, consumers who sign forms 
contracts are aware of, understand, and assent to the unread, unexpected and uncontemplated 
terms is erroneous. Certainly the drafters of these contracts know not only that their forms will 
not be read, but also that it is realistic for consumers to sign them unstudied. Any reasonable 
person should understand that there hasn’t been true assent to these terms. Thus, the evidence 
is that, objectively, the drafter doesn’t even expect the consumer to learn the contract terms. If 
applying the objective theory to consumer form contracts, this would not assume automatically 
that there is an objective agreement to all terms just because they have been printed and a 
document has been signed. Rather, it must be determined how a reasonable drafter should have 
understood the consumer’s agreement.       
 In order to fight this divergences between doctrine and reality, the role of the drafter 
should be clarified. In other words, it should be find an equilibrium between the drafter and the 
consumers’ interest so that they can both achieve “full” contractual freedom.  
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CHAPTER II 
KESSLER, RAKOFF AND SLAWSON’S VIEW ON CONTRACTS OF ADHESION 
PRIVATE OR PUBLIC LAW APPROACH? 
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2.1. Friedrich Kessler  
In the early 40s Kessler changed the view in which contracts were seen by people in 
general. Saleilles was the first one to introduce the classification of “contracts of adhesion” to 
the currently mode of contracting, but after him, many others did. Kessler was one of them, and 
maybe the most remarkable one. 
Kessler argued that contracts, as legally known (one in which freedom of contract is at 
its best) were not the ones that people usually faced in their everyday dealings. The contracts 
of today were fruit of the development of the market. This development transformed contract. 
Contract used to be a fair bargain between two individuals, or instead between an individual 
and a business. The current contracts are used as an instrument of the enterpriser to control, 
rationally, the possible outcomes of his affairs. And controlling affairs, in this sense means, be 
aware of the increasing number of transactions and their possible legal consequences.  
 The problem here is that law cannot follow such rapid transactions, happening in 
everyday life. Such pace is due to the fact that consumers consume just for consuming. 
Refraining from doing it, is, actually, almost impossible, because now is mostly a societal issue. 
Monitoring this transactions, which are infinite and atypical, and also, necessary for the proper 
functioning of the current economy seems a basic premise of justice.  
 Unlike other types of law, making a contract requires that both parties have an 
agreement and understanding of their intentions. This, as Kessler realized, means that “the law 
of contract has to be of their own making”60. This reflects the principle of Freedom of Contract, 
in which individuals contract, freely and according to their will. Inherent to this thought is the 
individualist society that we all are part of, and its associated concept of laissez-faire. 
 Thus, contract is seen as a “private affair” rather than a “social institution”. For this 
reason, it is not the courts’ duty to make contracts for the parties, however, it is a burden of the 
judicial system to interpret such contracts. For the same token, when a person makes a contract, 
it supposedly knows the contract in which is entering, and if so, this means that the person is 
giving an “objective manifestation” of assent. By agreeing is expressing its intention to be 
bound to such contract.  And no such contract, or whatever contract, can prevail if deprived of 
assent.            
 In respect to the behaviour of people when entering contract, one must be aware of the 
fact that, contracts initiate with an offer. This offer, is nothing more than a proposal to buy or 
                                                             
60 Kessler, supra note 6. 
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acquire something, it bounds no one, even because there isn’t any obligation to accept or reject 
such offer. People are free to choose what they want and who they want to contract with. That 
is the reason for the existence of privity-of contract principle.     
 The U.S courts insist to declare this contracts enforceable, due to the still present 
optimistic belief that “a contract is the result of the free bargaining of parties who are brought 
together by the play of the market and who meet each other on a footing of social and 
approximate economic equality, there is no danger that freedom of contract will be a threat to 
the social order as a whole”61. Thus, stating that people “meet … each other on a footing of 
social and approximate economic equality” is only one way to escape the problem, whereas 
there is no equality whatsoever in these contracts. It seems easier to deny the problem, because 
admitting its existence is one step towards change. But when changing implies going against 
more than established principles of contract law judges seem afraid to go with the flow (this 
flow being the unstoppable and undeniable change in contracts).     
 To put it differently, as Kessler argued “courts are hesitant to declare contracts void as 
against public policy because if there is one thing which more than another public policy 
requires is that men (…) shall have the liberty of contracting – and their contracts when entered 
into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by courts of justice”62. 
This would work perfectly some years ago, but when “men” turns into more than an individual, 
and becomes a powerful economic institution is unquestionable that the situation is not what 
used to be.           
 The development of large scale enterprise, accompanied by its mass production and 
mass distribution lead to the new type of contract which we all use today. This contract is a 
standardized one. A standardized contract is one means to join similar and consistent rules in 
an acceptable and proper order, in order to promote efficiency and also functionality of the 
business in which they are used. In the meantime, these contracts became so used that “once 
the contents of a contract have been formulated by a business firm they became used in every 
bargain dealing with the same product or service”63. Therefore, the individuality of the parties 
to contract turned into pattern of contracting. Kessler couldn’t have described it better: “the 
stereotyped contract of today reflects the impersonality of the market”.    
 The fact is that this contracts are very useful, and once this usefulness was discovered, 
it is difficult to go back again. It started in the insurance field but it quickly spread to all other 
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fields of large-scale enterprise. First they were used on a national basis, then they also spread 
to international trade relationships. Labour contracting is also through standard contracts. 
 But why did the standard contracts became such a usual and desirable practice? The 
answer lies in the uniformity of terms. Thus, uniformity of terms is the best way to a business 
enterprise to calculate risks. If an enterprise uses a contract pattern, it can know what to expect 
from such pattern, because the outcomes will be always similar. To demonstrate, let’s take the 
example of insurance companies and their insurance policies. The insurance business were the 
first to realize the full importance of the so-called “judicial risks”, the danger that a court and 
their judges may be deceived by “irrational factors” to decide against the powerful defendant. 
To safeguard their interests, companies started to be very creative in respect to their clauses. 
This safeguard may be related to the yearning to avoid judicial risks. As matter of fact, the use 
of warranties clauses in contracts of adhesion is one of the many reasons for their widespread 
usage. If there is a probability of limiting the remedies to which a buyer has rights, namely 
excluding his right to claim damages, surely the companies will do so, in order to avoid 
unforeseen and undesirable costs. The same situation takes place with arbitration clauses in 
international trade.            
 As can be seen, standard contracts are means of “excluding and controlling the irrational 
factor in litigation”64.         
 Another important issue regarding contracts of adhesion is their capability to reduce 
costs of production and distribution. This reduction will be ultimately returned in low prices 
and therefore, all society will profit.       
 Equally important is the fact that the standard form contracts are normally used by 
enterprises with strong bargaining power. According to Kessler: 
 The weaker party, in need of the goods or services, is frequently not in a position to 
shop around for better terms, either because the author of the standard contract has a monopoly 
(natural or artificial) or because all competitors use the same clauses…his contractual intention 
is but a subjection more or less voluntary to terms dictated by the stronger party, terms whose 
consequences are often understood only in a vague way, if at all. 65   
     
So, this leads us to the conclusion that standardized contracts are often contracts of 
adhesion, they are “à prendre ou à laisser”66.     
 Despite all facts, there still is another one to refer, which is the power of this type of 
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contracts to “build up and strengthen business empires”. Actually, this contracts were also used 
with the end of controling and regulating the distribution of goods from producer all the way 
down to the ultimate consumer.        
 Nevertheless, the economic power of such contracts is “not yet sufficient” for them to 
be properly regulated. There is a very simple reason for this fact: fear of change. If one were to 
admit the truth about these contracts, which is that they do not fall in the scope of “normal” 
contracts, many rules and practices would have to change. The structure of such contracts is 
increasingly departing from the traditional view on contracts.    
 It is preferable to keep beneath the surface this weakness of the law system, rather than 
improving and amending it. The solution found was protecting the weaker party of the contract, 
the consumer, and still keep “the elementary rules” of the law of contracts untouched. But since 
this contract problem is different from the “normal” contract problems, this turned into 
“contradictory and confusing” law regarding standardized contracts. Thus, the law potentialities 
regarding contracts of adhesion have not yet been fully explored.    
 A key point of this analysis could be the law in insurance contracts. The courts have the 
hindrance of only interpreting rather than making contracts for the parties, for this fact they had 
to count on this advantage of interpreting contracts to protect the policy holder. But, while 
protecting the policy holder against the roughness of the doctrine, they did not point out plainly 
that as a matter of public policy an insurance company cannot escape liability just for the fact 
that it previously focused on an possible expectable event which they labelled as “warranty”. 
They felt that if they did so, that would hinder the Freedom of Contract. The insurance 
companies when confronted with the possibility of cutting down their “unfair” warranties, 
started to create new ones.         
 This regular creation of warranties in order to circumvent the unconscionable ones 
turned into uncertainty. The legislature had to step in and so it did. It placed warranties and 
representations side by side.         
 Not to mention the situation where there is a “loss without insurance”. Who should bear 
the risks of such loss? The insurance company or the applicant? There isn’t a consensus among 
judges, who are not experienced enough with this situation. This loss is caused by “an 
unreasonable delay on the part of the insurance company in issuing a policy of insurance for 
which application has been made”67. Courts dismissed the possibility of recovery of contract. 
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The problem is in deciding contrary to a well-established principle of law of contracts contained 
in the field of which insurance lies. This principle states that: 
 An application for insurance is a bare offer and therefore imposes no liability upon the 
insurance company until it is accepted…nor does it afford a basis for any liability by reason of 
delay in accepting it or the want of care in dealing with it.68    
      
Thus, the argument was fortified by the fact that a future promise of action couldn’t be 
supported by consideration, “no legal benefit moved from the applicant to it by reason of the 
offer, and any detriment which the applicant suffers is not one which was contemplated by the 
terms of the offer or its acceptance”. This is a correct line of thought, for the simple fact that 
the applicant is not bound to accept it and therefore can search for another insurance 
alternatives, furthermore it is also free to withdraw his offer before the acceptance. 
 The plea that “recovery of contract would be contrary to the well-established principles 
of contract law” has encouraged the whole body of legal literature69. For this reason, the most 
part of applications currently have a provision which states that a company cannot be held liable 
under the application until it is approved by its home office and that a formal policy must be 
issued and delivered. In addition, generally people are informed, assuming that an implied 
promise will result in an immediate action is ignoring the reality. As Funk70 stated:  
If a court should hold that a contract to decide expeditiously on the proposal did exist, 
it is believed that, within a short time, all insurance companies doing business in that 
jurisdiction would incorporate in their applications stipulations expressly negativing such 
promise.   
The curious fact is that though courts agree with this doctrine, most of them still allow 
recovery, but in a discreet way. The recovery ex contractu is seen as impossible, but they still 
permit recovery ex delictu. According to these decisions, the failure of an insurance company 
to take an immediate action sums to the breach of general duty towards the public to act without 
unjustified delay on applications for acceptable risks. The courts know that an insurance 
contract cannot be treated in the same manner as the other contracts. The insurance business 
has an important role in society, because it insures people from possible future damages. It is 
expectable that the State, which gave the franchise for such business, has the power to regulate 
and supervise it.          
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 Insurance lies in the idea of securing people, and everyone has, at least, one insurance, 
if not many more. For the fact that insurance contracts are part of everyone’s life, it is in the 
public interest that application for acceptable risks shall not be unduly delayed.  
 As stated in Swentusky v. Prudential Ins. Co.,: 
 Public interest more requires that stability of the insurance business which is necessary 
to guard the great body of persons who enter into relations with it for their own protection and 
that of those dependent upon them, than it does that certain individuals should be saved the loss 
which may result by adherence to established legal principles.71    
      
But this event doesn’t occur only in the field of insurance. Other chartered corporations 
have similar relations with the public, such as banks, utility companies, and so many others.
 The courts’ systematic confrontation with insurance cases brought an issue into the light. 
This issue is, as Kessler realized, “can the unity of law of contracts be maintained in the face 
of the increasing use of contracts of adhesion?”72. On the one hand, the courts, both the ones 
that allow recovery in contract as well the ones that allow recovery in tort, have evidently 
realized that insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion. For this reason, they try to protect 
the weaker party against the strictness of common law and against what they consider as abuses 
of freedom of contract. On the other hand, the courts which deny recovery stick to the 
conviction that an application for insurance is exactly the same as other offer, and are sure that 
to build up by trial and error a dual system of contract law will lead to impairment of the security 
function of all law, since courts are poorly prepared to decide whether and to what extent an 
insurance contract has compulsory features.      
 Equally problematic is the task of creating a multiple system of contract law. Not only 
for the fact that “courts are not commissions”, which are capable of exploring all the branches 
of the problem which come to the dispute, but also because it is very difficult to perceive 
whether and to what extent a contract is a contract of adhesion.    
 Even so, there were no signs of inability of the insurance business to adapt itself to the 
new law made by the courts’ decisions permitting recovery. It is understandable to do so, for 
the fact that “deviations from the standard practice in handling applications which result in loss 
without insurance, are the exception”73.        
 When one takes a look at the cases allowing recovery, it will understand that the 
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reasoning behind them is very creative and useful. The courts, when faced with a standardized 
contract have the task of ascertaining what were the legitimate expectations of the weaker 
contracting party when dealing with a stronger party, and to what degree this party appointed 
reasonable expectations based on an ordinary daily event.      
 Of course it is a novelty to the courts to redraft the contents of a contract of adhesion 
even because it is one of their functions. The judge-made law concerning to constructive 
conditions proves the quite the contrary. It rejects the contention that a contract implied in fact 
is not different from an express contract, unless the intention of the party is “circumstantially 
proved”74.            
 In Kessler’s view, adapting the common law of contracts to every individual contract of 
adhesion is only conceivable if courts become “fully aware of their emotional attitude” in which 
concerns to Freedom of Contract.        
 Indeed, Freedom of Contract is the greater barrier to progress, for being a very important 
topic that the judges tend to avoid. Instead, they rationalize it. For them it is preferable not to 
sacrifice the legal certainty and the “sound principles” of contract law against the principles of 
justice and social desirability. One must admit that the feeling of justice and the case law are 
not synonyms.           
 The freedom of contract purpose is, thus to give enough space to the parties to adapt the 
law of contracts to their own interests. So must the common law do regarding to its elasticity, 
with rule and counterule always in competition. Insomuch as it is possible for the courts to 
follow the dictates of “social desirability”.       
 It is a normal exercise of common law to turn ideals into practice. And in doing so, the 
ideal of certainty must always be balanced against the social calling for change. However, one 
must bear in mind the possibility of legal certainty being sacrificed for progress.  
 For instance, discussing the problems presented by contracts of adhesion is a waste of 
time for judges, since they will always look at it through the spectrum of the “established legal 
principles”. Also, they will always stress out the fact that recovery is “contrary to the well 
settled principles of contract law”. What the judges actually want us to think is that the rules 
regarding formation of contracts are a locked and harmonious structure. 
A testament to the ever-evolving process of contract law was the Doctrine of 
Consideration. This doctrine, full of contradictions and inconsistencies, reacted to the Freedom 
of Contract, and showed that it can be used to protect a creditor against the risk of economic 
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duress oh his debtor (Foakes v. Beer). As matter of fact, the doctrine of consideration has 
defended “opposed social policies”.        
 “Even the mere risk of reliance has been regarded sufficient consideration” said Kessler, 
thus this doctrine gives way to compensate the argument that the applicant of an insurance 
policy could have withdrawn his application and applied for insurance in a another place. 
 It’s true that the acceptance of an application is not made by way of silence, for an 
irrational extent of time, because the standard clause in the application normally advises the 
applicant that the company will not be held liable until the application has been approved and 
formal policy sent and delivered.        
 This clause tries to state two things, one that the application will not be accepted through 
silence; two, that there is not any implied collateral promise to take prompt action for an 
acceptable risk. As Kessler said: “more serious is the argument that an assumption of an implied 
promise to act promptly is unrealistic because insurance companies, once subjected to such an 
implied promise, would immediately negative it by express stipulation in the policy”75. The 
critical issue here doesn’t lie in whether this companies would insert such a clause, but if they 
could do so without any problem.        
 Despite all efforts, the technical doctrines made until this day did not offer any solution 
to the courts. All the technical doctrines that were used in insurance cases denying liability were 
nothing more than mere rationalizations of “the courts emotional desire to preserve freedom of 
contract”. As an illustration, one must look  at the cases holding the insurance company liable 
in tort. Even in these cases, the judges “pay tribute to the dogma”, otherwise it wouldn’t be 
necessary to demonstrate that the plaintiff is not seeking recovery in contract.   
 Freedom of contract dogma is notably the “hero or villain” in the tragedy of the 
insurance cases, but it is kept aside, leaving the discussion to consideration or others. 
 Yet, the tort cases are an indirect test to the claims of the Freedom of Contract Dogma, 
because as Kessler argued “they keep alive the question whether or not the “received ideas” on 
freedom of contract [which form the background of the insurance cases] represent a cultural 
lag”76.            
 After all things considered, what Kessler concludes is that Freedom of Contract has 
intrinsic to it the idea of individualism. Maybe for the fact that it was conceived in an age where 
the normal course of deal was made by “small enterprisers, individual merchants and 
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independent craftsman”77.         
 Back then, the society had the belief that “individual and cooperative action left 
unrestrained in family, church and market would not lessen the freedom and dignity of man but 
would secure the highest possible social justice”78. In other words, the society strongly believed 
that there was a natural law, whereby the individual pursuing is own interests was also pursuing 
the community welfare.           
 The reason for the moral justification of the freedom of contract is to maintain the 
“prestabilized harmony” of the society’s structure which lies in the idea of free enterprise and 
perfect competition. Thus, the private autonomy of the contracting parties will work perfectly 
and its outcome will ultimately benefit the whole society.     
 The decadence of the “free enterprise system” had as its main reason the shift from 
competitive capitalism to monopoly. And, as a consequence, the “meaning of contract” 
suffered some mutations.         
 One must be aware that Freedom of Contract is not applied equally to all people and in 
the same extent. What happens is quite the contrary. The protection of the uneven distribution 
of property is an example that the law nothing did to prevent the freedom of contract of being 
a “one-sided privilege”. The Freedom of contract was just a way found by the society to ensure 
that no one will interfere with the contracting power of each other.   
 The most important effect of the Freedom of Contract noticed by Kessler was that it 
“enables enterprisers to legislate in a substantially authoritarian manner without using the 
appearance of authoritarian forms”79. In other words, standard contracts have become an 
efficient mechanism used by powerful commercial and industrial entities to impose a “new 
feudal order of their own making upon a vast host of vassals”80.    
 It was due to Freedom of Contract, which is one of the most well-founded maxims of 
our cultural philosophy, that the return back from contract to status was possible. 
 Conventionally, contract is only classified as group of “operative facts”, with its 
adjacent consequences. But the natural law philosophers were of different opinion. In their 
view, freedom of contract was like giving a piece of sovereignty to each member of society. 
This would allow them to be part of the law making process.    
 If so, then that means that the State is not the only one holding the law making power.
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 The parties, when consenting to a contract are also creating law. The power is divided 
between the state and the citizens. Believing that capitalism would replace the previous social 
structure, feudalism, just because “contract and not status had become chief means of social 
integration”81, is not, decidedly, the answer. Nor is the natural law philosophers’ theory, which 
claims that “the progress in any society towards freedom is to be measured by the extent to 
which all political relations can be reduced to contract, “the perfect form of obligation””82.
 In the good days of the free enterprise capitalism believing that making a contract was 
making law was the adage. It did not harm democracy in doing so. Actually it was its 
reaffirmation. The courts, as community representatives remain silent, in order to maintain their 
neutrality on behalf of Freedom of Contract. For the natural law theory to be meaningful to us, 
the pluralistic society as we know it, pressured by powerful groups, would have to deteriorate. 
On the other side, the dominant doctrine, by stating that contract is only a “set of operative 
facts”, is preserving “the illusion that “the law” will protect the public against any abuse of 
freedom of contract”83.         
 Until we do not recognize that Freedom of Contract has different meanings depending 
on the type of contract in which is inserted, change will not arise. Kessler couldn’t have phrased 
it better: “…its meaning must change with the social importance of the type of contract and 
with the degree of monopoly enjoyed by the author of the standardized contract”. 
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2.2. Todd Rakoff  
Since the first moment that Friedrich Kessler named form contracts as “contracts of 
adhesion”, a scholarly cloud has involved them.      
 Another very important commentator of this subject was Todd Rakoff. He realized the 
conflict between theory and practice. He is of the opinion that the form terms contained in this 
contracts of adhesion should be “presumptively unenforceable”. In addition, Rakoff states that 
the legal system treats differently contracts of adhesion from “ordinary contracts”84. These 
differences are noticeable in many ways, like for example, separate black-letter rules in the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts or the declaration by some judges that these contracts are 
“special”. Even judges started to see them from another standpoint. Expressions like “unequal 
bargaining power” triggered the application of a separate body of law, while facts showing 
“equal bargaining power” were treated by the “ordinary” body of contract law.   
 It is easily perceivable that these contracts call for a different law, but the problem lies 
in what principles should control these. The law which is currently applied to them is intelligible 
and lacks consistency.         
 It may be Rakoff says “that contracts of adhesion can be understood only as a collection 
of disparate deviations from the paradigm of “ordinary” contract law”85, but in the end he 
realized that maybe the problem is more a structural one. Structural in the way that these 
contracts only have arisen because of the “organization and practices of the large, hierarchical 
firms that set the tone of modern commerce"86. Thus, is due to contracts of adhesion that the 
relation between such businesses and their customers is much easier than it could be, since 
contracts of adhesion turn into functional and efficient transactions.   
 Obviously, such contracts do not fall into the so-called “ordinary” contract law, but 
neither are they seen as an aggregate of exceptions to that law. There is the invitation to develop 
a “unified model” but also the invitation to develop the already existing applicable law. 
 Another important point in Rakoff’s analysis is the fact that this contracts of adhesion 
(seen as negotiated contracts) are prima facie enforceable as written, what shouldn’t happen 
since they are not at the same step as the “ordinary” contracts. Rakoff’s view is that “quite 
                                                             
84 This term “ordinary contracts” is very used by this author to refer to all types of contracts that do not fill the characteristics of contracts of 
adhesion. 
85 Supra note 41 at 1175. 
86 Ibid. at 1176. 
 47 
 
contrary to “ordinary” contract law, the form terms present in contracts of adhesion ought to 
be considered presumptively (although not absolutely) unenforceable”87.  
        
2.2.1. Problem outlines 
 
A. Model status 
The expression “contract of adhesion” has currently many meanings and therefore needs 
a better definition and clarification.        
 The use of standard form documents is not sufficient itself to define it. Neither is the 
presentation of demands on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. In fact, the problem lies in the 
combination of these two factors.        
 Accordingly to Rakoff, there are seven characteristics that show that we’re facing a 
“contract of adhesion”: 
1) The document whose legal validity is at issue is a printed form that contains 
many terms and clearly purports to be a contract; 
2) The form has been drafted by, or on behalf of, one party to the transaction; 
3) The drafting party participates in numerous transactions of the type represented 
by the form and enters into these transactions as a matter of routine; 
4) The form is presented to the adhering party with the representation that, except 
perhaps for a few identified items (such as the price term), the drafting party will 
enter into the transaction only on the terms contained in the document. This 
representation may be explicit or may be implicit in the situation, but it is 
understood by the adherent; 
5) After the parties have dickered over whatever terms are open to bargaining, the 
document is signed by the adherent; 
6) The adhering party enters into few transactions of the type represented by the 
form – a few, at least, in comparison with the drafting party; 
7) The principal obligation of the adhering party in the transaction considered as a 
whole is the payment of money.88 
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This model ignores some problems, like for example, the problems that might arise from 
documents that do not clearly demonstrate to be contractual, such as some “warranties”, 
eliminated by stipulation. Many examples of commercial practices of the use of form 
documents also don’t fall inside the model. This model also excludes the issue of the “battle of 
forms”89 and also the issue of “industry-wide master forms”, which are viewed as equivalent 
exchange rules90.         
 Rakoff set aside from the model, intentionally, the structure of the market in which the 
contract has been made. This due to previous academic opinions that linked the use of contracts 
of adhesion to the exercise of monopoly power. However, as Rakoff realized, this is not true. 
Even small firms in competitive markets choose to use their own standard form contracts in 
their daily business, especially retail stores that extend credit or make time sales. 
 Hence, even if it is though that in a contract of adhesion most terms are not negotiable, 
in a competitive market the adherent must have the right to shop around for better terms, or at 
least, different terms.         
 Furthermore, there is another feature which is generally connected with the “concept” 
of contracts of adhesion. It refers to the fact that, normally, the adhering party does not read the 
standard terms before signing the document and even if it were to read them, probably wouldn’t 
understand them. As well do the drafting party know this adherents’ behaviour. One evidence 
of that is how businesses present their form contracts to the customers. Although this is a point 
to be made when discussing contracts of adhesion, Rakoff left it out the definition. In his 
opinion, this is only a consequence of the use of contracts of adhesion by our society. They are 
points that questioned the enforceability of form clauses. Additionally, Rakoff assumes that 
because contract law is rationalized on the “voluntary assumption of obligation” it cannot be 
applied in an instinctive and direct manner to contracts of adhesion.   
  
B. Scopes of choice 
To presume that form terms are enforceable just to avoid the fact that there is the need 
to construct a new framework for contracts of adhesion seems fearful. Although it would be 
hard to govern a countless number of transactions, it will not be impossible. There is the 
supposition that ordinary contract law “must form the framework for considering contracts of 
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adhesion ultimately seems to derive from the proposition that all the terms of a transaction must 
be developed in the same way”91. In other words, after despising a whole system of legal control 
to all terms, and after the parties provide any term, being it whatsoever, then “of necessity” 
every term provided so must be given the same consideration. The law, in this case has two 
options: or it follows the agreement of the parties; or it substitutes its own rules. It isn’t allowed 
to do both.          
 Although it would be better to pursue the drafting party’s conduct regarding contracts 
of adhesion, it is obvious that the legal system mustn’t do the same path. The argument from 
“necessity” totally misreads the so-called “shape” of contract law. Evidently, courts do not 
create a list of duties from the beginning to the end and call it “contract”, but actually they do 
not obligate the parties to provide many terms. When someone wants to be bound, they do make 
enforceable agreements which stipulate no more than core business terms, like price and 
quantity. Is only when courts/judges become aware of the omission of this type of terms that 
they inform that “courts do not make contracts for the parties”92.    
 The remaining obligations that may arise from a simple agreement will be thus specified 
and defined by a court. Some of these terms are more seen as tort obligations, some as incidents 
of special relationships, and some as a matter of procedure. In contrast, others as “constructive 
conditions of performance or frustration, or the specification of available remedies” are seen as 
instantly part of the law of contracts. The heart of the matter is that both these, however they 
are branded, have their implied terms standardized. They are not fruit of the parties’ specific 
intention, but rather from a series of background rules.     
 The issue of standardization of implied terms is most noticeable in regulatory statutes 
that offer terms, or full contracts, automatically applicable when there isn’t any specification 
by the parties. An illustration of that is the Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which 
though not professedly regulatory, is in fact a directory of the implied terms of sale’s contracts. 
Even terms, caught by case law became standardized.    
 Courts prefer to treat “judicially provided conditions of performance” as general rules 
from trade usage, custom, and policy instead of treating them as part of the individual part 
intent.            
 Evidently, parties are not obliged to enter in such standardized transactions at all, but as 
Kessler argues “beyond that freedom, the parties’ contractual power is now exercised primarily 
                                                             
91 Ibid. at 1180. 
92 Ibid. at 1181. 
50 
 
in specifying deviation from the standardized plan rather than in defining the obligation ab 
inicio”93. This reality begs the question of whether there is the necessity of declaring contracts 
of adhesion enforceable. The form terms normally provide alternatives to terms that the legal 
system will propose to lay emphasis on simply stated bargains. As matter of fact, most of the 
terms are used with the aim to relocate clear rules of law that would govern the transaction in 
another way. The most compelling evidence of these are clauses limiting the time in which a 
suit can be brought up or, due-on-sale clauses in mortgages.    
 There is an additional group of form terms that try to specify the rules of law whose 
application to certain situations is indeterminate. Examples of these are clauses which set time 
limits on issues that the law would require a “reasonable period of time”, not to ment ion the 
endless clauses and forms of force majeure, that try to circumvent the framework of a “flexible 
legal test of impossibility or frustration”. There are even clauses that try to circumvent an entire 
body of substantive and procedural law, such as choice-of-law clauses and arbitration 
agreements.            
 The clauses which are normally known for raising complications (limitations of 
warranties, of consequential damages, of liabilities for negligence, and of times for inspecting 
goods or filling proofs of loss) are included in one or another of the previous clauses. 
 When a contract fails to define some clauses, like for example the allocation of risks of 
negligence, no one assumes that this contract is lethally unspecified. For this, there isn’t any 
reason to believe that these terms should be regarded as enforceable, or even valid just for the 
fact they are included in a contract of adhesion.   
C. The traditional dogma 
If one wants to understand the current doctrine regarding contracts of adhesion, it must 
first take into account the reason why the traditional doctrine had more respect for the drafter’s 
terms.             
 The traditional approach may be illustrated by the Lewis v. Great Western Railway, 
which was decided by the Court of Exchequer in 1860. It turned out to be a very important case 
regarding this. The case refers to an action brought to recover damages for the loss of a parcel. 
The judge sustained the company’s plea that the plaintiff’s claim was blocked because it was 
not made within the brief period of time specified on a document that the plaintiff has signed. 
Lewis had earlier testified that he had listed the consigned items on a form supplied by the 
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railroad. He said that he didn’t read the paper, and that a person told him to sign the form. Lewis 
argued that this person didn’t even call his attention to the conditions or to read them. The 
Barons solidly support for the company (despite the argument of the Counsel that “if the 
plaintiff did not, in fact, consent to enter such a contract, he was not bound”).   
 The Baron Bramwell’s speech symbolizes the attitude of the court: 
It would be absurd to say that this document, which is partly in writing and partly in 
print, and which was filled up, signed, and made sensible by the plaintiff, was not 
binding upon him. A person who signs a paper like this must know that he signs it for 
some purpose, and when he gives it to the Company must understand that it is to regulate 
the rights which it explains. I do not say that there may not be cases where a person may 
sign a paper, and yet be at liberty to say, “ I did not mean to be bound by this,” as if the 
party signing were blind, and he was not informed of its contents. But where the party 
does not pretend that he was deceived, he should never be allowed to set up such a 
defence.94   
This view was adopted and repeatedly used during the latter part of the nineteenth 
century and especially in the first half of the twentieth. It was understood as part of the general 
law of contracts and applied it to signed form contracts.    
 Williston exposed this approach on his treatise, which was published in 1920, and that 
was part of the section 70 of the first Restatement of Contracts, published in 1932. It can be 
said to be the “traditional response to the problem of contracts of adhesion”. 
 Rakoff lists four propositions in which the traditional doctrine is built on: 
1) The adherent’s signature on a document clearly contractual in nature, which he 
had an opportunity to read, will be taken to signify his assent and thus will 
provide the basis for enforcing the contract; 
2) It is legally irrelevant whether the adherent actually read the contents of the 
document, or understood them, or subjectively assented to them; 
3) The adherent’s assent covers all the terms of the document, and not just the 
custom-tailored ones or the ones that have been discussed; 
4) Exceptions to the foregoing principles are narrow. In particular, failure of the 
drafting party to point out or explain the form terms does not constitute an 
excuse. Indeed, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, the adherent can 
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52 
 
establish an excuse only by showing affirmative participation by the drafting 
party in causing misunderstanding95. 
This propositions were visibly formulated through some version of the objective theory 
of contracts, and indicates that to be held to the terms of a contract, it is not compulsory to have 
intended to agree with them. One of the flaws of this theory is concerning to this “agreement”. 
As Rakoff said  “agreement requires communication; communication takes place through a 
socially determined medium; if there is to be any workable contract law at all it must be possible 
to base liability not solely on actual agreement, but at least sometimes on the “reasonable”, 
which is to say the socially specified, meaning of communicative acts96”.   
 The issue lies in the formulation of the basis of the obligation (for example, the classic 
case when a contract consists of terms which were agreed upon, in long-distance negotiations, 
signed and delivered to the other party), which may be made in two ways:  
A) To the party which received the document is expected to assume reasonably that the 
contract was signed with the intention to agree to its terms; the law, then, should protect this 
“reasonable reliance”; 
B) Instead, it can be understood that a signed document is legally binding, except if a 
“particular ground of excuse” appears.  
What, then, is the difference between these two statements? The degree of formality. 
Rakoff contends that if contract law is grounded in the “voluntary assumption of obligation”, 
then the second statement must be seen as a “formalization of the first”. He then adds that the 
“objective meaning of a communicative act” is to be set by the presence of a form and of its 
signature, with no need to ask to the other party if it did assented even.   
 But when this is applied to contracts of adhesion, the picture changes. The first 
substantive version of the objective theory simply will not be taught as enforceable, much less 
comprehensive. In that case, the drafting party can understand the adherent’s signature  as a 
sign of assent to the bargained terms and to the other remaining terms clearly known by the 
adherent (such as price), however the drafting party is aware that is very unlikely that the 
adherent have read and understand the form terms.      
 In Rakoff’s view, to sustain the presumption of enforceability of form terms, one should 
assume that a party is entitled to trust on a signature as a proof of assent, even if the reliance is 
                                                             
95 Ibid. at 1185 
96 Ibid. at 1186. See also J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials in Common Law, pp. 2415. 
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not reasonable in some situations. In other words, the traditional treatment demands that the 
form contract adherents’ are to be treated like they have read and understood the document 
presented to them, notwithstanding that this is not true and that the other party is aware of this 
latter fact. This may be understood as the “duty to read” (before signing the contract). This duty 
can be seen as “a refusal to impose any duty on the drafting party to ascertain whether form 
terms are known and understood”97.        
 The same formal view is taken regarding the traditional rule that “the signed form 
document represents the entire agreement of the parties regarding matters within its scope”. 
Here comes the Parol Evidence Rule. If this rule is applied in accordance with its Willistonian 
formulation it will take the possibility of proving that the actual parties agreement was not in 
conformity with the form document due to including more, fewer, or different terms. The same 
will happen in the case when a party believing in its form enforcement had no reason to suppose 
that the other party actually agreed in handling the document as if it were the exclusive 
statement of the agreement.         
 Concerning the degree of formality of the rules of law, Rakoff states that they are 
normally “underinclusive, over inclusive, or both”98. This “imperfect fit” is acceptable in order 
to make the law administrable and to implement our concept of equality before the law. If some 
group of rules is overinclusive, that fact is not enough to consider that this group should be 
changed. There’s always the problem of applying substantive injustice in analysing if a certain 
rule should be recalled or not.        
 If one assumes that all or most signed documents were fully consented to and 
understood, and if, in one particular occasion a document was adhesive, maybe the better option 
would be to apply a rule, that when signing a document, would result in being bound by it. This 
was what happened in the Lewis v. Great Western Railway case. This is when one realizes the 
importance of time and social conditions in determining the meaning of rituals and forms. If we 
look to the current contracts, the most part of them is adhesive.    
 Hence, Rakoff realized that the environment in which decisions are made changes the 
“verdict” of these, and that applying “old” doctrines to new realities is definitely not the 
answer:“Rigorous application of the traditional doctrines to contracts of adhesion generates 
                                                             
97  Ibid. at 1187. 
98 Ibid. at 1188. For further discussion see Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication”, 89 Harv. L. Rev., pp. 1685,1689. 
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in modern circumstances so many unjust results that it can no longer be justified as the tolerable 
cost of applying a general system of rules”99. 
 Still, change is difficult to achieve. The traditional view has the solution to the problem 
of contracts of adhesion, yet, using language and rules that respect to negotiated contracts will 
not solve any problem at all.        
 Rakoff calls for a new set of rules regarding contracts of adhesion: “To depart from the 
initial presumption that a signed document is enforceable, one must abandon the appearance 
of theoretical unity and devise a whole set of new and unfamiliar rules for contracts of 
adhesion”100.           
 If we keep assuming that contracts of adhesion are prima facie enforceable, then 
unwanted results will keep appearing.   
D. The Modern Doctrine 
I. Different results from same structure 
The modern courts and scholars understood this new reality. Though the current doctrine 
produces different results from the ones from older cases, it remains knotted to the traditional 
formulation that once a document is signed it implies a binding contract, and if one wants to 
support the nonenforcement of its terms it must do it with a plausible cause.  The 
Section 211 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, entitled “Standardized Agreements”, 
expresses very well the commitment of the modern doctrine: 
1) Except as stated in Subsection (3), where a party to an agreement signs or otherwise 
manifests assent to a writing…, he adopts the writing as an integrated agreement with 
respect to the terms included in the writing. 
2) Such writing is interpreted wherever reasonable as treating alike all those similarly 
situated, without regard to their knowledge or understanding of the standard terms of 
the writing. 
3) Where the other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting such assent would 
not do so if he knew that the writing contained a particular term, the term is not part of 
the agreement101. 
                                                             
99 Ibid. at 1189. See, e.g, Tobriner & Grodin, The individual and the Public Service Enterprise in the New Industrial State, 55 Cali f. L. Rev., 
pp 1247, 1252 (1967) 
100 Supra note 41 at 1190. 
101 Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1979) 
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In the first two subsections, the traditional doctrine is implicit for the fact that it refers that 
“signing automatically connotes assent”, that “the adherent has the duty to read” and that the 
parol evidence rule is applied to form contracts. In contrast, subsection (3) indicates an 
exception to the general rule that is considerably broader than the traditional excuses for issues 
such as fraud or induced mistake102. This development is evident in the explanatory comment, 
which declares that: “reason to believe that the adherent would not knowingly have signed may 
be inferred from the fact that the term is bizarre or oppressive, from the fact that it eviscerates 
the nonstandard terms explicitly agreed to, or from the fact that it eliminates the dominant 
purpose of the transaction”103.        
 The same pattern is followed by the case law. It assumes, too, that contracts of adhesion 
are enforceable.          
 The California Supreme Court is one of its followers, as it declared that “a contract of 
adhesion is fully enforceable according to its terms…unless certain other factors are present, 
which under established legal rules – legislative or judicial – operate to render it otherwise”104. 
This means that exceptions are not included in the doctrines of fraud, duress, and mistake. The 
traditional analysis is being exceeded by more liberal results, though these are only evident 
when observing the courts’ assumptions. For instance, the Williams-Thomas Furniture Co. is 
considered one of the cases stating the end of the traditional solution, even though the 
interpretation of such case wasn’t go far enough. This case was a key point in adapting the 
doctrine of unconscionability by means of providing a way of alleviating the adherents. Still, 
its origins were found in the traditional approach. As Judge Wright established the law in the 
following way: 
Ordinarily, one who signs an agreement without full knowledge of its terms might be 
held to assume the risk that he has entered a one-sided bargain. But when a party of little 
bargaining power, and hence a little real choice, signs a commercially unreasonable contract 
with a little or no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely that his consent, was ever given to 
all the terms. In such a case the usual rule that the terms of the agreement are not to be 
questioned should be abandoned and the court should consider whether the terms of the contract 
are so unfair that enforcement should be withheld. 105     
       
                                                             
102 Supra note 41 at 1191. See Dawson, Unconscionable Coercion: The German Version, 89 Harv. L. Rev., pp 1041, 1120 – 1121 (1976) 
103 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211 comment f (1979) 
104 Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 807, pp. 819-20, 623 P.2d 165, 172, 171 Cal. Rptr. 604, 611 (1981). Despite Graham did not involve 
a contract of adhesion, several cases referred to it. 
105 Walker-Thomas, 350 F. 2ed pp. 449-50 
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 The first step in the courts’ analysis was to conclude that the adherent’s signature is not 
a manifestation of assent neither in the eyes of the adherent nor in the eyes of the drafting party. 
Rakoff phrased it perfectly: “the signed document still has force; its terms still cannot be thrown 
over unless they are “so unfair that enforcement should be withheld”106. Or as Judge Wright 
stated, except this terms are unjustly advantageous to the other party. It seems that many terms 
may be unfair, but not so “unfair that enforcement should be withheld”, or that maybe are 
advantageous for the drafting party, but not “unreasonably” so. But, for the simple fact that the 
document was signed they are enforceable. The grounds for excuse have been extended, but the 
enforceability is still presumed.        
 This is not confined to situations where the doctrine of unconscionability is brought up, 
since the terms’ nature appears to presume enforceability of the document in question. 
 Similar are cases that regard whether matters of “public interest” are concerned, or 
whether one of the parties of the transaction had “superior bargaining power”107, which are the 
two most relieving doctrines bearing form contracts.     
 In the past decades, courts when assessing contracts of adhesion usually applied 
categories of “public interest” and “superior bargaining power” to a wider group of events that 
would fit analogously to doctrines of ordinary contract law respecting businesses “affected with 
public interest” and transactions rotten by “economic duress”. An illustration of such expansion 
is shown after comparing two cases settling the “validity of clauses in form residential leases 
that attempt to exculpate the landlord from his duty of ordinary care. The referred cases are 
O’Callaghan v. Walker & Beckwith Realty Co were decided in the late 50’s and held such 
clauses valid. On the contrary, in Henrioulle v. Marin Ventures, Inc., the clauses were held 
invalid.           
 In one hand, in the Callaghan case, the judge refused to find an admitted shortage of 
housing legally relevant: “the relationship of the landlord and the tenant does not have the 
monopolistic characteristics that have characterized some other relationships with respect to 
which exculpatory clauses have been held invalid. There are literally thousands of landlords 
who are in competition with one another…”108      
 In the other hand, in the Henrioulle case, the judge found a “public interest” involved, 
largely due to the presence of “unequal bargaining strength”: “In a state and local market 
characterized by a severe shortage of low-cost housing, tenants are likely to be in a poor 
                                                             
106 Supra note 41 at 1192. 
107 See e.g., Henrioulle v. Marin Ventures, Inc., 20 Cal. 3d pp. 512, 519, 573 P. 2d 465, 469, 143 Cal Rprt. 247, 251 (1978) 
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position to bargain with landlords.”109. So, the former refers to “superior bargaining power” 
applicable law, while the latter, more modern, refers to “economic duress” on facts that 
certainly would not settle such exception if in case of a fully negotiated transaction. 
 The problem of using doctrines of “public interest” and “superior bargaining power” or 
even “unconscionability” is that all of them have within themselves the structure from general 
law from which they come. They are treated as matters of exception or excuse.  
 It is not easy for an adherent to demonstrate that he signed a form contract, which was 
presented to him on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and that such form (its terms in question) diverted 
from the background rule that the law would imply. What the courts actually tend to do is to 
declare the enforceability of the form terms in question, rather than determine accurately if there 
are matters of public interest or disparate bargaining power involved. Thus, courts prefer to 
presume enforceability of form contracts just to avoid bigger problems.   
 As Rakoff concluded: “the present judicial doctrines, although they often provide 
different results, still ask why an adherent should be allowed to avoid a term of this contract, 
rather than why the law, as usually enunciated, can fairly described as a softened or decayed 
form of the traditional solution”110. 
II. Will the structure survive? 
This problem has reached such extension that the expansion of exceptions and excuses 
became a synonym of “renunciation” of the existing rules.     
 Some courts already admit that the present law concerning contracts of adhesion should 
demand more than a signature to make even the presumption of enforcement of form terms. But 
are these cases the norm or the exception? Do they reflect the controlling sense of justice that 
other courts, without exacerbate conservatism, do not over the counter admit? It is not clearly 
evident.           
 Yet, there is the suspicion through judicial intuition that the presumption of 
enforceability is not vigorous. The more recent cases, in which form terms were substituted, 
show the courts’ preference towards the adhering party, more than doctrinal statements reveal. 
And the courts rational sometimes follows the same reasoning. As Rakoff argued: “the 
circumstances accepted as sufficient foundation for the application of what is, in form, an 
exception are sometimes so commonplace that the exception could easily swallow the rule”111. 
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The Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello is a good example of a case which presents a matter of “public 
interest”. This case respected a form clause giving Shell the right to terminate a dealer’s 
franchise on short notice and without “cause”, the court held the clause invalid as matter of 
“public interest”. The court stated the following:  
That the public is affected in a direct way is beyond question. We live in a motor vehicle 
age. Supply and distribution of motor vehicle fuels are vital to our economy. In fact the 
Legislature has specifically concluded that the distribution and sale of motor vehicle 
fuels within this State is affected with public interest.112 
 Lastly, the courts that do enforce a questioned form clause, normally do not do so 
instantly, they explain the grounds for enforcement first, and in accordance with the case in 
point. But reaching a consensus on the fair meaning of the current doctrine is very difficult. 
 Evidently, there are cases in which enforcing a form term is suitable with the application 
of background law. Similarly, there are a number of cases that, without exception, enforce form 
terms in circumstances in which the other option, the legally implied rule, would induce a 
different decision. In addition, judges do not always treat the exception as a matter of “public 
interest” or “superior bargaining power”, nor they think that such concepts are infinitely 
malleable. As a matter of fact, there are cases which support form clauses limiting liability for 
errors made in publishing classified telephone directories. Such cases rely on the fact that the 
publishing of “Yellow Pages” (contrary to the white pages directory) is not regulated by the 
public service business of the telephone company113.     
 The present law applicable to contracts of adhesion is full of contradictions, different 
methods of analysis, conflicting results and so on. It is increasingly distant from the traditional 
doctrines, and rules conducting bargained-out agreements, in favour of the adhering party. The 
remaining question is whether the analysis sustained by traditional approach can still be 
preserved. Rakoff claims that this is a call for reconsider some fundamental premises. Still, it 
seems that even if the law is better established, the exceptions to enforceability appear whenever 
a contract is adhesive, thus questioning if any assumption of the presumptive validity of 
contracts of adhesion can be supported at all.       
 Is this reality only an intermediate position of law, due to the tendency of the law to 
mediate between past history and present reality? Or is this position justified on principle? 
 
                                                             
112 63 N. J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1974). 
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2.2.2. A Innovative analysis 
A. Contracts of adhesion as a practice 
The domination of the modern economy by business organizations brought a greater use 
of contracts of adhesion. Enterprises use standard form contracts to stead their external 
relationships, and also to control their hierarchical and internal structure. 
1. Relation between the Firm and the Market 
The modern business development had many effects in the way firms do business. One 
of the most remarkable ones was the substitution of market transactions for managerial 
coordination. This through means of vertical integration, that is, in the production of goods, for 
example, the trail from raw materials to consumer was largely reduced to require just one, or 
very few transactions. This practice became most frequent when firms became aware of their 
ability to reduce transactions, and thus reduce costs, since those are not free. They are not free 
because it takes money to assemble the significant information, negotiate the deal and then draft 
the contract. Avoiding outsiders in the marketplace is not a bad idea since they bring 
uncertainties to the productive process. And uncertainty is not desirable in this situation. The 
internal administration of the successive stages involved in production and distribution, and 
internal processing of the unavoidable disputes enables the coordination and predictability, and 
later, lower costs.          
 If complete integration is not achievable, it’s always possible to resort to franchise 
arrangements and the like, because normally they fulfil the same aims. Yet, integration has 
boundaries. The market also concerns to the relation between the firm and the consumer, which 
are at the end of the economic chain. These firms will also try to dominate the market through 
reduction of costs of contract formation, hence minimizing uncertainty and legal responsibility 
for uncertainty and gaining some mastery over the residual disputes.   
 If we see things through this point of view, standardization is valued, for the reason they 
reduce transaction costs. However, the possibilities exceed plain standardization since firms 
can draft their own terms in order to stabilize the incidents from business. For instance, the use 
of force majeure clauses, liability for consequential damages and short time limits for making 
claims and filling suit.         
 In fact, the firm’s intention to be free of external restrictions combines with “the 
professional ethos of the legal draftsman”114. Thus, it is the lawyer’s duty to safeguard his client 
                                                             
114 Ibid. at 1222. 
60 
 
from every possible eventuality. Here, the businesses demands are set aside, “the standard 
applied is the latitude permitted by the law”115. In the end, the document becomes hard to 
understand, even for average businessman.      
 Therefore, standardization is a way to spare and to control market relations, yet is hard 
to know the reasons why standard form contracts regularly contain terms that are hostile to the 
adhering party. Also there is no explanation for the use of this contracts on a take-it-or-leave-it 
basis or for the fact that clients do not contest this demand.    
 The consumer’s lack of interest to dicker about all but a few terms is reflected by Rakoff 
in this passage: “A salesman and a buyer of, say a major household appliance will haggle at 
length over its price and perhaps over whether the sale will be for cash or for credit; yet both 
will assume that remaining terms will be provided by the seller’s standard form”116.  
The problem is that, normally, these terms may respect to substantial issues, such as 
conditions of the buyer’s right of return or the seller’s right of repossession.  
2. Relation between the firm and the form 
The institutional dynamic is visible through the use of standard form contracts. 
Nowadays modern firms are organized by departments and over hierarchies. This is a call for 
the adoption of standard form contracts.      
 Within a complex organizational structure, the use of standard form documents foments 
efficiency and there are some reasons for that: first, the standardization of terms, and also of 
the forms in which they are contained, simplifies coordination among departments. Inasmuch 
as they allow to process transactions as a matter of routine; second, the standardization allows 
the efficient usage of the costly managerial and legal talent; third, the use of such contracts 
works as an “automatic check” on the outcomes of the actions of errant sales personnel. 
 Besides, form contracts help to consolidate the organizations internal structure. This 
happens both in private organizations, as in public bureaucracies since “discretion is power”117. 
It is harder to control subordinates with wider discretion because the standards of performance 
are less certain.          
 The hierarchy serves its ends by denying the agent’s authority to alter the terms of the 
document or requiring that acceptance will happen only if permitted by a superior or the home 
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office118. Rakoff stated clearly the nexus between forms and their informational purpose: 
“Apart from their obvious role in litigation, a clause transforming a vague legally implied term 
(“a reasonable time”) into a precise one (“ten days”) may simultaneously serve to inform 
subordinates of the decision made by managerial and legal personnel”119. 
Even so, enterprises blame the difficulty in pursuing the communicated special needs of 
the customer to justify their disclaimer of liability for consequential damages.   
 The take-it-or-leave-it approach is an illustration of the institutional inflexibility. Firms 
do not want to negotiate individually for two reasons: one, it’s more costly to negotiate in 
particular; two, it will be more costly, both economically and institutionally, to modify the 
organizational structure already familiarized with standard terms.    
 The market control share isn’t in any way linked to the use of contracts of adhesion by 
firms. Even in the presence of competitive markets, firms will reject the possibility of 
bargaining their standard terms in matters that usually two individuals would wish to negotiate.
 However, that there is another theory that states exactly the opposite. According, the 
firm’s internal structure is unrelated to the firm’s market behaviour, which includes its 
contracting practices. The fact that firms refuse to bargain in situations where an individual 
would do so, must be based on “market power in the usual sense”120. This would only be 
possible if we supposed that the market’s force is so strong and so exact that all the partakers 
will be obligated to act as individual human beings would.     
 At the same time, the presence of contracts of adhesion does not mean that competition 
is absent. Nothing prevents other firms from having different combinations of form terms. 
 The imperative question here is whether adherents will sufficiently pressure drafting 
parties, and thus, discipline them, by shopping around for better terms.   
3. Relation between the form and the adherent 
Customers are aware of their incapacity to change form terms, and if they do not 
understand the take-it-or-leave-it basis, the salesman will tell them that he does not have the 
authority to vary the form. Bargain is not even a possibility, because that means infiltrating in 
the hierarchical structure of the firm. No one will be willing to haggle, “we cannot make an 
exception for one customer”, as Rakoff writes, “the language of standardization becomes a 
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moral claim” 121. In situations involving organizational hierarchies, bargaining is not even 
expected, or appropriated for a consumer to do so. Yet, shopping is still a possibility, the only 
actually. The problem is that in most consumer transactions, making a plain choice may be 
difficult. The consumer most read and compare all the possibilities, and also take attention to 
terms concerning risks that in any given transaction are improbable to happen.   
 The standard forms are thus drafted to cover many eventualities and for that reason they 
are normally long and complex, even in the case that each term is clearly stated. The shopping 
ability of consumers is, in effect, low. They do not read, or understand the documents. Of course 
they shop some terms, otherwise they wouldn’t be shopping anything at all, but actually they 
do that within a small “space”. They just concentrate in a few terms, normally the ones that are 
best-publicized, and ignore the remainder. The ideal customer that reads, understands, and 
shops carefully does not exist.         
 Businesses take advantage of this “consumer apathy”, to “sell” new form terms. This 
may be expensive for the company, for the fact that it has to “underwrite the additional terms 
and bear the cost of stipulating shopping behaviour”122, but in the log-run may be advantageous 
because these new terms will catch the attention of the consumer, and thus making will 
acquiring the “thing” in question. The consequence, however, is that, over time, more and more 
risks will be moved to the adhering party.       
 The contracts of adhesion are used by drafting parties because they are means to predict 
and avoid future risks, and also to solidify the internal structure of the company. The adherents’ 
response to this is concentrating on a few terms, rather than reading all the form. The firms, 
being aware of such practice, also focus on this “few terms”, thus competing in their regard. 
The company’s incentive is, like Rakoff stated, to “save whatever they can with defensive form 
terms and employ the savings to compete with respect to the shopped terms”123. The 
competition just makes the problem even bigger.     
 Llewellyn realized that, as time goes by, the contracting through standard forms tends 
to be more seller-protective than customer-protective, and this occurs in whole lines of trade, 
since the bottom to the top industries.       
 Maybe the answer is in the “business reputation”, consumers could choose according to 
the firm that seems more reliable.        
 The reality is that the adherent cannot do anything to ameliorate his position. Through 
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an ordinary law point of view, the adherents’ flaw to read and understand the documents is the 
main problem regarding the use of contracts of adhesion. On a fuller view, this failure 
demonstrates the persuasive and complex nature of the institutional practice. Thus, the internal 
rigidity of the firm will hinder a well-informed adherent to object to any form term, even if he 
attempts to start a bargain and menaces that he will make his deal elsewhere, the business will 
not care. Moreover, if the adherent reads one form, that does not mean that he has read or 
shopped many others, or that he would find that rationale to do so.   
 Rakoff realized that consumers are nowadays dominated by economic organizations, as 
he wrote in this passage: “The consumer’s experience of modern commercial life is one not of 
freedom in the full sense posited by traditional contract law, but rather one of submission to 
organizational domination, leavened by the ability to choose the organization by which he will 
be dominated”124. 
4. The Form’s Power 
The use of contracts of adhesion is not just a result of the exercise of monopoly power, 
or a consequence of mass production and mass distribution, but rather, as a circumstance related 
to the “specific organizational form in which mass production and distribution”125 most 
typically arise in our society. There isn’t any other way to explain all the critical features: the 
standardization of documents in many economic sectors for a huge number of transactions, the 
use and acceptance of form contracts on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, the adherents’ fault to read 
and understand the documents they sign, and the forms’ trend to become more and more 
protective of the drafting party.         
 This is the only theory that links the standard form contracting practice with the business 
history of the past century, in other words, the development of large business enterprises and 
the replacement of management for bargaining, in the market.    
 With this in mind, the use of contracts of adhesion, which is legally held, must be seen 
as “an institution that itself generates and allocates power – not market power in the traditional 
sense, but power nonetheless”126. Thus, the use of standard form contracts, if legally 
enforceable, is translated into freedom from legal limitations and ability to control market 
relationships. If one wants to accept this practice, it has also to accept this consequence. 
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B. Appraisal of the Practice 
Any simple agreement between a customer and a commercial entity will consist in the 
terms typically haggled or shopped, the remaining terms will be implied. If the same happens 
in the case of a signed form, it’s the legal systems’ duty to decide whether and to what extent 
to apply the drafter’s form terms rather than use the law’s implied terms.  
1. The conception and dissemination of wealth 
The existence of contracts of adhesion in competitive markets shows that the costs saved 
by switching risks to the consumer through form terms, may be ultimately reimbursed to the 
consumer per lower prices or more beneficial terms vis-à-vis the few matters that are still 
bargained or shopped. The legal system should, before enforcing a contract, check its fairness, 
in the sense that equal values are being traded. The consumer lack of information concerning 
to some terms impedes him to make some pre-judgement of what is, in fact, fair, since is not 
absolutely conscious of all terms. Even in this situation, Rakoff believes that “firms are not 
making extraordinary returns, and accordingly, that customers are getting a fair deal, even in 
ignorance”127. Moreover, he considers that “it does not seem that contracts of adhesion raise 
any unique legal issues regarding the distribution of wealth between sellers and consumers”128.
 Doctrines such as economic duress or unconscionability are keener on distributional 
issues though. Yet, it is not expectable that competitive market forces will yield forms that will 
optimally and effectively please consumer demand or that are wanted in some broad sense. The 
market is not interested and has no idea of what consumers’ preferences are.  
 Supposing that the legal system, before enforcing a contract, tries to ascertain whether 
the stipulated allocation of risks are reasonable enough to oversee the possible perils of a 
transaction, the presence of competition will not provide the required guarantee. Again, the 
consumers’ lack of information will preclude the resort to the argument that parties can deem 
by themselves how should risks be distributed, or which party should support the insuring cost 
against such contingencies. The same applies in respect to the question whether the trade values 
are equivalent. Yet, here, competition is not a substitute. If one assume that some risks are better 
absorbed by the drafting party, even if that rises the price, the competition in this context will 
have a worse outcome, since it leans towards “degradation of any adherent-protective 
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provisions of the contract”129.        
 Having said that, Rakoff asks why one still relates the enforcement of standard form 
contracts to an overall gain in economic welfare. Llewelyn’s argument, that contracts of 
adhesion ameliorate the legal system’s allocation of risks and liabilities through the judgment 
of commercial experts, fails to realize that forms are not drafted from such a “professional and 
interest-free point of view”130. Also the proposition that form contracts are translate into huge 
cost savings fails to perceive that the alternative is not to “the bargaining-out of every deal but 
rather the use of standardized yet legally implied terms”131. It seems that Llewelyn’s aim was 
to be supported by the Williston’s statement that enforcement of signed documents “rests upon 
the fundamental principle of the security of business transactions”132. This assertion would have 
implicit two propositions. One is that the form documents have a “useful economic purpose”, 
for the fact that they specify a particular transaction and its general rules of law. In other words, 
the consumer knows that, generally, the reasonable time is “ten days”. However, this assertion 
has some flaws. In first place, the firm may not adhere to the set line that its forms stipulate, 
and being so, if the adherent consults the form will be deceived. Second, if the dispute goes to 
court, “the intermittent yet time-honoured” practice of the judiciary to ignore what seem clear 
form terms, or to read them against their meaning, really weakens the position.   
 In second place, the prerogative with basis on “the security of business transactions” 
continues by stating that if people want to become aware of the terms of a transaction they can 
do so by exploring the written document, concluding then that is important to keep such 
peoples’ trust. This does not mean that by signing the document, the seller or the consumer 
would become more certain that they are supported by the law. We must remember that one of 
this parties is a “segmented and differentiated firm”, in order to perceive that traditional rules 
assure to the members of the organization, not to the salesman, that the document states the 
transaction, regardless of what the salesman knew, said or reasonably thought. The internal 
firms’ reliance is the one reliance which is being protected. Thus, the aim of the doctrine is to 
authenticate the form as means of internal communication.     
 Therefore, form documents should be held enforceable for the fact they facilitate the 
communication and discipline within a firm, aid to modify their obligations to risks suitable to 
their business structure and lead to overall welfare as a result of their organizational efficiency. 
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Still, what is the nexus between institutional factors and substantiation for enforcement of form 
contracts? This argument does not explain the claim. Not only are the form terms not justifiable 
because of the firms’ structure, but also the drafting party, taking advantage of its position, 
often attempts to avoid its legal responsibilities for reasons that have nothing to do with internal 
efficiency.            
 Even on the assumption that the use of form contracts increases the “efficient operation 
of the organization”133 and even on the assumption that this gain is repaid to customers through 
lower prices, there isn’t, according to Rakoff, any guarantee that there has been a general gain 
in social welfare. The sending of risks and responsibilities to the adhering party has its costs, 
such as the transactions costs of arranging insurance or handling an uninsured risk that occurs. 
This may be the reason why the liability is first placed in the side of the drafting party. The 
draftsman will always bear in mind the size these costs may have, or whether these costs go 
beyond the costs involved in having firms covering the same risks. Thus, denying the 
obligation, saves the draftsman’s client, the firm and money. This suggests that the legal system, 
in creating legally implied rules, should consider the institutional costs supported by firms when 
adapting to the different responsibilities, but yet, it does not clarify why to give deference to 
the drafting party’s terms.         
 If standardized terms can be legally implied, this means that mass distribution is not 
dependent of contracts of adhesion. These contracts if applied in a competitive market may not 
generate a large redistribution of wealth to the drafting parties, yet any gain in social welfare 
due to their use and enforcement will be relativity modest. The drafting party will be not capable 
of measuring if any possible gain compensates the costs of attaining it. Analysing the standard 
form contract use as an issue of production or distribution of wealth will not be the answer, 
because this does not explain the presumption of enforceability.  
2.  Power and Freedom Line-up 
a) Freedom of Contract 
Contract Law is one means of freedom embedded in our society. Enforcing contracts of 
adhesion definitely releases the drafting party from legal restrictions, but at the same time the 
exploitation of such freedom leads to the imposition of terms on adherents.  
 The demand for contractual freedom was part of the historic movement related with the 
modern market economy growth that with the governments’ help, substituted the social order, 
                                                             
133 Rakoff, supra note 41 at 1234. 
 67 
 
which was organized by status and full of customary restraints on the power to contract. In the 
past decades, the meaning of freedom of contract has been largely discussed. Thus, Contract 
Law, and other fields of private law, have been seen as suitable to “prevent social coercion in 
the now-established market economy. The state’s help is no longer essential to wipe the remains 
of former legal orders. In Rakoff’s opinion, the Freedom of Contract “now consists in the 
absence of government meddling except when a substantial public policy justifies the 
intervention…it is defined in terms of the separation of the market and the state, private and 
public law; at its fullest reach, it is the doctrine of laissez faire”134.   
 According to Courts’ statements, denying the enforcement of a contract of adhesion 
obstructs the Freedom of Contract. Similarly, they perceive the drafting party as an individual. 
But, supposedly, Freedom of Contract means uncoerced choice, as the Courts realize, that is, 
its link to the human being, its development, its individualization, its fulfilment by doing so.
 However, none of these human values is visible by enforcing the organization’s form. 
The standard form is a representation of the organization’s needs and dynamics. It is incorrect 
to conceive that contracts of adhesion are the “extension and fulfilment of the will of an 
individual entrepreneur”135. Furthermore, it is unsuccessful to claim that this contracts are the 
“cooperative expression of the freedom of all or most of the individuals who comprise the 
organization”136. But, the commercial organizations evidently do not participate, even because 
who designs the forms are very few people, typically lawyers. Thus, the contracts of adhesion 
derive from the matrix of organizational hierarchy, their enforcement nothing has to do with 
“freedom of contract”.          
 It is no longer feasible to see the Freedom of Contract as the opposition between an 
individual and state due to our industrialized, organized and institutionalized society. Clearly, 
institutions other than the state can and do control the individual within the context of private 
law as typically designed. The threat is visible in many fields of economic life, for instance, in 
the labour relationship in modern industry, where such a domination exists. To recognize the 
elimination of such domination is as much an achievement of liberty as is the limitation of 
governmental control.         
 In Rakoff’s view, the courts should claim that enforcing standard form terms harms the 
freedom of the adhering party, since this terms are inflicted on the transaction in a way that no 
individual adherent can impede. The biggest aim of this contracts, is thus, to guarantee that the 
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drafting party will succeed in case of dispute. This is how big companies “legislate in a 
substantially authoritarian manner without using the appearance of authoritarian forms”137, as 
Kessler well realized.          
 The solution may be a term imposed by the adhering party, individually or as a class, 
rather than one imposed by the drafting party. Yet, the solution must be given by law, not by 
the drafter or the adherent. The judges, legislators, and administrative officials are impartial as 
opposed to the drafter. They have a broader view of the common good, and they are subject to 
political control. Thus the government has legitimacy, and should frame general applicable 
rules of law. The same cannot be said to the draftsman.     
 The courts should determine if the enforceability of a contract of adhesion is because 
“the adherent makes a sufficient claim based on public policy” or “simple fairness to override 
the drafting party’s claim based on the value of free choice”138. However, framing the issue in 
such manner is not correct, because individual freedom bears the prerogative of the adhering 
party not to have the drafter’s terms imposed on him. With this in mind, such terms ought to be 
totally unenforceable. Yet, this is not enough to assert this proposition, for the fact that 
individual liberty relates not only to individual human growth and achievement, but also on the 
preservation of a democratic society. If this democratic society is dependent on business firms, 
and if such firms are dependent on standard forms, maybe the enforcement of such is defensible.  
b) Conservancy of Civic Freedom 
Our society’s composition is based on individuals related to one another across markets 
and over the state, thus each citizen “faces the state naked”139. One of the first to realize that 
was Hobbes, in its Leviathan140.        
 During the twentieth century, totalitarian governments became real, with its means of 
mass organization, mass communication and mass terror. The legal protection of individual 
rights is not sufficient in face of such a reality. The citizen, even with the protection of his 
personal property, has no such power. According to Tocqueville’s theory, in the modern 
context, freedom must be achievable through the maintenance of organized and overlapping 
intermediate institutions, both civil and political141. Rakoff is of the opinion that “one of the 
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defining characteristics of modern totalitarian regimes is the absorption by the state of formerly 
independent loci of organized social power”142.      
 The courts’ willingness to enforce form documents supports the autonomy of 
intermediate institutions. Other illustrations of such support are the hesitancy to impose 
constitutional procedural requirements on nongovernmental entities; the readiness to accept 
arbitration as a compulsory method of settling disputes; and the allowance of opportunities to 
incorporate on rather minimal terms.       
 On the word of Rakoff “these instances bear witness to our sense that if we bring social 
structure too directly within the ken of the law, we will end up specifying the structure by law 
in a way that undermines the ability to manifold centers of power to thwart the possibly 
threatening designs of government”143.       
 This argument suggests that there is, leastwise, some liberty interest existent in the 
enforcement of contracts of adhesion. The argument’s point is that the power of intermediate 
entities ought not to be structured as an extragovernmental authority delegation, provided that 
this power is extra governmental, it will not serve its established intention. Also this argument 
has a limited range. The controversy is that standard form contracts should be upheld with the 
view to promote firms as instruments leading to civic freedom, which clearly is not such an 
impressive argument as the traditional claim that these contracts represent the direct expression 
of individual freedom. Business firms don’t look alike to the types of voluntary organizations 
held by law. Yet, participatory groups strengthen the independence by providing joint action in 
an uncoercive atmosphere. The opposite argument is that contracts of adhesion were created by 
business firms that could be seen as participatory, and they impose rules on adherents, who 
cannot opine on them.         
 It is preferable to have mini-authoritarianisms of many separate institutions for the 
evasion of the totalitarianism of the monolith.      
 Is a system of independent commercial institutions the solution? Maybe federalism and 
separated constitutional powers have broken the power of our society that we think that the only 
option is the existence of nongovernmental counterbalances. Is the preservation of business 
firms’ independence related to the legal institution of enforceable form contracts? Probably it 
would be easier that firms adjust themselves to a general requirement of only using terms 
implied by law. In the event that the rest of the legal powers remained constant, we could 
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conclude that firms are able to adjust, without any problem, to the complete nonenforceability 
of form terms. This would be a major change for firms, not just functionally, but also socially, 
to lose their power to draft enforceable form documents. This would be visible within a whole 
legal and social framework. As Rakoff stated “the degree of abstraction and assumption 
necessary to demonstrate that our fragmented governmental structure is by itself a sufficient 
protection against tyranny seems greater still”144. This line of argument is valid only justifies in 
part, the unusefulness enforcement of the analysis’ terms is still objectionable. Since contracts 
of adhesion normally protect the drafting party, even in the perspective of the firms’ needs, it 
is not understandable why some form terms are viewed as important for the maintenance of the 
business firms’ institutional strength. Further, the enforcement of form terms is only one of the 
methods that the legal system use to preserve the role of intermediate organizations.   
 The underlying theory cannot go far. It isn’t visible in the routine. The enforcement of 
a particular form term or set of terms had to be greatly desirable. It is not sufficient to allege 
that the use of form terms save firms money for the reason that price terms (which are not 
characteristically abusive of adherents) are adapted to account for the legal responsibilities.    
 In case it can be substantiated that the enforcement of a particular set of terms make the 
firms able to start new businesses and deals, and therefore contributing to the “functioning of a 
business as a social force independent of governmental control”, maybe the enforcement is 
acceptable.           
 This is something that involves ordering the power and freedom’s society, with this in 
mind, a general rule that contracts of adhesion are presumed enforceable cannot be sustained.
 Concerning this, Rakoff wrote “the inevitable infringement of adherents’ individual 
freedom that results from the rule leads one to suggest that form terms should never be enforced. 
But that suggestion must be tempered by the possibility that such enforcement will in some 
circumstances contribute significantly to the maintenance of civic freedom”145. The rule must 
be to justify the enforceability any form term. In the case that it deviates from the background 
rule, reasons should be shown for that. 
c) Extra problem of fairness 
There is the need to address an extra problem before we conclude that the assumption 
of unenforceability is correct. One of the analysis states that when a contract of adhesion is tied 
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to monopoly power, is assumed that the adherent is paying for more favourable terms than 
actually he got. Being so, the substitution of background law for severe form terms can be seen 
as a “restoration of the overall equivalence of the exchange”146. On the contrary, the proposed 
theory, calls into question, form terms within price-competitive markets. That is, the 
enforcement of terms would be foreclosed even in the case that the drafting party reduced the 
price to give back to the adherents the costs saved by moving some risks and obligations. The 
courts are not able to adapt the price term along with the form terms, and thus creating a 
significant disparity of consideration, which offers a good argument for enforcing written form 
terms. Maybe the question should be raised considering the possibility of unequal values being 
exchanged.           
 In the light of this question, it is necessary to recall that form terms are drafted by 
someone that is presumed to be sensible to the mandates of the legal system, for that reason, 
firms review forms or readjust prices, thus filling some legal requirements. This does not respect 
to prospective legislation or administrative regulation or even, the traditional claim to “freedom 
of contract”. Here the issue respects to retroactive unfairness, which emerges in the 
circumstance there is adjudication. Is not even the adoption of a whole new framework that is 
at stake, because according to the modern view, judges should not be impeded of enunciating 
new principle of law. Also, the attentive draftsman should have now realized that the 
presumption of enforceability is in decay.        
 The framework developed by Rakoff in this article is one that “raises the possibility that 
judges using it will, in some systematic way, be imposing on drafting parties obligations or 
risks that these parties were not paid to bear”147. According to his proposal, a set of legally 
supplied terms should exist, in order to provide a test, or to be an alternative to the drafter’s 
form terms. The problem is that these “supplied terms” may turn out to be ambiguous in some 
situations. Being hand to hand with uncertainty is normal nowadays. Yet, this uncertainty could 
be withdrawn if the drafter didn’t pass beyond the acceptable boundaries. Sometimes it may 
seem worth to keep the firms’ position as potential motivators of new businesses, however, this 
means imposing large uncompensated liabilities in a party that is trying to adapt background 
rules to new circumstances. Generally though, the judicial submission of background terms 
instead of form terms should not be dependent on the fact that the adherent paid for more than 
he got. This would be translated into risk free terms. Due to current form terms’ depreciation, 
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judges will sometimes prefer to shift risks without compensation, because this will keep 
draftsman from surpassing acceptable limits. The law has already done this in the past. The case 
law regarding non-competition pacts has lots of examples in which courts have set aside broad 
clauses instead of redraft them. In both cases, one party has received a benefit for which he had 
never haggled148. The exact same method is used in other fields of law, for instance, regarding 
patents’ coverage, if the request for coverage is wider than it should be, the patent’s protection 
may be lost.           
 Therefore, as Rakoff wrote “there is ample authority and sound reason for the 
conclusion that courts need not be inhibited from refusing to enforce form terms by the 
imbalance created in the particular transaction before them”149. 
 
d) Principles of choice 
When the presumption of enforceability is inverted and the burden of affirmative 
justification is put in the drafting party, the shape of the analysis derives substantially. The 
courts are already reaching decisions which are more adherent-protective, however, such results 
are not according to the current doctrine. Through the proposed framework, courts with same 
opinions would no longer be repressed by the idea that they are transgressing basic principles 
of legal rationality or justice. This analysis refollows the reasoning of statutory or administrative 
stipulation of issues that would otherwise be handled by standard form contracts. These are not 
“regulatory”, in an effort of requiring special justification because contrary to the general rule, 
instead such enactments could be seen as simple exercises of the governmental power of making 
law. Actually, the one thing that calls for justification is the practice of making statutory terms 
subject to alteration by what seems an agreement of the parties, but instead is a contract of 
adhesion. As Rakoff realized “although there may be circumstances in which counterprinciples 
do justify the enforcement of form terms, such instances are now the exception, not the rule”150. 
Rakoff then formulates partial principles revealed by relevant typical situations.   
 The principles are:  
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 “1) The deepest issues raised by the use of contracts of adhesion are the potential 
infringement on the freedom of adhering parties and the possible need to maintain the 
social independence of drafting parties.           
 2) The danger of upholding the authoritarian relationship between the drafting 
party and the adherent is a danger different in kind from the risk that the terms of the 
transaction, overall, represent an unfair exchange of values, and is less likely to be cured 
by competition. Indeed, there is a very real possibility that the drafting parties will 
attempt to capitalize on any legal toleration of form contracting. Terms that greatly 
exacerbate the authoritarian nature of the relationship have little claim to enforcement.
  3) The law can provide terms alternative to those appearing on the form. The 
drafting party’s standardized terms are not demonstrably better than the law’s and 
cannot be justified by arguments based on presumed consumer preference manifested 
in the marketplace. The parallel legally implied terms provide an appropriate reference 
point for judging the quality of the form terms.            
  4) A drafting party’s terms may represent a sound judgment about how the risks 
and responsibilities of a trade or line of endeavour ought to best to be apportioned. Given 
the dynamics both of drafting and of using form contracts, however, there is no reason 
to think this will routinely be true. It is better to treat whatever expert judgment is 
embedded in form terms as possible evidence of what the legally implied terms should 
be, rather than as an independent basis for enforcement of the documents. 
  5) That nonenforcement will cost the drafting party money is not a positive 
ground for enforcing form terms. Firms can compensate for such costs by increasing the 
price term, which is also the term most accessible to the adherent. If, however, the ability 
to specify particular form terms (or form terms in particular circumstances) can be 
shown to contribute substantially, in ways not readily compensable in money, to 
maintaining organizations as independent social actors, a cognizable claim to 
enforcement will have been made.        
 6) The drafter’s work product may deviate substantially from the practice of the 
drafting organization. A drafting party can hardly claim that it will lose its independence 
if it cannot enjoy legal rights more protective than its ordinary commercial practice of 
the organization may well be in order.                                                 
 7) Whatever value organizational independence has is a general consideration 
that goes to the structure of society as a whole. To uphold that value, it is not necessary 
to legitimate form terms of a particular drafting party that are substantially less 
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favourable to the adherent than are the practices of other comparable organizations. A 
comparison of the form document with general trade practice may therefore also 
appropriate.”151  
 
2.2.3. New doctrine’s development 
A. The Regular Concerns 
The first question arising here is whether the present analysis is sufficiently developed 
to create law, in the practical meaning. Is it possible to implement a framework for decision 
through legal institutions, such as courts, without harm? Rakoff tries to show that, both 
substantive and procedural tasks imposed by the new approach are not more difficult than those 
which are currently acceptable. The second question is concerning to the results adopted by the 
generated law. How are such results compared with the current adopted propositions and its 
stipulated consequences? It is known that contracts of adhesion cover a wide range of economic 
life, for that trying to identify all the possible results is almost an impossible job. Rakoff studied, 
instead, “several typical, widely adjudicated fact patterns” to show that actual consequences are 
better understood in this sense, than in courts expressed rationales.´ 
1) The Basic Classification 
In any given case, the legal matters arising must be previously classified. In this present 
situation should the facts be included in the contracts of adhesion category? The analysis bottom 
line here is the presence or absence of the seven aspects that all together define the model 
situation. Since actual cases rarely correspond to postulated ideal-types, the appropriate conduct 
to have in marginal cases is an extensive reflection of the whole social practice. This is not 
different from the categorization that already takes place in other fields of law.  
 The present law has a problem of categorization for the fact that it considers the contract 
of adhesion as a separate legal issue. Yet, the analysis of cases treated according to this approach 
will be considerably larger than the one recognised in the doctrinal lines, which emerge from 
incorrect and restrictive understanding of the matter. For instance, contrary to many judicial 
propositions, the suggested analysis demonstrates that finding “gross inequality of bargaining 
power” should not be understood as a requisite to prove the existence of a contract of adhesion. 
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In other words, “the practice of standard form contracting is not based on the exercise of pre-
existing market power”152.          
 The issue is actually whether one party is capable of drafting form contracts and use 
them in a way that configures the dynamic here studied. The test, as Rakoff realized is “the 
presence of the correlative social roles of drafting party and adherent as we have been using 
those terms”. 
2) Separation between Visible and Invisible Terms 
This study revealed that only some of the terms included in a contract of adhesion are 
seen as undesirable. For that reason, a distinction between terms that are typically harmless and 
terms that normally are abusive (even in a competitive market) must be done. The validity of 
the first set of terms can be treated according to the “ordinary rules of contract law”; the validity 
of the latter can be treated according to the principle that such terms should not be enforced 
without positive reasoning.         
 Rakoff says that, the visible and invisible terms must be separated. The visible terms are 
the ones that are bargained, while the invisible terms are all the rest. It is not a correct reasoning 
to consider that the terms offered in a take-or-leave-it basis are the invisible ones. The visible 
terms also include the ones shopped by a large amount of adherents. Being so, the visible terms 
of a standard form contract are normally those that set up the entire explicit contents of a simple 
ordinary contract, being the price term the paradigmatic example.    
 Yet, the task of distinguishing both types of terms is not easy. Even though the bargained 
terms are not difficult to identify in a concrete case, identifying the shopped ones is much 
harder. Here there is no question if the adherent effectively shopped such terms or not, for the 
fact that, only when adherents generally read, understand and shop for alternative terms do the 
dangers associated with invisible terms vanish. For that, courts should look at the adherents’ 
practices as a class153. It may seem a hard task, but the common law standards concerning social 
practices show the exactly opposite. There is not such thing as “reasonable men”, “reasonable 
reliance” or “reasonable disclosure”. Actually, the traditional rules applicable to form contracts 
are subordinated on such knowledge. Developing and applying “a customary shopper” standard 
is a problem that must have a legal resolution. The current ordinary practice must be 
appreciated, not according to courtroom evidence, but according to what is expected to be a 
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“reasonable practice”. The answer is in everyday experience. While unusual facts can be seen 
as evidence, there isn’t no fear of oversimplified or intensive categorization. The problem may 
appear in situations in which shopping practices are quickly shifting, maybe due to advertising. 
The main aim of proving that terms is invisible is to make such term more probable to be 
binding.           
 The “customary shopper” is dependent on the type of market in which it is included. For 
instance, when adherents are businesses it is more likely that more terms will be visible. We 
may think that doctrines of adhesion are just for consumers, but the present law does not state 
that only consumers, and never businesses can benefit from the new doctrines that temper the 
traditional rules154. There are opinions that relief should be denied to commercial adherents, 
different from the broad principle. Instead, they consider that the adherent “was represented by 
a person likely to be knowledgeable about what types of documents used or the problems likely 
to arise, or that the deal was sufficiently large to make it worthwhile for the adhering party to 
become knowledgeable concerning the particular clause at issue”155. Therefore, commercial 
parties with greater expertise, and more interested in individual deals, can be expected to shop 
or bargain more terms.        
 According to the “customary shopper” notion, it is a normal adherents’ behaviour to 
shop only some of the terms of an expected transaction. This is contrary to the imposition of 
the “duty to read”. Sometimes, in order to show that a term is adhesive, it’s proved that no other 
drafting party in a similar industry offers a more favourable corresponding term. The aim is to 
show what would occur if the adherent had shopped for a better deal. In the case, the term is 
considered unreasonable to shop, the doctrine imposes on the adherent, hypothetical 
consequences of what would have been unreasonable behaviour. This only makes sense if we 
assume that the use of contracts of adhesion creates problems simply when connected with an 
independent distortion of the marketplace.        
 By the same token, courts make a mistake when they treat a contract mainly constituted 
of form terms as they would treat a negotiated deal, just for the fact that one of the terms was 
haggled. The presence of a single negotiated term, normally a visible one such as price, 
indicates that the drafting party does not own crushing economic power. On the contrary, the 
institutional process makes it probable and rational that shopping or bargaining in respect to 
little terms of the deal will coincide with the imposition of invisible terms for the rest of the 
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transaction.           
 Thus, the division into visible and invisible form terms is possible. Such partition is 
valuable because it gives to the law a better correspondence with the institutional origins of 
form contracting than do the “monopoly power” or “superior bargaining power” doctrines.  
3) Selection of  the Transaction Type 
Even though there might be some difficulties in specifying the limits between visible 
and invisible terms in certain situations, this consideration does not undermine the basic 
division. However, there is one case which is important to address. For economic purposes and 
judicial process needs, the items needed to fill the set of visible terms must be gathered in more 
or less integral packages. To identify few packages would be inappropriate to the many lines of 
trade in which contracts of adhesion are used. To identify many packages leads to the problem 
of which one should be employed in a particular case. Llewellyn had knowledge of this issue, 
but tried to soften it by comprising “the broad type of transaction” as one situation where actual 
assent was given. It would be more precise, in many markets, to consider the selection as one 
on the edge between visible and invisible. As Rakoff realized “shoppers often do not think in 
terms of legal categories of any subtlety, and the drafter’s stipulation of a legally defined 
transaction type will be, in a strict sense, an invisible term. But the core substance of the legal 
type may be very near the boundary of visibility”156.     
 Actually, it seems possible to have “legally stipulated rules of preference” to the several 
alternative transaction types. An illustration of this is presented by the Article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, which specifies as a bottom line that sales of goods are presumed to be sales 
for payment on tender of delivery157. These are essential as “filler terms”.   
 If the drafting party’s choice of transaction type is visible, that choice must be justified. 
This because, due to the level of generality, both options may be fair or reasonable. The risk 
lies in the more specific terms used to fill the chosen type. This will turn out to be easier to 
courts. Being so, judges can make a detailed comparison of the drafter’s terms with the legally 
implied features of a certain type, with no need of reconstructing the entire relationship. 
However, due to the huge number of lines of business, this will produce similar problems of 
application even in a sophisticated scheme. In case they apply such scheme generally, the 
businesses would tend to reduce their initiative to create new lines of business or new practices 
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for already existing deals.         
 Equally, if the transaction chosen is within the borderline area, business firms should be 
allowed to decide what broad type of business they intent to prosecute, though this line of 
though doesn’t explain deference to the drafter’s specifications of the details by which the type 
is to be concretized.           
 Given this points, Rakoff concludes that “the proper standards governing the selection 
of transaction type are not far different in structure from the present law concerning contracts 
of adhesion generally”158.          
4) The Judge’s preparation the Invisible Terms. 
The major part of terms stipulated by the drafting party will be invisible, thus 
unenforceable according to this analysis. In such cases, background law should be applied. Yet, 
the courts cannot evaluate that a term should be upheld, without considering how the case would 
be without the form clause. That is, before judging invisible terms, the background law and its 
concrete application to the case must be known. It will be a legal system’s routine task to build 
the implied term applicable to a precise situation of a specific type of transaction. The 
constructing materials for this would be case law principles, statutory and administrative 
sources, and adequate custom and practice. As Rakoff wrote “in many situations, the basic 
outline of the implied term already exists in the law, either in the form of a generally applicable 
norm or as a term routinely added to simple negotiated transactions of a given type”159. In such 
circumstances, the only necessity is to apply the rule to the concrete situations, putting aside 
the presence of a form term on point. In fact, the form terms already come decoded and in 
accordance with certain transactions.       
 The continuous reference to the background law, might lead one to think that this will 
increase the possibility of litigation, both to the judiciary and the parties, which probably won’t 
be valuable. Deciding based on the presumption of validity of form terms seems the best choice, 
in order to save review into precedent, or resorting to trade usage and commercial concrete 
situations. Additionally, it seems easier to proceed the rule of enforceability of a form than 
applying the rule of law. If so, the present proposal will intensify the resort to trial. These 
protests just make sense if contrasted with the strict application of the Willistonian rule 
concerning standard form contracts. The present law has moved from this approach already. 
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Thus, the existing law has the tendency to apply alleviating doctrines into a large number of 
cases. Yet, the additional burden seems minimal. For instance, when the unconscionability 
doctrine is applied, it already considers the commercial practice and the legally relevant context, 
in accordance with the general approach required by the Uniform Commercial Code, in issues 
of its domain. In this respect, Rakoff said, “similarly, the courts can hardly hope to determine 
whether a form term is “very unfair” without having at least some idea of what result 
background law would stipulate”160.        
 The suggested method would change the actual practice in two ways. In the first place, 
if determining the legally implied term was necessary to assess the drafter’s work, and not as 
piece of the alleviating doctrine, the burden of proof on issues such as commercial usage would 
naturally move to the drafting party. In second place, judges would have to accurately 
determinate the background rule at stake and its application to facts, more than is required under 
the actual practice. This would meant that further investigation into unusual commercial 
practices and usages is needed, because this matter hasn’t yet been fully explored. Nevertheless, 
the judges can always resort to mechanisms used in case of insufficient information: they can 
decide a case based on the record presented, and they can decide by applying burdens of 
production or persuasion.         
 The proposed regime lacks practical meaning of change. The real effect, said Rakoff, 
“would be to convert issues than now must be raised by the adherent – and that are thus often 
not raised – into issues to be pressed by the drafting party, the side more likely to have the 
necessary resources and incentives”161. Also, if in the presence of a more coherently body of 
law, the people’s incentive to litigate would reduce. The present system seems to efficiently 
discourage litigation and also fails in its promise to ease the worst features of contracts of 
adhesion. Such efficiency only emerges due to the adherents’ failure to state their legitimate 
legal strifes.           
 In the case the background law reaches the same result the form term does shall render 
its decision based on the legally implied rule only and treat the form terms as irrelevant. 
Exclusive trust in the background law has two symbolic purposes: first, the enforcement of an 
invisible term, even when explained, signifies the approval on imposing terms on the adherents. 
In case the rules provided by governmental authority reach the same result, such approval 
shouldn’t be considered. Second, the approach followed in litigated cases becomes the 
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foundation on which many cases will be abandoned, settled, or mediated. In Rakoff’s words, 
“the judicial nod of the drafting party’s “freedom of contract” is not harmless, even if nothing 
in the case turns on it”162. The existing law abounds with general statements supporting form 
draftsman, which seem to be overstated.       
 If the form term is different from the legally implied term in a way that would change 
the result of the case, then is possible that the decision rests only on the background law. The 
rules of law sometimes are beyond reach, even in the most bargained contract.  Grossly 
negligent behaviour is one these, for instance163.  When someone tries to circumvent such norms 
they are considered “void as against public policy”. Currently, an example of such cases is the 
“due-on-sale” clauses in mortgages void as unreasonable restraints on alienation. 
 According to Rakoff, the use of contracts of adhesion embodies a different social 
institution “not adequately encapsulated by the difference between “public” and “private” 
contract”164, and we must surpass these normally applicable concepts. This is, in case a certain 
background rule may fluctuate from a dickered term does not indicate that it can changed by a 
form. Therefore, it is not enough to evaluate solely the degree of importance of the substantive 
rule in comparison to the strength of negotiated agreement. The contracts of adhesion freedom 
issue must also be addressed.  
B. Rule on the Invisible Terms 
 In order to produce accurate judgements concerning some classes of invisible terms, 
Rakoff applied his principles of decision to usual fact patterns. He starts by stating that his 
analysis developed “a general proposition that invisible terms should be presumed 
unenforceable”165, and that if one wants to enforce them, it must justify it properly.  
 For his test Rakoff chosen three sets of problems which are quite common in the case 
law, and that raise issues concerning to the form contracting practice.  
1) Controlling the Instituiom        
 The reason to enforce contracts of adhesion is not a matter of general right, instead it 
concerns the achievement of particular social purposes. But, if the law accepts any imposition 
on adherents by drafting parties, the firms will be tempted to impose even further. They do so 
with the intention of gaining more power over the adherents, power that may be valuable, even 
                                                             
162 Ibid. 
163 Restatement (First) of Contracts § 575 (1932); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 195 (1981). 
164 Rakoff, supra note 41 at 1261. 
165 Ibid. at 1262. 
 81 
 
commercially. This power may go beyond the rights contained in the terms. Explaining the 
degree of authoritarianism implicit to the use of contracts of adhesion is not an easy task. It’s 
not permissible to admit the use of such clauses to terrify adherents. If the legal system wants 
to enforce such clauses, it must control the abuses of the practice. Hence, courts should not 
support terms which aim to increase the power of the drafting party. However, overcoming the 
problems is not impossible. In an analogous situation, concerning bargained-out contracts, the 
courts considered themselves competent to separate legitimate commercial aims from “in 
terrorem” ones when splitting liquidated damages clauses and penalty clauses166. This became 
an easier task due to the availability of background rules of law to set up the bottom line for 
consideration of legitimate purposes. The same analysis can be used within the suggested 
framework. Actually, this view is more persuasive than the existing doctrine, thus showing the 
yearning to protect adherents, visible through many settled cases. The Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co., a case concerning the analysis of a cross-collateral clause, is a good 
example of such practice. In a time-purchase contract for ordinary household goods, the 
draftsman provided that any payment would be protected against all outstanding accounts. 
According to Judge Wright, the effect of such provision was to “keep the balance due on every 
item purchased until the balance due on all items, whenever purchased, was liquidated”167.
 However, the court upheld the written document. The appellate court returned the case, 
to understand if this matter was resolved through the unconscionability though, adding that the 
clause had the possibility of being unfair, and thus recommended an investigation into the 
commercial practice for purposes of fairness determination. Another important effect was the 
fact that the seller could follow the purchaser steps. Equally, cases which laid down clauses in 
gas-station franchise-and-lease agreements allowing lessor oil companies to terminate at will 
or on very short notice are seen as obstacles to the use of termination menaces with the single 
intention of disciplining leeses.           
 So, as Rakoff wrote “any contractual option given to one party is in some sense a 
weapon that can be invoked against the other. When such powers are stipulated in form clauses 
solely or predominantly for their values as weapons, however, they ought not to be enforced”168.
 Besides that, there are form terms drafted only for ordinary commercial purposes. For 
instance, the class of terms that prevents adherents the resort to courts. The reason for enforcing 
such clauses is that these clauses serve an important commercial purpose, such as making the 
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debt collection cheaper, which would otherwise make the cost credit to increase. This is not 
merely a question of helping the drafting parties making money, if so, this purposed could be 
served by enhancing the visible price term. Also, onerous terms aren’t justified because of the 
consumer preference for lower prices, since the institutional dynamic doesn’t explain why 
adherents concentrate exclusively on the visible terms. Then the question arising is whether 
legal institutions are capable of processing a huge number of small disputes. This, raises 
questions more easily handled by official authorities than by form draftsman. In Rakoff’s 
words, “whatever their commercial utility when bargained for, and regardless of how often they 
appear in negotiated contracts, clauses that limit or burden the recourse adherents may have to 
legal remedies are nothing less oppressive when imposed as a part of a contract of adhesion”169. 
There is a huge body of case law distinguishing clauses of this kind in negotiated commercial 
agreements from formally identical terms contained in contracts of adhesion. The former was 
upheld, but the latter didn’t.         
 The same problems are raised by arbitration clauses in form contracts, although they 
seem an attractive method of resolving small commercial disputes. This clauses not only 
designate the form of proceeding but also the arbitral body as well. According to Rakoff, 
“unlike commercial arbitration between members in the same trade, in which knowledgeable 
panels may well be deemed fair by both sides, the lack of obvious common interests or shared 
trade practices between firms and consumers makes it very difficult to develop appropriate 
tribunals for their disputes”170. The more visible effect is, actually, the adherents’ barring to 
courts. Judges are starting to abandon the presumption of enforceability while searching for a 
more adherent protective doctrine. If the law follows this path, maybe is more advisable to the 
consumer to resort to judicial judgment. The courts noticed this problem and several recent 
cases held that arbitration clauses, when contained in contracts of adhesion, should be held 
unenforceable171.                                                                                                    
 Therefore, terms that may be though as enforceable if included in negotiated 
agreements, should not be given the same reasoning if included in a contract of adhesion. This 
because they just intensify the authoritarian relationship implied in the use of such contracts. 
Some case law reaches these results, while other keeps tied to the existing doctrinal 
formulations.  
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2)   Measuring the relevance of Organizational Structure 
It is already known that the use of contracts of adhesion helps the firm’s organizational 
structure to develop. This is due to their capability to: “reduce the effort required to organize 
internal hierarchy and maintain communications among divisions; (to) minimize the need to 
delegate authority; to control subordinates’ use of any authority that is delegated”172. Although 
the enforcement of form contracts promotes the strength of some forms of organizational 
hierarchy, that is not enough to justify the level of imposition on adherents that enforcement 
involves. Indeed, there is no reason to believe that any particular organizational pattern will 
lead to “a gain in efficiency for society as a whole once the effects on all parties are 
considered”173. Also, the instrumental value of firms in providing alternative place for social 
initiative and power does not depend on the preservation of any particular organizational 
form174.            
 Some might say that is important to reserve to the firms some power to determine their 
own structure, but that also is not sufficient to impose the costs of maintain such structure on a 
non-member of the firm who can done anything more than adhere to its specified 
transactions.This point of view is well illustrated by the courts’ use of the “doctrine of 
reasonable expectations” in cases regarding “conditional binding receipts issued by salesman 
of life and disability insurance”. In these transactions, the proposed insured fills an insurance 
application, gives to the agent a check which covers the initial premium, and receives a receipt.
 This receipt establishes that no coverage, even if only temporary, will be in force until 
some conditions are met. Then, when all the conditions are met insurance will be provided 
effective as of the date of the application and initial payment. Here, the agent may tell the 
applicant to make a medical examination, but he can also say nothing. He may also tell the 
applicant that temporary binding insurance is from the time of initial payment. Normally, these 
applications (or receipts) generally claim that no agent is allowed to vary the terms of the printed 
documents. The problem arises when the applicant dies before one of the conditions precedent 
to coverage has happened, and thus, the condition doesn’t occur and the company rejects any 
responsibility. Courts haven’t yet reached a consensus concerning this outcome. In one side, 
there is considerable authority for demanding fulfilment of all the conditions, even in the case 
an agent states that coverage will be in force after the payment of the first premium, at least, if 
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the receipt states clearly that the agent has no power to vary its terms. These cases follow the 
traditional reasoning of form contracts. Rakoff’s view on this is that “the doctrinal formulation 
used by at least some of these courts reveals that they are rather consciously upholding the 
efforts of insurance companies to protect the hierarchical structure of their sales organizations, 
for the courts also state that oral representations by someone sufficiently high in the company’s 
organization to be a “general agent” rather than a mere “soliciting agent” (a salesman) will take 
effect despite the parol evidence rule or broad form statements limiting authority”175 
 On the other side, two recent suitcases have requested the insurance company to handle 
the financial results of its scheme of organization. These courts stated that a temporary 
insurance policy is shaped simply by acceptance of the first premium payment. If the insurance 
company wants to evade this outcome, it must not only plainly draft a receipt stating the 
conditions precedent, but also, its agents must notify the applicant of the conditions in clear 
language. The argument used in both cases was that the applicant has a “reasonable 
expectation” that insurance is immediately in force after the payment of the premium. Here 
there is no “duty to read” documents, and certainly, the use of complex policy provisions 
presses applicants to trust on the agent’s oral representations. In the case the salesman rests 
silent about the issue, the court’s reasoning is that the insured’s expectations will make him to 
misinterpret the meaning of the receipt. Under the proposed analysis, both cases reached the 
desired result. This kind of insurance contract are, without a doubt, contracts of adhesion. This 
conditions which companies normally rely on are evidently invisible terms.  
 Rakoff poses the following problem: “when an applicant has, without fraud, satisfied an 
agent that he is likely to be an insurable risk, and he has paid the initial premium on a policy 
that is ultimately to be dated from the date of application, how should the law – not the 
draftsman – allocate the risk that he will die before the insurance company completes its 
investigation of the application? In fashioning the applicable background rule, the court should 
of course consider what the applicant might reasonably expect; but just as relevant is the courts’ 
own sense of what is fair”176. Accordingly, the proposition that “the public has the right to 
expect that they will receive something of comparable value in return for the premium paid”177 
seems an appropriate one. Another possible argument is one that states that performances which 
start immediately are better, or other that asserts that is not normal to attempt to prove that a 
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dead man would have been found insurable if his death had not been known178 - this examples 
may be seen as judicial sense of what is right. In this type of transaction, the legally implied 
terms should state that the applicant has acquired a temporary contract of insurance that will be 
in force until the company reaches a concrete decision, or it accepts or it rejects the policy. But, 
is there any basist to substitute the form terms for the legally implied ones? If the firm is allowed 
to protect its hierarchical structure, at the adhering party cost, then the law should require the 
firm to plainly states the coverage conditions on its form documents whereas is free of any 
obligation to control its salesman’s representations. This is the view embraced by the courts 
that sustain a written conditional receipt as long as it states that agents have no power to vary 
its terms. However, that is not yet a justification for sustaining the enforceability of invisible 
terms, in order to maintain the firm’s chosen organizational structure. However, this argument 
is not a good one, for the fact that if the company wanted to protect itself, it could do it through 
price raise. In case an agent misrepresent the firm, is the company that should borne the 
consequences, not the insured individuals. Even if they merely remain silent, the form 
conditions should not be applied, because there isn’t any basic presumption in favour of using 
legally implied terms. This cases support the idea that the written terms only should be enforced 
if agents properly disclose “the highly conditional nature of the temporary coverage”. Thus, 
this cases’ conclusion alters the relationship between insurance companies and their agents. If 
firms want to their terms to stick, they must discipline their agents. If they don’t want to have 
such responsibility they can accept the consequent liabilities or stop writing such insurance 
altogether. These seem proper approaches, contrary to the more traditional ones which 
permitted companies to shift the costs of discipline to adherents.    
 This trend was generally adopted by courts in rather different contexts. The best 
example of such movement is the line of cases developed under the section 20(II) of the 
Interstate Commerce Act. The referred section provided that “interstate carriers subject to the 
Act were generally liable for full actual loss, damage, or injury to property transported, 
notwithstanding any attempt to limit liability”179. However, “it excepted traffic for which the 
carrier maintained approved tariffs providing for rates dependent upon the value declared in 
writing by the shipper or agreed upon in writing as the released value of the property, in which 
case such declaration or agreement shall…limit liability”180. That is, the statute provided a 
background rule and also “freedom of contract”, because it allowed varying the rule by 
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agreement. Then, in 1920, the Supreme Court stated that the value would be considered to have 
been “declared in writing by the shipper or agreed upon in writing and the statutory prerequisite 
for limiting the carrier’s liability would thus be satisfied, if the carrier handed the shipper a 
receipt stating the valuation on which the rates were based and advising the shipper of the 
opportunity to declare, and pay for, a higher value”181. In other words, the burden of avoiding 
form terms, thus by choosing the statutory choice, befell on the adherent.  This is just one 
example of the contracts of adhesion problems. In this respect Rakoff wrote: “The dynamics of 
contracting by standard form – the desire of organizations to deal with standard risks, the desire 
not to have sale agents making variant contracts, explaining form terms, or valuing goods, and 
perhaps the desire to compete primarily by price – lead the drafting party to stipulate a low price 
alternative. When damage occurs, is the shipper to be held to this limit? Or will the legal system 
refuse to let the carrier rely on an invisible term that stipulates a rule contrary to one established 
by statute?”182 The traditional approach to standard forms, coupled with the exchange equality 
belief, was employed by the 1920’s law which upheld the form term. Some modern cases follow 
the same path183.                               
 Nonetheless, the most recent settled cases deviate from the traditional analysis in three 
considerable ways: 1) “situations in which the shipper either knew of and exercised the 
available choice or was such an experienced shipper that it ought reasonably to have known”184. 
In this case, courts normally decide according to the traditional law, thus enforcing the shipper’s 
choice, not automatically but rather through the demonstration that the form term was visible; 
2) “courts presented with a document that the shipper signed without inserting any special 
valuation nevertheless hold the carrier responsible for assurances made by its agent that were 
contrary to the form terms, and find for the shipper for true amount of the loss”185. Here the 
courts substantiated their decision on declarations that did not contain enough fraud or 
misrepresentation to invalidate or vary any signed contract below traditional doctrines; 3) “the 
carrier cannot merely recite in a form document the existence of choice and direct its agents to 
be silent, but rather bears an affirmative obligation (if it wishes to limit its liability) to have its 
agents explain to the shipper the alternatives involved”186.      
                                                             
181 Ibid 
182 Ibid. at 1273. 
183 See e.g., Rocky Ford Moving Vans, Inc v. United States, 501 F. 2d 1369 (8th Cir. 1974); Foremost Ins. Co. v. National Trailer Convoy, Inc., 
370 So 2d 1258 (La. Ct. App. 1979). 
184 Rakoff, supra note 41 at 1273. 
185 Ibid. at 1274. 
186 Ibid. 
 87 
 
 This cases may be compared to the ones involving binding receipts issued by insurance 
agents if one identifies that the doctrine of “reasonable expectations” applicable to insurance 
cases, is only one path of asserting the conflict between the law’s terms and the drafter’s.  
  However, the modern law under section 20(II) is not justifiable only through the 
statutory provision that “the shipper will receive less than full protection only if an agreed-upon 
writing limits liability”187. The same statute has been in force since courts widely recognised 
the efficacy of signed forms. This case show, in effect, that there is another attitude concerning 
the responsibility of an organization for its agents’ representations and silences. This change is 
much more sensible to issues regarding the authoritarian power of adhesive forms, and is much 
more averse to the fact that form terms are a substitute for internal organizational disciplines 
3) The Influence on the  Commercial Practice 
The use of standard form contracts is connected, normally, with the drafter’s tendency 
to write terms which are more favourable to the business than its own practice. Thus, the firm 
attains the discretion to follow or disregard its practice in any given circumstance. If the dispute 
goes to trial, the result is the adherent begging for relief whose cost is none. The division 
between contractual terms and actual practice was litigated directly in respect to disclosure 
provisions of the Truth in Lending Act not yet rewritten as they would after. This act demanded 
that some creditors included in their visible disclosure statements “the default, delinquency, or 
similar charges payable in the event of late payments”188. Cases discussed in numerous courts 
posed the question whether, under this language, “the creditor had to list its right to demand 
accelerated payment of the principal upon a debtor’s default and the method by which interest 
would be computed in case of such acceleration”189. The Board’s staff interpreted the governing 
law not to demand disclosure of any acceleration right per se, and also not to demand disclosure 
of any policy concerning applicable finance charges, except when such policy varied from the 
one used with respect to voluntary prepayment (mandatorily disclosed).    
 Once the same issue reached the Supreme Court in Ford Motor Credit Co. v. 
Milhollin190, the court upheld the agency’s view. Thus, under the agency’s interpretation, the 
creditor must include in the disclosure statement only its actual policy concerning to finance 
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charges as it was a different specification from the full extent of rights granted on the contract 
signed by the debtor. Here, the courts of appeal didn’t reach a consensus. However, the Supreme 
Court upheld the agency’s position again. The Court’s reasoning was that “if the creditor 
genuinely changed its policy after the transaction had been entered, the creditor might well be 
entitled to enforce the previously unexercised, and therefore, not “disclosed” rights lurking in 
the contract”. In the Milhollin case, the court expressly assumes that debtors will read and 
understand at most the disclosure statement, which implicitly suggests that the contract terms 
will be invisible. This proposition seems contrary to the enterprise’s practice since it states that 
invisible terms that diverge from the disclosed policies may also be enforceable. Here, not only 
the invisible terms were diverting from the creditor’s practice, but also the adherent was 
explicitly invited to trust on such practice. But this is not the discussion’s central point. Thus, 
according to Rakoff, the central point as that “the domination implicit in the use of adhesive 
terms is not counterbalanced by any plausible claim that the substance of the form term is 
necessary for enterprise independence; the enterprises own practice negates that claim”191. 
Actually, the only relevant claim possible to make here is the power to free its practices from 
legal challenge, power which cannot be established, because it’s a consequence of the “evil we 
want to avoid”192                             
 Equally important is the presence of form terms correspondent to firm’s practice, 
particularly when such firm’s practice is consistent with the general trade practice too. As 
Rakoff stated “the courts have the power to adopt and enforce rules of law contrary both to 
customary practice and to form terms embodying that practice. Both the source of the 
uniformity of practice and strength of the contrary social policy are relevant to such decisions”, 
then he adds, “what is less obvious, but also true, is that the existence of uniform trade practice 
can provide a valid reason to sustain related form terms, because in some circumstances 
rejection of the terms would present a serious threat to enterprise independence”193.   
 This situation often happens in adjudication. Here, it’s the legal system’s duty to judge 
after the fact whether to accept the already-established trade practices, contained in the form 
clauses. The influence of trade custom at the time of judicial decision-making is well illustrated 
in cases regarding whether mortgages must pay interest on escrow payments made to cover 
upcoming taxes, associated to mortgaged property. The banks’ practice of demanding advanced 
payment of taxes started at the time of 1930s default and its commercial aim was to escape the 
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accumulation of liens against the property which would be previous to the mortgagee’s. The 
mortgage mechanism usually requires monthly payments to cover taxes, but remains silent 
about the issue of compensation for funds’ use. It is a standard bank practice since 1930 to 
recollect the profits earned on the float between the mortgagor’s payment and the tax collector’s 
bill. For this, many mortgagors filled up a judicial process to recover interest on profit. Courts 
frequently decided that drafter’s silence had the purpose of letting the bank avoid payment. 
Other courts were of the opinion that the desired result was it to be a contract of adhesion 
invisible term. Yet, most decisions denied the mortgagor’s claim194. Concerning this issue, 
Justice Braucher in the Carpenter v. Suffolk Franklin Savings Bank195  wrote: 
No doubt the contracts between the plaintiffs and the bank were “adhesion”    contracts, but we 
are not prepared to hold that they are unconscionable in the aspects here in issue. Customers who adhere 
to standardized contractual terms ordinarily “understand that they assenting to the terms not read or not 
understood, subject to such limitations as the law may impose”… the enrichment of the bank may have 
been unjust in some sense. Apparently, the Legislature thought so when it enacted G. L. c. 183 § 61… 
[Prospectively requiring interest payments on sums held in escrow under residential mortgages]. But 
most of the unjust enrichment, if any, enriched the bank’s depositors at the time. The plaintiffs do not 
suggest that those depositors should now disgorge their excess returns. Thus a judgement of restitution 
would ultimately result in a transfer of funds from present and future depositors to compensate for excess 
payments to past depositors. Doubtless for this reason the Legislature enacted its reform with an 
effective date over two years after enactment. We do not think we should go further in disrupting 
legitimate expectations than the Legislature was willing to go.196   
In other words, this argument states that even in the case standard terms are “not read 
or not understood”, the invisible terms of a contract of adhesion are presumed enforceable and 
that if an adherent wants to avoid the contract, it must show that the terms are “unconscionable”. 
Also, it states that even if the term apparently makes the contract unjust in some way, it must 
be sufficiently unfair to meet the applicable test. If this eventually settled the issue, the similar 
terms would be viable for the future and for the past. But concerning this even Justice Braucher 
seems to identify this framework as inappropriate, and lacking. He explains his decision on 
other grounds arising from the retroactive imposition of burdens.     
 The Carpenter case, instead, achieves the proper outcome. Here, the matter of 
retroactivity was analysed as the core problem. When considering a contract of adhesion, the 
invisible term must be in accordance with a certain background term, properly determined for 
such end. In one side, advanced payments in the course of a normal bargain wouldn’t require 
the recipient to pay interest. In the other side, the escrow payments’ purpose is to create a fund 
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for payment over third party which aim is protecting the bank’s collateral. According to Justice 
Braucher, the Massachusetts’ background rule   implied an obligation to pay, because he 
understands it to treat the legislative enactment which requires interest to be paid in the future 
as a measure of background norm’s maintenance, not as something opposed to it. Being so, the 
form term conflicts with the background rule.     
 Nevertheless, the drafting party can attempt to demonstrate the prevalence of the 
document. The background rule, thought opposite to the form document, could not be perceived 
as such, because there wasn’t yet concrete legislation on the question. Similarly the 
consideration of policy was not a basis for this result. As Rakoff stated “the industry’s 
determination of what was proper, although wrong, was not reasonable”197. In fact, the form 
term was in accordance with the bank’s practice and the bank’s industry.                                                             
If any wide rule always sustained a draftsman’s product while the background rule was 
ambiguous, such rule must not be upheld. In circumstances where the draftsman’s 
determination was not seen as unreasonable, and the adopted term was in accordance with the 
whole line of trade practice, more conclusions should be drawn. It is possible to demand that 
the establishment of a new industry, or a new practice should not be done until legal rules 
governing its conduct had been set by a governmental authority. But that would harm the 
separate intermediate organizations’ support. According to Rakoff “if enterprises are to go 
forward as independent sources of social practice, they will have to invent new solutions to 
legal problems… if firms are to establish new practices, some legal force must be accorded to 
the very fact of that establishment”198.                                      
 When a form term is not in accordance with the practice of the drafting party, so that 
only one argument to enforce the term is stated, the term should not be given deference. Also, 
if the drafting party’s practice is much more severe compared to other firms in the same 
situation, deference is not justified. However, if the form term document represents the 
organization and trade practice, consideration for the transactions already placed must be given. 
Thus, Rakoff realized that “when new legislation administrative rulemaking, or even 
prospective announcement of judge-made law is at issue, the general rule for invisible terms 
incorporating trade practice should not differ from the general rule for invisible terms as a 
whole. Trade practice should be adopted whenever it is sufficiently sound to be enforced as 
background rule, but not otherwise”199. In Rakoff’s opinion, his framework is adequate to 
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address this problem. It can be used both to sustain the nonenforcement of form terms and to 
establish appropriate, limited grounds for enforcement. 
2.2.4. Rakoff’s Conclusion 
Contract law is a social interaction system. It is based on wide generalizations about 
how social elements act and react with each other, and how institutional forces govern such 
relations. The circumstances in which contracts of adhesion are used is disconnected with the 
ordinary contract law generalizations, thus not properly defining how the parties are situated. 
For this, there is a call for a new legal structure, an entirely new body of law. In order to do so, 
an analysis of thought with experience must be done. The three types of situations discussed in 
this article do not consume all the contracts of adhesion case law. Also, not all the possible 
outcomes are predictable yet. Rakoff wrote, “The need for that reconstruction, based on an open 
recognition that contracts of adhesion represent a different social practice from “ordinary 
contracts”200, is the essential point”. For that, it is the judges and legislatures’ duty to create this 
new legal structure. They must not be afraid of leaving the ordinary contracts bonds, once and 
for all.             
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2.3. W. David Slawson 
Professor David Slawson is a highly recognized scholar whose aim was to discover all 
the accuracies of contracts of adhesion, particularly its new method of contracting. Slawson 
wrote many articles on this matter, the most remarkable ones were the “Standard Form Contract 
and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power” and “The new meaning of contracts: the 
transformation of contracts law by standard forms”. He is also one of the co-founders of the 
doctrine of “reasonable expectations”.       
 In 1971, Slawson wrote an article concerning Standard forms and Democratic Control 
of Lawmaking Power. Here, he started from the premise that “all contracting is law making”201. 
Yet, firstly he introduced the problem in a very practical way. In his opinion, the standard form 
contracts are predominant in all mundane transactions, for instance, all individuals have, at 
least, once in their life (and once is an exception) contracted this way. The contracting method 
envisioned by earlier scholars, as an individual participation of both parties in an agreement, is 
now only a historical mark. Actually, the standard form contracts impose privately made law 
that respects the major part of law to which we are bound. This lawmaking means the imposition 
of officially enforceable duties or the creation or restriction of officially enforceable rights.        
 As Slawson phrased it “the predominance of standard form terms is the best evidence 
of their necessity. They are characteristic of a mass production society and an integral part of 
it. They provide information and enforce order”202. A good example are the automobile 
insurance policies, which inform the policy holder how to behave in case of accidents or other 
such events. Services such as insurance are vital to our life, that is why there is some reason to 
make them available at a reasonable cost. In order to do so, they must be standardized and mass-
produced like other goods and services in a business economy.  The order could be settled by 
drafted rules (laws in the traditional sense) even because our society seems better organized, if 
some lawmaking power is decentralized. Therefore, the inclination is to let the economy be 
ruled by privates parties, and its translation is private control through standard form.    
 According to Slawson, if there is a huge amount of law made through standard form 
contract, at least it should be made in a democratic manner, that is, the agreement must respect 
both parties wills. The contract in the traditional sense is democratic because it respects both 
parties agreement. Unlike these contracts, the standard form contracts are not democratic. They 
are not democratic even because most of the times, the consumer doesn’t read the form, or if 
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he reads, it does it after being bound to its terms. The few that read it, are not sufficiently 
powerful to vary its terms. In Slawson’s words “the form may be a part of an offer which the 
consumer has no reasonable alternative but to accept”203. This overpowering standard forms 
have a nefarious effect in our economy. The major consequence of mass production and mass 
merchandising is making all consumer forms standard. This economic effect allied with our 
present law has the tendency of making all standard forms unfair. It is preferable to sell a 
standard form that a nonstandard one, because the latter is normally “just as expensive to make 
and sell as a nonstandard tangible product”. For this reason, sellers prefer not to offer 
nonstandard products or to demand a higher price for them.If this nonstandard negotiation were 
to take place, the buyer would have to pay expensive lawyer fees and also the seller’s extra 
costs. Moreover, the practice of negotiating a nonstandard contract could be attained more 
easily and less expensively in other ways, even if there were some benefits given by the seller.
 Another important aspect of the use of such forms is to achieve economies of mass 
production and mass merchandising. If their use is under the present system, the most probable 
outcome is that these forms are unfair. If they are not, someone is likely to be losing money. 
An unfair form has not the effect of detaining sales, because the seller is always free to arrange 
his prices. The law also is not a threat for this unfair forms. A user of an unfair form also isn’t 
much of a threat because the terms, normally unfair, are the ones providing protection for 
contingencies that probably won’t occur. And in the event such contingency happens, the 
consumer is not in a position to compare the form he submitted with other forms, and if he does, 
he’ll see that most of them are “similar”. As Slawson writes “an unfair form thus normally 
constitutes a costless benefit which a seller refuses at his peril. If he fails to take advantage of 
it, his competitors will. Competitive pressures have worked so long and so thoroughly to make 
standard forms unfair that we no longer even notice the unfairness”204.    
 Attempting to make the law of contract fair and legitimate through the insistence that a 
standard form to be enforceable must also be an uncoerced and informed agreement, is 
idealistic. It is impossible, in our modern life, to require that each time we contract, we do it in 
a complicated way, through minor agreements. Instead, we are presented with standardized 
contracts given by tolerated monopolies, in which the power of contract is the power of one 
party to impose whatever terms he likes on the other.       
 Similarly, it would be idealistic to give courts competence and power to rewrite standard 
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form contracts. Such a scenario would lead to the undoing of standard forms, because courts 
would have wide discretion to alter terms of the contract and this would harm the already 
achieved order by imposing central and inflexible control.      
 The answer, according to Slawson, is to create a “set of legal principles which reconcile 
the interests of the issuers in setting such terms as they wish on an agreement and of the 
consumer in having his reasonable expectations fulfilled”205. Slawson believes that an 
“administrative law of contracts” is the path to follow. The contracting parties no longer believe 
in the private law solution made to govern them. In such a situation all the terms would be 
known. That’s not the case anymore. Nowadays contracting parties agree to some part of the 
contract, normally a tiny one, and the remaining features are left to the seller to decide. So, they 
delegate power to the seller to decide their “not-viewed terms”206. Thus, Administrative law 
view is an attempt to maintain the unilateral or “delegated” cases of agency lawmaking 
consistent with the legislative purpose, made in the public interest. 
2.3.1. Controlling the Lawmaking Power      
             
 A) Standard’s control         
            
 The Courts have a twofold role in the lawmaking process. They can make law 
themselves or review law made by others. The method to do so is according to standards. The 
law must be in accordance with standards. This standards respect to other laws of the 
jurisdiction, essentially the ones of upper rank, the so-called “authoritative standards”. There 
also are “non-authoritative standards” which are reasons, principles or considerations without 
legal authority within the jurisdiction, but that possess more generality than the reviewed law, 
and which follow the public interest.       
 For instance, a court follows an authoritative standard when it rules in accordance with 
the decisions of a higher court of its jurisdiction. On the contrary, a Court follows a non-
authoritative standard when it chooses to refer to decisions of courts of equal or lower rank or 
of other jurisdictions. It is a normal process to resort to applicable authoritative standards to 
resolve disputes. It may also resort to non-authoritative standards, when the law was not made 
democratically. For example, it is not a requirement to justify statutes by reference to non-
authoritative standards, in the same manner that is not required to the parties of a contract to 
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justify their contract by reference to non-authoritative standards, this due to the fact that the 
contracting process is democratic. The contract terms are consented and thus binding only to 
the contracting parties.         
 The requirement of having a rule in confomity with non-authoritative standards will 
improve the law and will make it democratic regardless of its nondemocratic roots. One of the 
court’s functions while reviewing is to determine whether such standards are in the public 
interest, even because they must be so. Besides, conforming law to standards has not only the 
purpose of showing that the law is democratic and in the public interest, it is also to make it so. 
It makes the law democratic, because it subjects the law to democratic control. Thus, 
conforming a law to standards increases its susceptibility to change, for the fact that standards 
are usually much simpler than the laws which are made to follow to them.   
 The standards’ conformity also eases control, because such standards are made in 
accordance with factors which we consider pertinent. They also may serve as warning for future 
events, because even if one instance of agency lawmaking only affects some, the most general 
standards may justify more than one instance, thus many similar instances which will affect a 
large number of persons.         
 This conformity to standards is normally enforced, in the case it is enforced, by judicial 
review, which is the perfect test to assure that such standards will be truthful and precise.
  
B) Private consent 
The consent of the parties is what gives legitimacy to the privately made law, which 
controls our society. The lawmaking power is delegated to private individuals by the laws of 
contract such as collective bargaining, incorporation, partnership or private association. Some 
courts would perceive such lawmaking as unconstitutional, since it is not supposed to delegate 
such power in private parties at all. Justifying that privately made laws are subject to democratic 
control is not sufficient. Hence, the Supreme Court decided that the Section 3 of the National 
Industrial Recovery Act was unconstitutional because it delegated to privates the power to draft 
by themselves “codes of fair competition”, which weren’t substantially checked by any public 
authority, even though they would been void if they weren’t democratically adopted and 
enforced207.            
 Another important problem may arise when a law is democratically enacted by one 
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group that affects other groups who weren’t able to participate in its making. Here too, there 
must be a justification by reference to standards. The same reasoning applies to statutes, as 
Slawson wrote: 
 A corporation is deemed to have consented to the laws of the state of its incorporation 
to the same extent as if it were a voting citizen, but the laws of other states can affect its activities 
only insofar as, among other things, they comply with the standards of the Interstate Commerce 
Clause208.  
C) Conformance of Private Lawmaking to Standards  
When the lawmaking is consensual there aren’t any serious effects. The problem is when such 
lawmaking is not consensual. If one is subjected to private laws which he has not consented, 
there must be some kind of protection, that probably only judicial review can offer. The problem 
is that, while private law-making is not recognized as official law making, judicial review can 
do nothing about it. If one private person makes law for another without his consent - for 
instance through a standard form, which the major part of people doesn’t even read - it should 
be subjected to judicial review by the same authority that held its enforcement.   
 In Slawson’s opinion there might be two types of recipients of form contracts. In the 
first type, the recipient of the standard form has, in some way, manifested its consent to the 
related transaction. Of course, some of the terms are unknown by the customer, but others are 
known. That is sufficient to consider that the recipient has consented to some parts of the 
contract, which are considered to be the authoritative standard to which the other parts of the 
contract must in conformance with. There might be also authoritative standards from the public 
law. Yet, just as in Administrative Law, conformity with appropriate standards “would not be 
a part of the enforcing party’s prima facie case”209 The second type refers to recipients which 
agreement is adhesive, that is, coerced to the extent that it no longer expresses its consent. In 
this case, the recipient’s agreement has no legitimacy to the standard form, and the form, if it is 
to stay, must be in conformity with the applicable authoritative standards in public law (if there 
is any) and also in conformity with non-authoritative standards in the public interest.  
 The situation seems similar, however, between the two types, however there is a big 
difference which is that “the authoritative standard consisting of the recipient’s non-adhesive 
manifested agreement is lacking”210.         
 Sometimes, only some parts of the agreement are adhesive, for that reason Slawson 
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writes that the second type of treatment should be given to those, whereas the non-adhesive 
parts should be treated by the first type.       
            
 2.3.2. Standard’s Form Consensual Lawmaking     
            
 A) A description of contract that meets the requests of democratic consent 
           
 Slawson stars by stating that the enforcement of a standard form lies on the presumption 
that it is a contract. He wrote: 
  Since a contract is in theory the agreement of the parties to it, and since an agreement 
which is uncoerced expresses the consent of each person making it, the assumption upon which 
standard forms are commonly enforced carries with the conclusion that the law of which they 
consist is legitimate.211          
  
The Courts have given little importance to how these consents are attained. Yet, many 
standards forms which no one reasonably reads or understands are commonly treated as 
contracts. For instance, there are some contracts placing “warranties” on packaged consumer 
items inside the box, where they won’t be seen by the consumer until he opens the box at his 
house. Here, the consent doesn’t seem too democratic.     
 If the necessary consent is obtained through this means, it cannot be said that a standard 
form is a contract. In Slawson’s view “since the recipient is ignorant of its terms or even its 
existence until after he has consummated the transaction, it cannot possibly be the manifestation 
of its consent, and if we were to condition its contractual status upon a later manifestation of 
whether, and to what extent, it conformed to his manifested consent, we would end with a law 
of contract which defined standard forms as partly contracts and partially not”212.  
 The best path may be to follow the administrative law, which in this case would be more 
practical. In administrative law, the only expressions of legislature are named “statutes” and if 
they do not clash with constitutional law (the highest authoritative standards) they are 
unquestionably enforced. The remaining documents, such as rules, regulations or rulings are 
named as something else, and are enforced only in the case they are in accordance to the 
applicable statutes or other standards.       
 Thus, if the administrative language was applicable to contracts it would be a sort of  
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“manifestation or statute of a private legislature made up by parties, which would include in its 
terms, expressed or implied, a delegation of power to one or both of them to make more 
subordinate law”213. If so, contract law would meet the democratic consent requirement by 
means of the parties’ manifestation of mutual assent to one another.   
 The consensual theory of contract clearly does not demand “actual subjective consent” 
to make a contract binding. It is not sufficient for the parties to act either verbally or non-
verbally in order to give each other the reasonable expectation that they understand the meaning 
which both tend to manifest. And there is always the possibility that one of them gives an 
unintended manifestation which ultimately will lead to unwarranted contracts. Because all of 
us have unmanifested thoughts. As Slawson stated “this position rests upon the assumption that 
the sole legitimate basis for the law of contract is the parties’ consent, but the position would 
be no different if any other reasonable basis were adopted instead”214.   
 Similarly, contractual liability is based on the reliance of the promisee on a promise, the 
so-called promissory estopel. This means that if one wants to enforce a promise on the grounds 
that he relied on it, he must prove that his reliance was reasonable, which is to say that the 
promisor made the promise upon which he relied. Thus, he cannot enforce more than what he 
promised, or in other words, to what he manifested his consent.     
            
 B) Are Standard Forms contracts?        
Slawson’s conclusion on this is that standard forms aren’t contracts. As he wrote “they 
cannot reasonably be regarded as the manifested consent of their recipient because an issuer 
could not reasonably expect that a recipient would read and understand them”215. It cannot be 
said that reasonable expectations are determined by what the form states, instead it is the way 
how the transaction is conducted that matters, therefore the seller has no grounds for “asserting 
that he relied to his detriment on manifestations of mutual assent”216. The situation here is that 
the seller has no interest in his forms being fully read, even because if he wanted, he could bring 
the adverse terms of his forms to consumer’s attention by the same manner in which he 
advertises his product’s desirable characteristics.      
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 C) Identifying the contract        
            
 The contract, in this context, is the standard form itself.  There might be cases where a 
transaction involves one or two forms, but even so, is only lightly more complicated. The form 
received by the recipient is then the contract, and the other must be in accordance with the 
standard it establishes. Automobile sales practices make for a good illustration. First they have 
a shorter order form describing the kinds and amounts insured, which is the contract, and then 
they have the insurance policy itself, which is only delivered after accepted. These are two 
separate forms where only one is a contract.       
 Another good example that might help to determine the content of the contract is the 
law of sales. In this case, normally the contractual terms impose no obligations on the purchaser 
other than the payment. They only confer rights or assume or deny liabilities, subject to 
conditions. Slawson gave the example of the airline ticket: “[it] confers the right to ride a 
particular airline to a particular destination at a particular time, subject to the holder’s appearing 
at the airport sufficiently in advance of departure time. The purchaser does not promise to 
appear at the airport or to take that or any other airplane. All the promises except the promise 
to pay emanate from the issuer of the form”217. Nowadays consumers do not contract, instead 
they “buy promises” as they buy products. The price of the product is therefore the only 
consideration for the promise.         
 Standard form contracts generally have attached to them an implied warranty of fitness 
for intended purpose, which serves the function of the original contract, implied from the 
conduct of both parties, to which the standard form must be in accordance with, if valid. In the 
case a form “is not subject to such implied warranty, it must be a part of the contract and thus 
itself an expression of what the recipient can reasonably expect”218.   
            
 C) Economic benefits         
            
 If the suggestions given by Slawson were applied, competition among forms would be 
more in the consumers’ interest. If some sellers’ forms were censured due to their failure to find 
a sanction in a buyer’s actual or implied agreement, sellers would be obliged to show the 
adverse parts of their forms. Being so, buyers would have enough information to make a proper 
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selection of forms, according to their advantages. Thus, sellers would feel the competitive 
pressure to make the forms in the consumers’ interest. Competition reaches even the warranties, 
since warranties are one of the features to which the buyer pays more attention. As Slawson 
stated “if only a few consumers out of every hundred used their newly gained understanding of 
the differences among competing forms as a basis for choice, the effect would be sufficient to 
force issuers to improve their forms at all… since forms are standardized, a change intended to 
benefit the few who discriminated between forms would work to the benefit of all”219. 
             
2.3.3. Contracts of Adhesion       
            
 A) Coercion and Consent 
 According to Slawson “a contract which one party makes because he is coerced in this 
“total” sense is what we shall mean by a contract of adhesion”220. The presence of a standard 
form does not imply that the contract is adhesive in the same manner that its absence does not 
mean that the contract is not adhesive. If we look through the democratic theory of contract 
perspective, it seems to be no reason to enforce contracts of adhesion. The private law 
legitimacy of contract is obtained over the consent and manifestation of the parties’ agreement. 
If these are coerced, they cannot be consider consent. Thus, since the standards of the supposed 
contract are coerced, hence invalid, “the legitimacy of the transaction must be judged by other 
standards”221. Such standards might be available in statutes or in the common law or they may 
be provided, subject to endorsement by a court, by the creator of the private law himself. 
 So, in order to deny the enforcement of a contract because it is adhesive, a judgment of 
both parties must be made. There might be situations where one of the parties has no option but 
entering the contract, in this case, this party must prove that he had no reasonable choice, thus 
resisting to the contract’s enforcement. On the contrary, the other party wants to hold the 
enforcement because he illegitimately constricted the options of the first party. The Common 
Law path shows that generally this judgment is done separately, except when there is the 
necessity of both being together. For instance, in early cases concerning contractual 
responsibility, the party looking for excuse had to show that the other party subjected him to 
“duress”, which normally just applies to conducts of violence or of threat of violence. In 
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contrast, the most recent cases222 highlight the loss of options by the party avoiding 
enforcement, but they fail to note that this loss would not excuse contractual liability if it were 
accompanied by standards that define legitimacy.       
 Another extreme perspective is the one that considers contracts of adhesion as non-
representative of the exercise of legitimate power because they do not fulfil the characteristic 
purpose of contract law. Maybe, but is also true that this contracts provide more flexibility and 
individual fit than any other social ordering, since any individual person can participate in the 
creation of rules that ultimately will govern himself, by negotiation, compromise and bargain. 
Moreover, in the same way that is capable of flexibility and fitting, it is also capable of properly 
organizing the functioning of a corporation, thus another beneficial end of standardization. In 
fact, standardized contracts maintain the cost of writing, performing and enforcing them within 
tolerable limits.         
 Equally important is the fact that some contracts because containing standard terms 
(which are not dickered) are seen as contracts of adhesion. The act of bargaining, thus 
negotiating, is the one from which derives the legitimacy. Accordingly, if a contract has 
standard terms and dickered terms, it only should be given enforcement to the last. As we know, 
dickering is not easy nowadays. And this difficulty comes from the seller’s lack of authority to 
bargain its terms. Even in the past, it was not a requisite to dicker to close a contract. 
 Another extreme position is the one that considers that courts should never refuse 
enforcement on the sole grounds of adhesion, unless there is a statute stating so. The flaw here 
is that “never refuse” is too much. Even if there was a statute, there would always be situations 
where courts would have to refuse enforcement. As Slawson realized “a person who possesses 
the power to impose adhesive contracts on another possesses the power to make the law for him 
without his consent. Neither a legislature nor a court can constitutionally allow that power to 
exist in private hands except when appropriate safeguards are present, including a right to 
judicial review”223.           
            
 B) Principles of Adhesion appliance       
            
 There might be some means through which private law-making becomes legitimate. 
Most of the contracts made currently are contracts of adhesion, and fortunately they are 
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considered legitimate and thus enforced. Otherwise it would be very difficult to maintain the 
order. This contracts commonly appear in competitive markets, which balance supply and 
demand at a “market price”, “below which no buyer can hope to buy and above which no seller 
can hope to sell”224. If one is in need of an essential good which is commercialized through 
adhesive terms, he has no reasonable choice but to buy it, and if he does, he has no other choice 
than accepting its price, and the other terms established by the market. Therefore, if there aren’t 
any external influences affecting the market, its lawmaking is legitimate. According to Slawson 
“society has decided through its legitimate democratic processes that it wants those prices and 
terms imposed because theory teaches that they tend toward an optimum allocation of resources 
and are an incentive to efficacy. This decision serves as a standard of legitimacy, and since the 
contract is within this standard, it is legitimate and should be enforced”225.  
 However, in contracts which public utilities with legal monopolies need to provide their 
services such legitimacy shouldn’t be so easy. In this situation, if a user cannot do without the 
service, any contract he enters is a contract of adhesion. Here, the enforcement should be 
dependent on the existence of legitimate exercise of the lawmaking power in the contract or in 
a particular term involved. The imposition of conditions or rules in the contract are effectively 
regulations which were imposed by the utility as if it were an administrative agency. This rules 
or conditions should meet the utilities’ legal authority standards, being them express or implied.
 There are many monopolistic entities, privately owned or operated organizations, which 
use contracts of adhesion, such as unions, professional organizations, private schools and clubs. 
In the event that this organizations are not democratic, it seems plausible that judicially created 
standards should be applied to them. Since members of these organizations may not have 
chosen to enter or aren’t capable of structuring the organization in their best needs, this 
organization will only operate legitimately if its activities are in conformity with broader 
standards created to work the public interest.       
 However, if the organization is an adhesive, democratically operated one, the 
relationship with its members is more complex. Here, we assume that the member had no 
reasonable choice but to join, and that his participation in the democratic governance of the 
organization is the only foundation for asserting that he individually consented to its rules. 
Issues raised by the possible inequality between members are solved by corporation law, labour 
law and the law of professional organizations and private associations. The model adopted by 
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each of them is a constitutional democratic government, containing a combination of majority 
rule and individual rights.  The application of the model is not dependent on the organizations 
features. It is not required for these organizations to be “quasi-public” or even an arm of the 
state, to be fully protected by the constitution. Rather, they concentrate on their members’ 
characterization as being adhesive. But, as Slawson realized “since the individual as not 
consented to his treatment by joining or remaining in the organization, the law of the 
organization as applied to him as no legitimate basis other than its possible justification through 
his opportunity for democratic participation or its conformance to judicially acceptable 
standards”226.           
 Thus, it is a well-established common law principle that “a contract cannot be imposed 
upon a person against his will by an offer which purports to make his failure to do something 
he would not ordinarily do into a manifestation of his acceptance”227. For instance, a person 
cannot be bound to a contract for the simple fact that it requires that unless he replies to a letter, 
he will become a member. Of course he can fail to reply and still not become a member. People 
give importance to not being bothered in the pursuit for contractual activity. Yet, there are many 
situations in which someone might advantage of this to impose additional insignificant terms, 
which may be onerous.          
 People didn’t stop going to theatres for the fact that a signing behind the ticket means 
exclusion of liability for injury from fire, riot, or building defect. These kind of contracts may 
be called “contracts of imposition” and should be perceived as partially adhesive and enforced 
only to the extent that their adhesive terms can show to be in conformity with the public interest 
standards.  
 C) Adhesion Principles to Administered Industries – Complementing the Antitrust Laws 
One of the most important contexts to acknowledge the potential application of 
principles of adhesion is the private unregulated industry. Generally, terms for sale are set by 
competition or regulation whereas others are “administered”. These administered terms either 
conform to no standards at all or only to standards that lack the implicit approval of the public. 
In fact, the industry may establish its own standards, which aren’t publically controlled. There 
isn’t any evidence of public approval of such standards or of how they shall be in the first place.
 The judicial review of industrially administered terms has not been simple for Courts. 
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Many cases, such as the United States v. Trenton Potteries Co. or the United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co. showed that the members of industry conspired with each other, in order to set 
prices. In such cases, the defendants argued that their conduct was not prohibited by the 
Sherman Antitrust Act, because the set prices were not “unfair” or “unreasonable”. The 
Supreme rejected this defence due to its incapability to review prices in day-to-day basis and 
also due to fact that antitrust laws state that prices should be set by competition, and not by 
“reasonability”.          
 It might be possible that Courts have some difficulty in administering prices on a day-
to-day basis, but they are capable of reviewing terms of sale. Just as Slawson realized “there is 
no obvious reason… why a court is not competent to review the terms which an industry set for 
the warranties on its products, if the terms could be shown to have been set administratively”228. 
According to Slawson, “a court is usually competent to review administered terms, if three 
requirements are met: there must be available standards which the court can apply; the standards 
must be easily derived; and the standards must retain their relevance long enough to be 
usable”229.  Thus, the existence of standards is needed because is the only way in which courts 
obtain legitimate power to make law in a democratic society.    
 The worst barriers to judicial review of prices come from the failure to meet the second 
and third conditions. For instance, the supply and demand standard exists even if there isn’t any 
“pure” market mechanism to enforce it, but “the time and effort that would be required to find, 
collect, and assess the market data necessary to compute a market price in the absence of a 
market mechanism that does it all automatically are usually too great for the standard to be 
usable”230. Different from these are the insurance coverage contracts that can easily be reviewed 
by the courts.          
 Therefore, the appropriate standards to review terms of an industry should be made in 
accordance with the purposes of that industry and its products or services. Again, this industry 
standards should serve the public interest as if its products or services were provided to achieve 
that goal. In Slawson’s opinion “the court would have to ask, in effect, what would a reasonable 
buyer under the circumstances have chosen to buy had he the range of choice which the 
industry-imposed adhesion had denied him?”231. Actually, these standards could turn into 
valuable analogies, as happens with standards restricting the contractual freedom of physicians, 
                                                             
228 Slawson, supra note 1 at 558. 
229 Ibid.  
230 Ibid. at 559. 
231 Ibid. at 560. 
 105 
 
lawyers, accountants or other professionals. Indeed, business historic may be a rich basis for 
relevant standards.           
 The issue here is that industries should be subjected to some kind of control, being public 
or private, monopolistic or not because of the fact that they might limit the liberty of others by 
possessing lawmaking power that affects the public (which has no effective control). For 
instance, telephone companies, electric utilities and water companies, although privately 
owned, have been subjected to regulation. We should perceive that these principles should also 
apply to administered industries, without needing to convert them into public utilities, “since 
the industries can always avoid judicial control to the exact extent they choose to compete”232.
            
 2.3.4. Current Judicial Control of Contractual Lawmaking 
In Slawson opinion, if its principles were to be applied, that would mean that issuers 
would have to design contracts in the consumers’ interest if they wanted them to be enforceable. 
Of course, this does not mean that Courts, currently, enforce all standard forms. As matter of 
fact, the Uniform Commercial Code gives the courts power to ignore “unconscionable” terms 
contained in a contract. Even without any statute, courts frequently “construe” or disregard 
written contractual terms in order to reach a result which they believe equitable.  
 The Ferguson case was concerning an insurance policy for theft. Here, the insurance 
company tried to excuse its liability, but the Court held that the provisions exempting liability 
were contrary to the public policy of Kansas, and did not give effect to it. This case shows the 
uncertainty faced by authors of standard form contracts. On one side, courts try to enforce all 
terms contained in standard forms because they see them as contracts. However, in many 
situations, courts would have to invalidate or “construe” what they contemplate as an unfair 
term. And unfair terms keep popping up.        
 For the fact that, seemingly, all standard forms will be enforceable, issuers are 
stimulated to make their forms unfair. The judiciary hasn’t yet found manner to restrict the 
overreaching of issuers. Thus, the only methods available to protect recipients are the 
“unconscionability” and the “judicial construction”. However, such methods don’t seem too 
accurate. Judicial construction, for instance, has no regard to the words to be construed, and the 
construction is carried with no sense of reality. Courts weren’t there at the time of the contract.
 They do not know if the recipient have read the contract (which probably he didn’t), and 
they construe terms in accordance with the context they think to be fair. Unconscionability, on 
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the other side, allows a court to depart from a claim where the wording of the form have dictated 
the result and expose the real grounds of decision, but these grounds haven’t been yet properly 
defined, or at least, there isn’t any correct guidance on it.      
 All this principles and methods are means to achieve the same ends. For that, terms 
which seem unfair and thus fail to conform to the contract or to the standards shown to be in 
the public interest should be refused enforcement. Whereas terms that show to be in conformity 
would not be regarded as unfair.       
 According to some commentators, the Subsection (2) of section 2-302 of the Code, adds 
some procedural protection, for the fact that is an additional “opportunity to present evidence”. 
Yet, when the issue is unconscionability, much more must be borne in mind. When a court is 
presented with an unconscionability claim it should scrutinise the factors of assent, unfair 
surprise, notice, disparity of bargaining power and substantive unfairness. Because these factors 
might be unrelated, the best thing to do is to examine each one of them separately and according 
to its factual setting. By the same token, one harsh clause might overbalance with a huge number 
of other clauses that are generous. The recipient might not be aware that the contingency 
contained in the harsh clause is more likely to happen than any other generous clause. Because 
of this, a claim of unconscionability of any clause causes a consideration, and a factual full 
hearing on, all of them.        
 Slawson’s opinion is that “if the principles derived here are to be treated separately from 
unconscionability, nothing they take into account should be taken into account for the same 
purpose again under the name of unconscionability. Unconscionability, therefore, should be 
concerned solely with the possible unenforceability of a writing against a party who had 
consented to it”233.          
  
2.3.5. Slawson’s Conclusion       
           
 According to Slawson, contract law is one means by which a private law democratic 
system allied with a competitive economy achieves the consumers’ interests, and thus, the 
public interest as a whole.          
 However, this contracts are made in a quite strange atmosphere and for that, some 
factors should be taken into account. These contracts are made at a speedy pace, becoming 
almost impossible to be aware of all terms. Also, normally they are promptly accepted because 
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one of the parties has not really an alternative other than accepting the terms the other party 
sets. It should then be perceived that a contract only includes those terms which a party is 
reasonable expected to understand. For that reason, fast contracts are simple, just like their 
contents, in order to be easily understood by the recipients or otherwise they won’t be 
considered contracts at all. Forms which are not seen as contracts can nevertheless be enforced, 
if its terms are in conformity with the standards contained in the contract or if they are in 
accordance with judicially imposed public standards. Another important factor is that consent 
does not give any legitimacy to contracts of adhesion, since manifestations which are known to 
be the product of adhesion do not express consent.       
 Thus, contracts of adhesion achieve their legitimacy from the ability of justification by 
reference to the same public standards as are required to sustain those parts of every standard 
form which cannot be supported by reference to an actual contract.  
 Slawson tie up loose ends with the assertion that: 
 There being no private consent to support a contract of adhesion, its legitimacy rests 
entirely on its compliance with standards in the public interest. The individual who is subject 
to the obligations imposed by standard form thus gains the assurance that the rules to which he 
is subject have received his consent either directly or through their conforming to higher public 
laws and standards made and enforced by the public institutions that legitimately govern him.234  
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2.4. Further considerations 
 Kessler, Rakoff and Slawson had divergent points, but all of them perceived that 
contracts of adhesion are a public affair. They had the belief that someday, an entire body of 
law would be born to remedy the failures so far experienced.     
 Kessler, for instance, recognized that the concepts of contract law are not motionless, 
but emphasised the fact that people still look at law concepts as static. People still make that 
religious separation between the public and the private, without even thinking that today they 
mix. Regarding contract law, we still adopt the private perspective as if the contract relationship 
remained unchanged to this day, when in fact the opposite happens. The contract is no longer 
between two equal individuals instead it is one individual versus an institution: what Kessler 
called a “contract of adhesion”. However, people have the tendency to generalize. While 
contract law is largely seen as a private issue, the public law administration law is seen as purely 
public, since is the state’s duty to govern it. They do so, because it is socially acceptable and 
practicable to place people that are “equal” on one side, and institutions, in the other. However, 
everyone fails to recognize that private businesses are taking advantage of this widespread 
inertia. People cannot remain clawed to the traditional legal concepts just out of the fear of 
change. Change will be difficult but pleasurable. If people separate individuals and institutions 
and if the market is perceived as an institution, should it not be governed by public law, or at 
least controlled by it? The problem is that everything related to contracts remains in the private 
sphere, as if contracts were still made on an equal footing. They are not. More than that they 
are made in an unfair manner, so that firms obtain the maximum profit. Even more, they are 
made by informed people, namely lawyers, so that they will remain legally enforceable. Kessler 
was the only author that perceived the shift in the institutional power. The exchanges can no 
longer be held in reserve to individuals, they are now, mainly made through powerful economic 
organizations, that are at the level of the State. The contract is no longer a private issue, it is 
rather public and institutional.  In this context, the laissez-faire doctrine just does not make 
sense anymore.           
 As well as it does not make sense to talk about freedom of contract, if it is purely a 
private right.  In fact, is due to freedom of contract in the context of contracts of adhesion that 
many problems arise. This principle, that it is also a right, implies that people voluntarily accept 
their contractual obligations. In other words, they have consented to the contract. From this 
principle arises another principle called private autonomy, which, in this context, enables 
enterprises and businesses to draft their own contracts. Therefore Freedom of Contract implies 
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a double discourse. On the one hand,, it calls for “voluntary consent” of the parties, and on the 
other , it lets a powerful organization draft a contract that will be delivered to a person that only 
has to sign or agree to it to be bound to its terms. If the contract is already made without any 
negotiation, just the simple delivery of the form contract, how can “consent” be voluntarily 
given? Worst, how can a signature or a simple act of acceptance be perceived as consent, when 
consent implies negotiation? Freedom of Contract, as Kessler realized, should be balanced with 
the social importance of the type of contract. In this context, this freedom cannot be treated as 
if it were in the context of an ordinary contract, since it is visible that it is not fairly distributed 
to all members of the society. This was the reason why Kessler said that “freedom of contract 
enables enterprises to legislate in a substantially authoritarian manner without using the 
appearance of authoritarian forms”235. That, in other words means, making effective law, which 
is not subject to any “democratic control”. We should recall what Slawson argued, that most of 
the law’s production gains legitimacy through the parties consent while most standard forms 
do not. In the cases where such legimacy does not exist they should not be even legal. To be 
supported, standard form contracts must pass through a judicial control and review as is 
typically done for other types of lawmaking “not directly validated by democratic process”. In 
other words, contracts of adhesion or standard form contracts, because they are not supervised 
or controlled, must be subject to some kind of control to ensure the consumer’s protection. Law 
is being made and applied to consumers without any sort of higher control. The contracts of 
adhesion fall totally neither within the private sphere nor within the public one. Their basis and 
foundations are private, but their lawmaking is public, because applied to many individuals.
 Since they make law to individuals, in the same manner as the legislature does, they 
must be subject to public law scrutinity. The use of standard forms by organizations results in 
a high degree of authority for the same. If we let them continue to use them, this authority will 
increase even more. The democratic control is urgent. In Rakoff’s words, “if the legal system 
wants to enforce such clauses, it must control the abuses of the practice”236. According to 
Slawson, the best path to control a standardized contract is through standards applied within a 
administrative law of contracts framework. This framework would have two types of standards: 
the authoritative standards, according to the higher court of the jurisdiction; and non-
authoritative standards, referring to “reasons, principles, or considerations possessing no legal 
authority within the jurisdiction but of greater generality than the law being reviewed and 
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serving to demonstrate that it is in the public interest”. Then, when confronted with unfair 
standard contracts judges could “identify, select and applicate the correct standards for 
reviewing form terms in the same manner they use such standards to create common law”237. 
Slawson believes in giving some partial lawmaking power to the drafter, in the sense that is the 
adherent who delegates the power to fill the form terms to the drafting party. Being so, is the 
private parties’ duty to decide where the public interest lies, because this power was legally 
delegated to them. However, this solution seems way too general, lawmaking legitimacy is 
dependent on many factors. In Slawson’s words, “there being no private consent to support a 
contract of adhesion, its legitimacy rests entirely on its compliance with the standards in the 
public interest”238. 
Another issue that Kessler refers is the monopolistic situation that might be enjoyed by 
the author of the contract, which years later was discredited by Rakoff. There seems to be no 
relation between the use of standard form contracts and businesses with monopoly power. Even 
small companies today use these contracts. These days, due to the development of the global 
economy, contracts of adhesion or standard form contracts are needed to keep the market going. 
They are needed in order to promote the market efficiency and, as some argue239, to lower costs 
to the consumer. Also, contracts of adhesion foster the development of the organizational 
structure of an economic organization, for the fact that they organize the internal hierarchy and 
minize the need to delegate authority. However, this is not a plausible reason for the level of 
imposition on consumers that the enforcement involves.     
 But then, other questions come to mind. Why is the enforcement of form terms prima 
facie valid? Slawson accepts and uphelds the idea that standard form contracts are presumably 
enforceable because lawmaking is socially better accepted if descentralized. In other words, the 
lawmaking power should be divided, and not totally condensated in the hands of the state. 
Rakoff, in the other side, is of the opinion that form terms contained in contracts of adhesion 
should be presumptively unenforceable. Rakoff focuses his analysis on the separation between 
contracts of adhesion and other type of ordinary contracts, and it seems the best option. Also, 
he separates the form terms in visible (normally the price term) and invisible (all the others). 
The visible terms are normally bargained whereas the invisible are not. However, setting the 
bounderies between visible and invisible is not an easy task. Promoting the nonenforceability 
                                                             
237 Slawson, supra note 1 at 558-60. 
238 Ibid. at 566. 
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of form terms may lead to an increase in litigation, both for the judiciary and the parties,  
because there will be a continuos reference to the background law. Conversely, deciding on the 
basis of enforceability seems the best choice in order to save review into precedent, or resort to 
trade usage. Also, it seems easier to keep the rule of enforceability of a form than applying the 
rule of law.            
 On the whole, the three authors agree that contracts of adhesion lack democratic control. 
They are used to achieve the highest outcome possible for the organizations, with no mercy for 
the consumers. They make law and they force us to accept it because there is no other way to 
resort other than the market itself. For the fact that contracts of adhesion are made to the public, 
but governed by private principles, at least in some extent they must be governed by public law. 
A hybrid between public and private law, would be a good option, since this contracts are, 
before being contracts of adhesion, public contracts. Why is private contracting the only 
accepted form of contracting? It is not fair, and not even viable. It is hard to admit but the fear 
of disturbing the social and economic “equilibrium” is bigger than the fear of losing social 
justice. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE AZIZ CASE 
PUBLIC INTEREST OR PRIVATE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION? 
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3.1. The Aziz Case 
 The Aziz case is a good example of how the European Courts are dealing with contracts 
of adhesion. These contracts are regulated by the Directive 93/13/EEC, concerning unfair terms 
in consumer contracts and seem to be more consumer-protective than the Common Law 
regulamentation on the issue.  In the EU the clauses are largely unenforceable against 
consumers, for example through the Directive “indicative list of unfair terms” that together with 
further EU developments tightened the “presumptive” unfairness. Also, there are cases where 
the terms are per se  unfair, the ones contained in the “black list”. By contrast, the US 
jurisdiction considers contracts of adhesion “presumptively” enforceable. Thus, the US judges 
resort to the doctrine of unconscionability or to the doctrine of  public interest to demonstrate 
that a contract is unfair, therefore, nonenforceable.      
 In Europe, the Aziz case was a major contribution towards the doctrine of public interest 
in contracts of adhesion. The Courts no longer look at this contractual relationship as if it were 
strictly private and equal. Instead, Courts prefer to treat the consumer as a weaker party in the 
transaction, and thus, giving it more protective measures. Moreover, it opened the door to the 
debate concerning the constitutionalization of private law.     
 The Aziz case dates back to 2011, and deals withthe interpretation of the Directive 
93/13/EEC concerning the validity of certain terms of a mortgage loan agreement entered by 
Mr. Aziz and Caixa d’Estalvis de Catalunya.   
 
3.1.1. The case 
 On 19 July of 2007 Mr. Aziz signed a mortage loan contract with Caixa D’ Estalvis 
Tarragona (currently Caixa D’Estalvis Catalan, Tarragona i Manresa, Catalunyacaixa)240. The 
information sheet given by Caixa D’ Estalvis Tarragona was signed by the applicant Mr. Aziz 
and it specified that the property that would be subject to the mortgage loan was his family 
home, in which he had lived since 2003. Mr. Aziz was married and had other two family 
members living with him. He was a specialized worker in machinery, engineering and 
mechanics. He worked in the same company, as a permanent employee since 2006, and had a 
fixed monthly income of 1.341,67 Euros. Mr. Aziz was a Moroccan national who had 
continuously worked in Spain in various professions since December 1993. The lent capital 
                                                             
240 ECJ, Case C-415/11, Mohamed Aziz [2013] ECR I-nyr. 
 115 
 
was a total of 138.000 Euros. Its reimbursement had to be made in 33 years, through 396 
monthly installments which began on 1 August 2007. The last installment was due on 31 July 
2040. Each monthly installment, including the initial interest rate would be 701, 40 Euros. 
 In its clause 6, the loan agreement established an annual default interest of 18,75%, 
automatically actionable on unpaid amounts, without the need for any notice, or claim by the 
creditor. Besides that, clause 6 conferred on Catalunyacaixa the right to demand the entirety of 
the loan in the event that any of the terms agreed expired without the debtor having fulfilled his 
obligation to pay part of the capital or interest on the loan. Lastly, in the clause 15 of that 
agreement concerning to the agreement on determination of the amount due, was stipulated that 
Catalunyacaixa had the possibily to resort to foreclosure to collect the debt, but it could also 
directly submit an appropriate settlement to determine the amount claimed. Mr. Aziz frequently 
paid the monthly instalments from July 2007 to May 2008, but he ceased paying as of June 
2008. Given this default, on 28 October 2008 Catalunyacaiza went to a notary in order to obtain 
a certificate which determined the amount of debt owned by Mr. Aziz. The value of the debt 
was 139.764.76 Euros, a result of the unpaid monthly instalments, including contractual and 
default interest.          
 After an unsuccessful attempt to contact Mr. Aziz to pay, on 11 March 2009, 
Catalunyacaixa brought an enforcement procedure against him before the Court of First 
Instance No. 5 in Martorell. The main claim was for 139.674,02 Euros, but it also claimed 90, 
74 Euros for due interests and 41.902,21 Euros for other interests and costs. Mr. Aziz failed to 
appear, and on 15 December 2009, that Court ordered enforcement to the procedure which 
resulted in an order of execution issued by the Court on 15 December 2009. A demand for 
payment was also sent to Mr. Aziz, who did not respond or oppose the order. For that reason, a 
public auction was held on 20 July 2010 to proceed with the sale of the property. No bids were 
made. Consequently, in accordance with Article 698 of the Spanish Civil Procedure Law, the 
Court of First Instance no. 5 of Martorell required the sale of property at 50% of its real value. 
The Court indicated 20 January 2011 as the date on which the property transfer had to occur. 
As a result, Mr. Aziz was expelled from his house. However, shortly before this occurrence, on 
11 January 2011, Mr. Aziz applied to the Juzgado de lo Mercantil No. 3 de Barcelona for a 
declaration seeking the annulment of clause 15 of the mortgage loan agreement, on the grounds 
that it was unfair. That would also mean that the enforcement proocedings would be annulled. 
This Court expressed some doubts concerning the conformity of Spanish Law with the legal 
framework established by the Directive. As a result, the Court stayed in the proocedings and 
referred to the ECJ the following questions for a preliminary rulling: 
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1) Whether the system of judicial decisions on mortgaged or pledged property pursuant to  
Article 695 et seq. of the Spanish Code of Civil Procedure, imposes limits regarding the 
consumer’s grounds of objection, which involves, both formally and substantively, a 
clear obstacle to the consumer’s exercise of rights of action or judicial remedies of such 
a kind which guarantees an effective protection of his rights, might be considered a clear 
restraint to the consumer’s protection?241 
 
2) How is to be understood the concept of disproportion with regard to: 
a) The use of acceleration clauses in contracts lasting a considerable time – 33 years in 
this case– for incidents of default happening within a limited specific period; 
b) The fixing of default interest rates – in this case superior to 18% - which are not 
consistent with the criteria for determining default interest in other consumer 
contracts (consumer credit), which, in other types of consumer contracts, might be 
considered as unfair, and which, in contracts relating to immovable property, are not 
subject to any clear legal limit, even where they are applied not only to the 
instalments that have already been required but also to the totality of those that have 
become required due to the result of the clause of acceleration; 
c) The unilateral impositon by the lender of mechanisms for the calculation and 
determination of variable interest – both ordinary and default interest – which are 
connected to the possibility of mortgage enforcement and do not allow a debtor who 
is subject to enforcement to object to the quantification of the debt in the 
enforcement proceedings themselves but instead require him to resort to declaratory 
proceedings in which a final decision will not be given before enforcement has been 
completed or, at least, the debtor will have lost the property mortgaged or charged 
by way of guarantee – a matter of great relevance when the loan is sought for the 
purchase of a house and enforcement implies the eviction from the property? 
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3.1.2. The ECJ’s new approach 
 In the Aziz case, the ECJ accompanied by the Advocate General, investigated three 
terms at the very center of Spanish mortgage contracts. The ECJ went far in its direction towards 
what is “correct” and “fair” in the interpretation of what is “disproportionate”. In fact, what the 
ECJ is doing is measuring and weighing the fairness of contract terms to a degree of detail 
which usually only is found at the level of national courts’ appeals. 
 
A) Assessment of standard contract terms 
The three contract terms presented by Caixabank have, in effect, reinforced its position: 
1) through the acceleration clause – in case of default by the debtor in respect of just one of the 
total of 396 monthly payments, the borrowing bank may automatically call in the totality of the 
loan; 2) through the interest default clause – if the borrower fails to pay, without the need for a 
notice or reminder at all, he must pay default interests of 18,75% on the sum of capital due; 3) 
through unilateral determination of the amount owed -  for the enforcement proceedings the 
lender may unilaterally determine the balance of the loan and can thus automously generate an 
important condition for the conduct of the simplified mortgage enforcement proceedings. The 
ECJ based on the arguments of the Advocate General in the assessment of the acceleration 
clause as well as of the default interest clause, but took a different view with regard to 
assessment of the unilateral determination.        
 Both Advocate General and the ECJ pointed out the significance of the obligation to 
pay instalments which then has to be balanced against reasons which prevented the consumer 
from performing properly as well as the procedural remedies provided under national law to 
redress the potential misconduct. The Advocate General and the ECJ only disagreed on the 
assessment of the acceleration clause. While the Advocate General makes a sharp reference 
under the requirement of good faith to the expectations of the consumer, the ECJ remained 
completely silent about it. Implicity, both are aware that losing the home and having the risk to 
be evicted is a serious threat that cannot be so easily overcome by the single non-payment of a 
loans’s instalment.          
 As regards to the assessment of the default interest clause, the ECJ agrees with Advocate 
General in using point 1. e) of the indicative list242 to interpret and understand the default 
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interest clause, but both thoroughly investigate the purpose which “may be lawfully pursued by 
default interest under national law and whether it constitutes, for example, merely a flat-rate 
amount to cover damage caused by default or is also intended to encourage the parties to 
observe the agreement”243. The reference to national rules on default interests is not the only 
basis of the assessment, but might also be the limit to European consumer law. The Advocate 
General and the ECJ both recognize that the regulation of default interest depends of the 
national legal cultures. Yet, this is a rather bizarre reference in a market which is dominated by 
global standards and an ever stronger effort to create a European capital market. It is a way of 
defence for Member States who may feel tempted to camouflage a consumer unfriendly 
regulation of default interests by reference to the respective national legal culture. Unlike the 
Advocate General who limits herself to weighing the different interests involved, the ECJ 
applies the proportionality rule in private law relationships.    
 The reasoning behind the unilateral determination of the amount owed has a notable 
difference between the Advocate General and the ECJ. The Advocate General emphasises the 
key function of that clause for the enforcement proceedings. Without such a unilateral 
determination of the amount, Caixa bank would not be capable of initiating the mortgage 
enforcement proceedings, but would first have to go to court and ask for a determination of its 
claim. The difference is evident. If Caixa bank is capable of unilaterally determining the amount 
owed, it can count on a prompt enforcement procedure which cuts the borrower off from the 
any potential reference to the fairness of the standard form contract. If not so, the borrower may 
pose the fairness test before the Court which has to determine the amount owed. The ECJ, 
different from the Advocate General, and without mentioning to the Opinion, underlines point 
1 q) from the UCTD Annex (preventing the consumer’s right to a legal remedy) as a point of 
reference. Thus, the reference to the national rules remains the cottier, just like the link of the 
term to the procedural consequences occurring from the separation between the declaratory and 
the enforcement proceedings do. However, the Advocate General does not vacillate to add 
guidance to a possible interpretation of the respective national legal rules and she is quite 
forthright of the criteria the national court must take in consideration in its final assessment. 
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B) Veiled constitutionalization in Aziz? 
The constitutionalization of European private law is one of the most studied subjects of 
private law. Normally, the thought is that private law constitutionalization permits for a “better” 
and more “just” solutions, for instance, to protect the weaker party, the worker, the migrant, the 
tenant, the private investor and the consumer244. Mohamed Aziz gives a new tier to the 
constitutionalization of private law debate. It is hidden because the advocate general and the 
ECJ do not even refer the Charter of Fundamental Rights, despite the fact that “the right of 
housing” is provided by Article 43 (3):   
 In order to combat social exclusion and poverty, the Union recognises and respects the 
right to social and housing assistance so as to ensure a decent existence for all those who lack 
sufficient resources, in accordance with the rules laid down by Union Law and national laws 
and practices. 
In the event that Advocate General or the ECJ were to make a direct reference to it, 
Article 43 of the Charter would be seen as a principle, rather than a right, and if so, that would 
cause a discussion about social inclusion and poverty. Moreover, the ECJ would have to 
investigate the extent to which other fundamental rights could be used to give housing a 
profounder constitutional dimension. Legislation does not address this issue, even the new 
Mortgage Credit Directive does not mention Article 43 of the Charter.   
 Yet the fact of not referring Article 43 does not mean that both the Advocate General 
and the ECJ were not aware of the constitutional dimension behind this case. In fact, both 
Advocate General and the ECJ gave a constitutional dimension to their arguments. The closest 
to constitutional reasoning is contained in the Opinion of Advocate General, when she 
underlines the consequences of the interplay between contract law and national proceedings. 
The ECJ agrees and confirms this point, but enhances an even tougher constitutional element 
in stressing the whole purpose for which the credit has been granted: housing as the creation of 
a family’s home245. The reasons for such an undercover approach might be also found in the 
attitude of the Spanish Constitutional Court which had corroborate the constitutionality of the 
Spanish enforcement proceedings246. If the ECJ addressed the issue of constitutionalization in 
an open way, the contract terms in Aziz would have forced the ECJ to initiate a constitutional 
                                                             
244Hugh Collins, The Constitutionalization of European Private Law as a path to social justice? In H. W. Micklitz, The many faces of Social 
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dialogue with the Spanish Constitutional Court. The fact is that ECJ is fully aware of the 
citizenship dimension of consumer rights as demonstrated in Asbeek, where it underlined the 
“essential needs” of the consumer/tenant to acess housing247. The reason why ECJ refrained 
from openly addressing the constitutionalization was the risk of turning each and every private 
law conflict into a constitutional conflict. It is preferable to ECJ to keep its low profile, even if 
it is not satisfactory. It would be more convincing if the ECJ had clearly addressed the 
advantages and disadvantages, the possibilities and bounderies of the constitutionalization of 
private law.  
 
3.1.3. The ECJ as supervisor of unfair terms  
 The adoption of the Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts brought 
up the increasing importance of European private law. The ECJ was afraid to be considered the 
court of last resort to examine standard contract terms in Europe. For that reason, the ECJ 
created new avenues for consumer protection.   
 A) The procedural innovation – ex officio doctrine and injunctive relief  
 The ECJ created a new path and introduced a procedural remedy into the European 
Consumer Law. It created the ex officio obligation of the national judge to examine the legality 
of standard terms. The ECJ made a reference to some cases, such as Pannon248, Asturcom249, 
Pénzügyi250, Photovost251, Invitel252, Banco Español de Crédito253, Banif254 and Asbeek 
Brusse255 to confirm and develop more sophisticated criteria for this new procedural remedy. 
Until now, the ECJ had imposed an obligation on the national judge in an order for payment 
procedure (Banco Español256) and in inter partes proceedings where the consumer opposed to 
the order of payment (Pénzügyi257). In the Invitel, the ECJ stretched the ex officio doctrine to 
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the action for an injuction. By doing so, it connected the individual and collective remedy. What 
is yet to decide is the degree to which the ex officio doctrine can be lengthen, beyond the scope 
of the unfair contract terms directive, to all the EU rules which provide for mandatory level of 
protection, not just in consumer law, but also in labour law, anti-discrimination law, 
environmental law, in sum, whatever the EU sets binding standards.    
 In Mohamed Aziz, the referring Spanish Court did not ask the ECJ whether the court 
inquiring into the enforcement proceedings must also evaluate themselves “the effectiveness of 
individual contractual terms which have effects on enforcement”. In fact, neither did the 
Advocate General. Also, the ECJ did not explain the role and function of ex officio doctrine in 
this case. Conversely, the Advocate General reasoned from the principle of effectiveness the 
need to grant interim relief to protect the rights of over-indebted consumers against the 
devastating effects of the separation between the declaratory and the enforcement proceedings. 
The ECJ upheld its position in Unibet258. This was how the ECJ introduced a new procedural 
remedy that unites the enforcement proceedings and the declaratory proceedings. The 
procedural autonomy of Member States, so much emphasized did not meet the effectiveness 
test. Here, Advocate General Kokott built a connection between the rights granted under the 
Directive 93/13/EEC and the necessity to provide for appropriate protection within national 
procedural law259.           
 In other words, the total separation of the two proceedings makes it impracticable for 
the consumer to raise in the enforcement proceedings the question of whether the underlying 
contractual terms are in compliance with the requirements of Directive 93/13/EEC. In this way, 
procedure and substance remain interlinked. If not for Directive 93/113/EEC, the ECJ would 
never have the opportunity to investigate in a deeper way the procedural law of Spain. 
 Therefore, the interim relief would have to be granted in those situations where the 
European substantive and national procedural law would damage the effective and equivalent 
protection of substantive EU law. If so, this would mean that an important gap would be closed 
in the protection of collective rights of consumers.      
 As far as the developments in the field of remedies to the ex officio doctrine, the ECJ 
has already started to lay autonomous procedural consumer law. Regardless of its feasibility 
and legality under the existing law, the extension of the ex officio doctrine would put even  
heavier weight on national judges, on their obligations and their commitment to the protection 
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of collective interests of consumers. The ones who are for the public interest litigation, rely on 
the Courts to promote particular and normally socially mistreated policies, such as 
environmental protection, anti-discrimination and consumer protections applauding such 
judicial activism from the ECJ to the national courts. Still, the fervour for the ECJ’s 
commitment in social policy is rather outbalanced by the unwillingness of the national courts 
to follow the ECJ’s interpretation of the ex officio doctrine. 
B) Guide for the interpretation of European Private Law 
Is it sufficient to provide national default rules as as guidance for the interpretation of 
good faith and significant imbalance in European contract law? Is the only standard reference 
made by the ECJ in its judgments is “it is for the national court to decide on the basis of the 
facts of the case…” enough to overcome the problem that there are no European default rules. 
Maybe is the role and function of the Draft Common Frame of Reference to set default rules, 
or is it the ECJ reference to “general principles of civil law” the path to close the gap? 
 Or is the European Court of Justice’s ambition to gradually take over the substantive 
control and to establish the standards of fairness across whole the Europe? The Directive 
93/13/EEC, technically only sets minimum standards. Is the ECJ establishing the limit for 
minimum justice? And where are the national courts in relation to all this? Are they mere agents 
of ECJ, like in the RWE260, or are they refraing from resorting to ECJ as the former House of 
Lords did twice in the field of contract terms?      
 In Mohamed Aziz, the guidance to national courts was strengthened, on the one hand by 
upgrading the function of the indicative list261, and in the other hand, by engaging in a European 
interpretation of good faith, significant imbalance and disproportion 
3.1.4. The ECJ as a social righteous 
There are lots of cases that resemble  Mohamed Aziz all across the Europe. It is the ECJ’s 
duty, as a court of last resort, to assure to the citizens of Member States the protection that 
sometimes lacks in their own national judicial systems. Mohamed Aziz was a “test case”, in 
which the ECJ was faced with the social and societal dimension of the current economic crisis. 
Often, neither the national governments nor other political actors at the European level offer a 
solution to this problem. In order to surpass the crisis, and to prevent banks from going 
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bankrupt, politicians around Europe seem to have ignored the effects of the crisis on citizens in 
their existence as human beings.        
 It is not a novelty to rely on ECJ to redress social and societal deficiencies of the national 
and European legal orders. Yet, there is a major difference between all the public interest 
litigation which has reached the ECJ and Mohamed Aziz – the extension of the conflict. This is 
not a one Member State conflit, it concerns all. In addiction, this conflict is inserted into a crisis 
that stirs the foundation of the European legal order as such. In such a harsh political 
atmosphere, the ECJ has the responsibility to provide guidance to the solution of a conflict with 
extreme and societal reach for Spain and beyond Spain. Thus, over-indebted consumers can 
now read the judgment carefully and refer it to upcoming cases to the ECJ. This will push the 
Court harder and harder, particularly, if national courts and national political actors are not 
prepared to respond and to remedy discrepancies in national laws and national procedures. 
 Moreover, the Aziz case reveals the flaws of opening up markets for mortgage credits to 
low-income consumers in the EU without creating possible safeguards at the European level 
against the potential risks of private household debts for the economy at large. This could be 
done, for instance, through an appropriate European mechanism on mortgage foreclosure. 
 The political elite seems to regard the loss of homes simply as collateral damage. For 
that reason, the ECJ should act like a guardian of social justice who corrects the failures and 
disinterests of such elite.         
 As an illustration, we should remember the positions hold by the Spanish Government 
and the European Commission. Both favoured the interests of Caixa over Mohamed Aziz. The 
Spanish government attempted everything to challenge the admissibility of the reference, often 
with suspicious foundations. It has argued that the questions which had been referred were 
“irrelevant” for the mortgage enforcement proceedings262. By the same token, the European 
Commission had no problem in stressing the legality of the acceleration clause to protect the 
interests of the lender and efficient enforcement proceedings263.    
 Is this a parallel between the ECJ and the Warren Court in the US? The Warren Court 
opened the door for class actions in the field of consumer protection for which the famous 
Federal Rule 23 had not been created in the beginning. Thus, this is a path for public interest  
debate. The question is whether the European Union is floating in direction to the public interest 
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litigation? Or is it, instead, taking into account Constitutional values in private law 
relationships? Perhaps both. 
 
3.2. The public interest 
The public interest debate started in the 1960s during the U.S social turmoil and it 
quickly spread to other jurisdictions, namely the EU. The problem is that, over the years, 
lawyers and other legal actors became allies of great corporations and have neglected their 
obligation to use their powers for the protection of people. The public interests has been ignored 
too many times.          
 This debate has its most challenging element in the analysis of the definition of public 
interest as distinct from an individual or collective interest. For instance, concerning standard 
form contracts against consumers, those supporting enforcement generally speak of freedom of 
contract in a market society and trust on the consumer’s consent as the main reason for 
enforcement. On other hand, those who do not agree with enforcement usually argue that the 
consumer does not consent in a meaningful way and that, even with consent, enforcement of 
some or all of the form terms would be unjust or unfair. Both arguments have considerable 
weight, but each of them is rights-based, that is, limited to the rights of one party of the contract. 
Even if these arguments relate to many sellers issuing form contracts and to millions of 
consumers against whom they might be enforced, this does not mean an argument of public 
interest. Of course, the sellers’ advocates would argue that, ultimately, all the society is 
benefitting with its enforcement and the consumers would make the same assertion about 
nonenforcement. However, each of them would be speaking of the combination of individual 
results, not a different collective interest that should be borne in mind when determining an 
appropriate legal policy.        
 Although this may be true, other arguments are based on the public interest notion. The 
definition of public interest is based on the concern about the positive and negative effects of a 
policy on most of the people of the society, including those whose individual interests are not 
directly implicated by a given transaction or activity. For instance, concerning to standard form 
contracts, the public interest might include factors different from freedom of contract or an 
unjust result for the consumer party.        
 There are many concerns in the context of form contracts. One of them, might be called 
the “secondary effects”. Considering the consumer’s advocate argument that courts should be 
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more ready than they have been to strike down unreasonable and oppressive contract terms. 
One feature of that assertion would be the benefit to the consumers thus saved from the 
enforcement of such terms. Another feature would be the assertion that judicial activism would 
serve the public interest by arming the sellers’ lawyers with utensils to convince their customers 
to draft form contracts in a fairer way.       
 Being so, all the society will benefit by giving everyone more self-assurance in entering 
into form contracts and forming a universal sense of fairness in the market place. Different from 
these arguments are the individual rights arguments that rest upon costs and benefits to the 
society rather than arguments about real consent or normative beliefs about fairness. 
 The disappearance of the public interest is due to the fact that many legal fields have 
been privatized by the presumption that benefits and costs concerned in a given activity are 
limited to the private parties who are individually interested in the outcome. This is true, but 
just half-true. Let us recall Mohamed Aziz, a case that was simply an example of many more, 
concerning to over-indebted consumers. When one of the parties has much more power than 
the other, normally it takes advantage of that. In the Mohamed Aziz it was the banks, all across 
the Europe, that took advantage of low income consumers to profit and assure their (market) 
position. Being so, if one reality respects many people, namely people with low or no power to 
react, that situation must be resolved according to the public interest. We must consider also 
the society in which we live in. That society is full of interest group influence and legislator 
self-interest. The people have become a mere number. For that, the belief must be to protect the 
weaker party that is also the public in general. It is true that is hard to connect public interest 
factors with particular legal rules. What tends to happen is that legislators often rely on the 
courts to have such factors in mind coupled with the structure of a statutory system as a whole 
when creating a rule.           
 The main problem of public interest is that normally is viewed more as an exception 
than as a rule, for that it sometimes lacks the protection needed to the consumers.  
 Yet, this is just one of the possible paths to follow to achieve the largest consumer 
protection. 
           3.3. Private Law’s Constitutional Approach  
 The public interest is, no doubt the core element of the consumer protection issue. The 
way to address it may change, but its basis remains the same. As far as standard form contracts, 
Mohamed Aziz introduced a new element already known in other cases: the possibility of 
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introduction of constitutional values or norms in the private law sphere264.   
 Should private law and constitutional law be interconnected in the new European multi-
level system? Should the private law be conformed with constitutional principles? 
 The constitutional law has intrinsic to it a “protective function of the State” or a “positive 
obligation of the state” 265. The development of private law in accordance with constitutional 
values is the constitutional law’s duty, and also of the courts in applying it. The approach taken 
(before) separates the private law from the constitutional law, instead of thinking of it as an 
interrelationship. Thus, the relationship between both should be one in which dialogue takes 
place. This is an consequence of the extreme formalism of law, to separate two fields that, in 
reality, complement each other. For that reason, judges should be instructed to open-up private 
law to the power of the constitutional norms. The values contained in such norms are embodied 
and are constitutive of the very forms of social ordering. Adjudication is a prominent possibility 
because it may spell out those values and encourage the autonomous self-regulation. As 
Gerstenberg writes “the role of the courts in developing constitutional norms within private law 
is not one of absorbing into themselves the entire task of re-writing the entire background rules 
of private law. Rather, the role of courts can be seen as one of providing ‘deontologic side-
constrains’ for the autonomous self-regulation of comprehensive social spheres that carry out 
their own internal logic and integrity”266.        
 The main problems with this approach lie in the influence of “higher law” (human rights 
norms and constitutional norms) on the “ground-rules” of private law and also the related 
question of the role of adjudication in “constitutionalising” private law, that is the judicial 
awareness of constitutional norms within the private law in the broader context of liberal 
democracy. In this sense, one should start by asking why there is so much resistence to the idea 
that a private party may invoke fundamental rights against another party that is not the State. If 
it is recognized that fundamental rights are more than just legal guarantees for protecting the 
freedom of the individual against excesses of political power than there is no reason for that to 
happen. They are also “objective elements of the constitution”, or objective principles that aim 
to safeguard the “fair value” of rights, even in the sphere of individual relations. Supporters of 
the view that fundamental rights’ scope should be limited to the dimension of correcting 
imbalances between the excesses of state power  and individual liberty claim that only like this 
can legal implications remain predictable. If there were an extension of fundamental rights to 
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private (non-state) actors, then that will require courts to “balance” competing fundamental 
rights. The same would not happen in disputes between the individual and the state (because 
the state does not bear rights). Thus, the courts are not prepared to bear out this burden, in the 
absence of detailed and specific legislative guidance. Gerstenberg’s view267 on the extension of 
fundamental rights between and among private (non-state) actors features three points: 1) it will 
result in a threat to private law’s libertarian core of private autonomy, by placing the private 
actors under the same duties as public bodies acting in the public interest; 2) it will cause a 
judicial usurpation of legislative prerogatives in determining the limits of spheres of private 
autonomy, by displacing or overriding the policy choices of statutory legislator; and 3) it will 
replace the authority to interpret private law’s core concepts such as property, contract, tort 
from ordinary courts to constitutional (and generalist) courts, what will ultimately result in an 
superfluous and redundant private law. These three points support the belief that courts give 
priority to the legislature in changing private law when the shifting point is the efficacy of 
human rights within private law; and also the belief that is the ordinary court’s duty to 
administer the background rules of private law.      
 The idea of constitutionalization of private law seems “eye-catching” but presents us a 
dilemma. On the one hand, if fundamental rights are seen as protected interests then what 
constitutionally matters is the threat itself to these interests, regardless of its provenance. It is 
not important whether the threat comes from a state action or a private action. On the other 
hand, because of the concerns with liberal autonomy and judicial awareness of constitutional 
norms in need of balance, there is resistence against the collapse of the separation between 
constitutional law and private law, for the concerns that notions of value and magnitude are 
boundless or without a logical endpoint. Gerstenberg’s larger point is that subjecting the ground 
rules of private law to constitutional norms does not eliminate, but enables choice, autonomy, 
and experimentalism”268.         
 Constitutional rights establish a border between the state and the society nearby a sphere 
of individual sovereignty and integrity of the the person. In addiction, constitutional rights serve 
as a collective self-restriction by rejecting certain irresolvable contentious and emotionally 
charged issues from the public agenda. On the contrary, the relationships between private 
individuals remain outside the normal range of constitutionalism, because they are governed by 
private law as conceptually different group, which aims to its own coherence. Surely, private 
                                                             
267 Ibid at 769. 
268 Ibid. at 770. 
128 
 
law must be in accordance with the constitution, because it is the Grundenorm of any State. But 
this does not mean that constitutional norms may be inserted into private relationships. 
However, Gerstenberg’s view is one where: 
 Private law and relationships between individuals do not remain outside the range of 
constitutional law, but are always already determined by underlying constitutional values such 
as fairness and democracy…and also all the rules and standards of private law must, perversely 
and without exception, be interpreted in the light of those values.269  
He then adds that the horizontal private relationships should, rather than being excluded 
from the constitution, be a “continuum” of the same. Also, he is of the opinion that the 
separation between adjudication and legislation collapses for the fact that if constitutional rights 
have a binding effect on private individuals, and if constitution law has an immediate impact 
on private law, then constitutional courts (adjudication) become meaningless. Thus 
adjudication must harmonize or construct transitory orders between highly abstract and open-
ended principles, in a continou review process. But the collapse between the separation of 
legislation and adjudication brings up the earlier concerns: first, private autonomy is threatened; 
second, the private law becomes superfluous.      
 As illustration, one shall take a look to the Lueth case. Lueth, a jewish president of the 
Hamburg Press Club was known for criticizing Harlen, a producer of antisemitic films and one 
of the most influential film directors of the Third Reich. Lueth called upon distributors, cinema-
owners and the public to boycott Harlan’s new movie. The film’s producer and distributor 
sought an injuction  in the ordinary private law courts to force Lueth to remove his call for a 
boycott. Lueth was ordered to abstain from calling a boycott in the future on pain of facing fine 
or imprisonment. The ordinary courts’ interpretation of BGB 826 was that any call for a boycott 
ipso facto violates the same rule, because that is clealy what the rules states and means to say. 
Here, the conflict was between property interests and free-speech values. The Constitutional 
Court attempted to explain that “the fundamental rights granted by the German Grundgesetz, 
such as freedom of expression, were not only ‘subjective rights’ of individual addressed (as 
barriers) against the state, but also, and at the same time, ‘objective principles for the whole 
legal and social order’”270. Hence, the Lueth case questioned (in the German legal context) the 
view that constitutional law governed only the ‘making’ of private law, but not the 
interpretation or application of private law. In other words, the influence of constitutional law 
on private law does not come to an end with the ‘making’ of private law, but rather extends to 
                                                             
269 Ibid. at 771-72 
270 Ibid. at 773. 
 129 
 
its interpretation. Moreover, the Constitutional Court stated that the influence of constitutional 
norms on private law must be ‘mediated’ by the interpretation of the private law itself. This was 
then known as indirect application. Therefore, it emphasized that the litigation, even in the 
presence of constitutional norms, remains on the grounds of private law and that the balancing 
between competing constitutional values takes place withint the private law framework and that 
it is the private law’s task to build a fair balance when rights such as property rights and freedom 
of expression crash. Being so, the private law legislator maintains its role.  
 The problem of “balancing” the constitutional rights is one of reconciliation with the 
supremacy of the Constitution. But one cannot have it both ways – both constitutional 
supremacy and idea that the impact of the constitution on private law is subordinated upon 
private law itself as a self-sufficient self-programming.     
 The idea of indirect application opened up a debate. For instance, Aharon Barak271 
supports a model that he calls “strengthened indirect application”. This model has two 
particularities. First, individual’s rights such as the right to property are rights of the private 
individual concerning both the government and other individuals. Second, the limitation and 
narrowing of right due to the regard for the other’s right must be evaluated within the particular 
normative framework of private law. In Barak’s opinion, private law is the “geometric location” 
for formulating remedies for an infringement by one private individual on the constitutional 
right of another individual. The party must find its remedy within its framework of private law. 
To the extent that private law does not, despite the violation of a constitutional remedy, grant 
an appropriate remedy, private law must be revised to provide the remedy as needed. This 
model is different from the traditional indirect application that would deny the remedy in the 
cases in which the private law does not contain the legal tools and institutions for the absorption 
of constitutional values. Also, it differs from the traditional model because it does not ignore 
the existing private law and does not create a type of constitutional private law that exists side 
by side with regular private law.        
 This approach to European Private Law has implications on the future of the European 
Union itself. European scholars have pointed the necessity for an alignment between the 
principles of social justice in European contract law and the constitutional principles already 
recognized in Europe. Yet, this issue remains controversial.    
 In Mohamed Aziz, the ECJ deliberately avoided the issue of Constitutionalization of 
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European Private Law since it did not openly addressed the relationship between the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and European private law, whereas in other cases it is obvious that the ECJ 
is creating constitutionalised private law as a safety net. Yet, in this case the ECJ kept a low 
profile, due to the fear of turning every private law conflict into a constitutional conflict. One 
must admit the importance, in Mohamed Aziz, of the Article 43 of the Charter, “the right to 
housing”, since Aziz was evicted from his family home. It is necessary to define Article 43 of 
the Charter as a principle rather than as a right. The ECJ avoids the issue, but adds that the 
overall purpose for which the credit was granted was the creation of a family home272. 
 It is only a matter of time before the ECJ engages into “constitutionalised European 
Private Law”, with a solider set of rules that will bind not only the Member States and challenge 
their national law private systems, but also the private parties to a contract. However, the 
problem lies in the unwillingness of some Member-States to adapt their national law to the 
European standards. Contract law for its complexity is a field rather untouchable. It is, 
undoubtedly, the law field with more harmonization difficulties. 
 
           3.4. Relation with U.S jurisprudence  
 The private law approach is not sufficiently “fair” in which concerns to contracts of 
adhesion. It is obvious that this contracts are, most of the times, unfair for the consumers. For 
that, more protection must be granted. The only one who is in a position to fight this powerful 
economic corporations is the State. The State has two options: or it continues to regulate the 
issue as if it were private, by regulations containing safeguards to the consumer (as the EU 
does); or, once and for all, admits the public nature of contracts of adhesion. Slawson’s 
administrative view on contracts may be a good option, because it would result in an effective 
control of standard terms by means of judicial review. This judicial review could be made 
according to the principle of proportionality, a very public principle. Actually, proportionality 
is one of the most important grounds for judicial review. It has been a ground for many years 
and has evolved from the concept of unreasonableness. The concept of proportionality has been 
developed more as a general principle of law by the judges over the years. This doctrine of 
proportionality is well established and is a broad concept in the European administrative law. 
Why not forget the traditional doctrine of contracts and govern contracts of adhesion in an 
administrative manner?  It seems the best method of having some sort of judicial control over 
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this contracts. The proportionality doctrine is applied in other fields of law, for instance, 
constitutional law. It is a very effective control mechanism because it entails a three-part test: 
1) is the measure suitable to achieve a legitimate aim?; 2) is the measure necessary to achieve 
that aim or are less restrictive means available?; and 3) does the measure have an excessive 
effect on the applicant's interests?. The general principle of proportionality therefore requires 
that a measure is both appropriate and necessary, Therefore, the general principle of European 
Union law of proportionality is often considered to be the most far-reaching ground of judicial 
review and of particular importance in public law cases.      
 If one wants contracts of adhesion to be subject to some kind of public control, the 
administrative view coupled with an assessement based on the principle of proportionality 
could achieve better outcomes that the ones reached through the doctrine of unsconscionablity 
or through the doctrine of public interest, or also through the EU “doctrine” of presumptive 
nonenforcement. However, this would mean shifting the principles of “private contracting” to 
“administrative contracting”. The American schoolars that addressed the problematic of 
contracts of adhesion as a matter of public interest, namely Kessler, Rakoff and Slawson would 
probably accept this view of reviewing standard terms through the principle of proportionality. 
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4.1. The Freedom of Contract 
  Freedom of contract is one of the most discussed issues regarding contracts of adhesion. 
As the name refers, it is the freedom of individuals or groups to contract with whoever they 
want. This freedom is one of the bases upon which the law is founded. The liberty of people to 
make arrangements or agreements, according to their intents and wills.    
 This principle plays a huge role in the acceptance of contracts of adhesion for many 
reasons. First, the whole idea of contracts of adhesion is only possible due to the existence of 
such liberty. Without it, it would not be possible for a business to contract in such an 
authoritarian manner. Second, for the fact that is its purpose to give room to parties to adapt the 
law to their own interests, businesses do it in their favour, by establishing harsh clauses to their 
customers (who will not find a better option in their close competitors). Third, the freedom of 
contract lies in the absence of governmental interference (except when public policy justifies 
its intervention). In other words, Freedom of Contract separates the state and the market, the 
private and the public. As Kessler writes “the law of contract has to be of their own making”273, 
to provide for individuals the fairer solution in the attainance of their own interests.  
 The problem is that, Freedom of Contract is not a concept as static as previously thought. 
Over the years, Freedom of Contract has changed its meaning just as contract itself is not what 
it used to be. Contract was perceived as the result of free bargaining between two individuals, 
who meet each other on a relation of approximate economic equality. This contracting 
manifested their consent because it was individually negotiated and properly dickered. In our 
days, due to the economic reality that lies in the capitalistic structure of society, contracts are 
not a “meeting of minds” anymore.        
 According to Rakoff, Freedom of Contract means uncoerced choice  linked to the human 
being, its development, its individualization, its fulfilment, in doing so – none of these values 
is visible by enforcing the organization’s form274. Thus, seeing the organization as an individual 
is the first error. An organization is an institution, with power, information, and means to achive 
its goals. Of course, an organization should have power to contract, but due to its prime position 
in many fields, its freedom of contract must be “moderated”. It is misleading to consider an 
individual which normally is an average person in need of the products or services offered by 
these organizations on an equal footing with the same. The organizations do not even actively 
participate in the deal, they simply provide the product or service.    
                                                             
273 Kessler, supra note 6 at 629. 
274 Rakoff, supra note 41 at 1236. 
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 The Freedom of Contract is one of the barriers to progress. Not the Freedom of Contract 
itself, but the perception given to it. The Courts, judges and legal actors across the world do not 
accept the fact that the Freedom of Contract must be redefined, instead of being rationalized. 
This principle does not fit the reality anymore because there is not any contract equality. The 
contractual relationship is currently composed by two parts, in which one is the consumer and 
the other is an unreachable organization that imposes its terms in a take-it-or-leave-it basis. The 
consumer has no Freedom of Contract other than choosing the best alternative to its purchase. 
On the other hand, the organization has the Freedom of Contract to do whatever it wants, for 
instance drafting unfair contracts, which most times even the governments uphled. And all this 
is possible due to its privileged power, given by a society whose roots are embedded in money, 
profit, risk and speculation. The Government cannot subsist without the organizations’ support, 
because they are responsible in many ways for the progress of our society. Maybe that is why 
they are so many times benefited at the expense of the rest of community. Freedom of Contract 
is not equally applied to all the people, and even further, what actually occurs is quite the 
contrary. The Freedom of Contract is currently a “one-sided privilege”275 that only a few enjoy, 
namely organizations, corporations, etc.        
 In effect, Freedom of Contract, that so-well established principle of law, it is to blame 
for all inertness of evolution. Is it preferable to maintain the “prestabilized harmony” of the 
society structure and the legal certainty rather than battle for social justice? It is due to that 
Freedom that we people are losing ours? The problem rests with the fact that the contractual 
parties are completely separated. Kessler claims that Freedom of Contract “enables enterprisers 
to legislate in a substantially authoritarian manner without using the appearance of authoritarian 
forms”276. In other words, is due to Freedom of Contract along with Private Autonomy that the 
organizations are capable of making contracts that impose their terms, obligations and duties. 
They are effectively making law. People are not in a fair position anymore, because they, on 
the contrary of organizations, cannot impose any terms. Is this fair? To permit an unfair 
relationship right from the beginning?       
 Freedom of Contract does not exist anymore. Perhaps there are some remnants in other 
contractual relationships. But when Contracts of Adhesion are at stake, it simply vanished. 
Freedom of Contract requires that the contracting parties voluntarily assume the contractual 
obligations. In this context, they do it but not “voluntarily”, they are almost forced to do so. 
                                                             
275 Kessler, supra note 6 at 640 
276 Ibid. 
136 
 
There might be two options to solve this problem concerning Freedom of Contract:  
 One, the whole redefinition of the contractual relationship, or at least the separation of 
this new type of contracting from the other types of contracts. That is, creating a whole new 
body of law regarding to Contracts of Adhesion or Standard Form Contracts. Since the current 
concepts do not fit the reality anymore.        
 Two, withdraw some of this Freedom of Contract to organizations. Since shifting seems 
too difficult, maybe the solution is to limit the drafting of contracts by companies. Regular 
inspections of this companies coupled with regulation on the matter could be a start. Besides 
that, harsh fines should be administered to non-compliant companies. The fines must be so 
severe than the companies themselves would be more frightened to pay them than of loosing 
the revenue that would be available if they did not comply.  
 
4.2. The Institutional Power (The Market and the State) 
 The institutional power is the power held by entities like governments (the state) and 
corporations (the market) to control people and direct their behaviour. Entities with institutional 
power, and their agents, have the official authority or ability to decide what “is best” for the 
whole society. Institutional power exists in situations where authority has been socially 
approved and accepted as legitimate. Corporations or companies have a considerable power 
over our lives, as well as the State. As far as lawmaking power for instance, it is considered that 
its holder sui generis is the State. However, that is not true, the state is not the only holding the 
lawmaking power, the parties when consenting to a contract are also creating law – the power 
is divided by the State and the citizens. In this context, when an individual is entering into a 
contract, which is a standard form contract, its consent is sufficient to create law. The problem 
is that such consent is empty. The consumer, most of the times, does not even read the whole 
contract, he accepts the “visible terms” as Rakoff stated, which may be the price and others. 
The remaining terms, the “invisible” ones, are usually the most problematic ones. Thus, this 
lawmaking power is “given” to the market by consumers through their “empty” consent. But 
why is that? Is it because consumers want to do so? Or is it a consequence of their necessity for 
something that only the Market has access to? Namely services or products? Probably the 
second option. Actually there are institutions, other than the State and the Market that control 
the individual within the context of private law, for instance labour relationship in the modern 
industry, “where such domination is as much an achievement of liberty as is the limitation of 
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governamental control”277.        
 Therefore, the State has the power because it is perceived as a “coordinator” of the whole 
society, whereas the market has power because of (consumers’) contracts. If the parties of a 
contract are creating law by consenting to it, and if a contract is only made with consent, then 
the market, as the party holding more power, is imposing law, through contracts and the 
consumer is legitimizing it through its consent. They are socially accepting this law. 
Unintentionally, the consumers are giving the Market power, but that is because they do not 
have other option than to do so. Otherwise, they will live apart from the others. How can 
someone currently live without the aid of the Market?     
 Given these points, the holders of power in our society are the State and the Market. 
This is only possible due to the consumers’ consent on the contracts they enter. This strengths 
the Market power, their organization and their structure to the limit were they can be also called 
an institution.         .  
 
4.3. The call for a multiple system of contract law 
 It is more than obvious that the current system does not respond to the needs of contract 
law, more particularly the needs resulting from the use of standard form contracts. It is true that 
the contract law has grown substantially in the past decades, but even so, it is not adequately 
prepared. Plenty of doctrines have risen in the hope of solving this problem, but unfortunately 
none of them properly addressed the issue. While there are some helpful doctrines, but yet 
incomplete, others are completely lacking a senseful explanation. As Rakoff argued standard 
contracts call for a different law, but the problem lies in the principles applicable to them278. 
Also Kessler called for a different set of legal principles. The time has come for us to part from 
the doctrinal moorings and to begin to see things in a more pratical way. One thing is Contract 
as such. Another are contracts of adhesion. The basis of the situation may be the same (an 
exchange or a transaction) but the path made is another. One is civilized, and respectful of all 
the elder principles of contract law, another takes advantage of the same principles through use 
and abuse to achieve the better possible outcome. The judges and other legal actors have to 
recognize that they are different realities. Ordinary contracts are still adequate to the principles. 
Contracts of adhesion distort the same principles. For instance in which respects to Freedom of 
                                                             
277 Rakoff, supra note 41 at 1237. 
278 Ibid at 1175. 
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Contract, this Freedom is no longer perfectly shared by the two parties. Instead, one of them, 
normally businesses that issue this forms has much more freedom because imposes whatever 
terms it want. The customer is deprived of his freedom by “allowing” the imposition of the 
same terms. For that, much more protection must be given to the consumers, and the businesses 
in other side, must be highly controlled. The contract as contract of adhesion must be fully 
separated from the ordinary contract. Its principles, proceedings and rules. The principles, as 
we know them, at least must be adapted. But the impasse lies in this “adaption”. It is very 
difficult to redraft everything all again. The most advisable thing to do is adapt. There are many 
ideas of adaption, one of them being the Slawson’s idea of an “administrative law of contracts”. 
For him, the solution was the creation of a “set of legal principles which reconcile the interests 
of the issuers in setting such terms as they wish on an agreement and of the consumer in having 
his reasonable expectations fulfilled”. Thus, administrative law’s view is an attempt to maintain 
the unilateral or “delegated” cases of agency lawmaking consistent with the legislative purpose, 
made in the public interest. This public law approach is difficult to implement, but its outcomes 
would be fairer than the ones achieved in the private law. The Contract must remain in the 
private sphere, but in a field or area of contract different from the “ordinary” contracts”. In the 
same manner that a marriage is a contract, but with another name, so must be contracts of 
adhesion, dettached from regular contracts. I agree with Rakoff when he says that there is a 
need for reconstruction (or adaption). As he writes “the need for that reconstruction, based on 
an open recognition that contracts of adhesion represent a different social practice from 
“ordinary contracts”, is the essential point”279.  However, I believe that the State has to intervene 
in the fairness control. For that, it is the judges and legislatures’ duty to create this new legal 
structure. More than creating this legal structure, they must respect the rights of the consumers 
as a matter of public interest. These are not “individual” contracts. They cover the public in 
general. For that, consumers must be treated as a collective group, rather than an individual 
making a single transaction in a regular day of his life. We as consumers are obliged to 
“contract” that way.  
 
4.4. The public interest in the US and the EU 
 The public interest issue has become a common bond between two completely different 
legal systems. In the US, the common law legislation treats standard form contracts like any 
                                                             
279 Rakoff, supra note 41 at 1284 
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other contract, with the proviso that there are exceptional rules for unfair situations. The Courts 
in the US interpret form contracts contra proferentem, that is, the interpretation is against the 
drafter. The party who provided the wording must prove that its contract is fair. The rules 
applicable to standard form contracts are contained in the Uniform Commercial Code, more 
particularly in the section 211 of the American Law Institute’s Restatment (Second) of 
Contracts280.            
 The US doctrine and jurisprudence distinguish between regular form contracts and 
contracts of adhesion. The contracts are subject to special scrutinity if they are found to be 
contracts of adhesion. According to Slawson “a contract which one party makes because he is 
coerced in this “total” sense is what we shall mean by a contract of adhesion”281. For that reason, 
this contracts have a special treatment which is more severe. One article on the issue was largely 
influential on the decisions taken by many courts in the US. That article is The Delivery of a 
Life-Insurance Policy written by Patterson in 1919. The majority of American Courts has 
adopted this view, especially after the Supreme Court of California endorsed the adhesion 
analysis. The American Courts seem to be moving towards more consumer-protective 
measures, because they are aware that businesses are in a much better position that the 
consumers. The Courts do not upheld form contracts, without first challenging its fairness, if it 
has been called into question in the first place. They are concerned about the consequences that 
this contracts might have in the society, so they now discern them as a matter of general public 
interest. This contracts must be fair to the needs of the whole society. The public interest 
doctrine is more viewed as a relief doctrine, but I think it is one of the better recourses to achieve 
the greater justice possible. It is mainly founded on the idea that one of the parties has “superior 
bargaining power”. In fact, many cases were decided according to this idea. For instance, in the 
Henrioulle case, the judge found a public interest involved, mostly due to the presence of 
“unequal bargaining strength”, he said “in a state and local market characterized by a severe 
shortage of low-cost housing, tenants are likely to be in a poor position to bargain with 
landlords”282. This case also denoted the “economic duress” felt in this transactions. In a fully 
negotiated transaction, the “superior bargaining power” and the “economic duress” would not 
take place. This two factors harm the consumer in a considerable manner. Another important 
                                                             
280 The same provides that “Where the other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting such assent would not do so if  he knew that 
the writing contained a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement”. This section has an influential though non-binding force in 
courts.   
281 Slawson, supra note 1 at 549 
282 Henrioulle, 20 Cal. 3d pp. 519, 573 P. 2d pp. 469, 143 Cal. Rprt pp. 251. 
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case founded on matters of public interest was the Shell Oil Co v. Marinello. This case respected 
to a form clause giving Shell the right to terminate a dealer’s franchise on short notice and 
without “cause”. The court held the clause invalid as matter of public interest and admitted that 
“the public is affected in a direct way beyond question…the distribution and sale of motor 
vehicle fuels within this State is affected with public interest”283. Therefore, according to the 
US jurisprudence, for a standard form contract to be fair it must be in accordance with the public 
interest.           
 In the EU, the situation is similar, but its approach is different. The EU law spreads to 
all the Member-States through the imposition of Directives that then are transposed to each 
Members’ national law. They are binding but subject to some adaptations. With regard to 
contract law, this transposition is much more difficult, due to the differences between contract 
law rules in each member state. Initially, the EU was centtered on an “internal market 
approach”, where the consumer was not seen so much as a weak person in need of protection 
against the meanderings of the market but as a an active partner who should be encouraged to 
use the enlarged potentials of cross-border shopping. Over the years, the approach has changed 
substantially to focus on a “consumer rights”. The consumer policy is now one of the EU’s 
priorities we can see in Article 153 of the EC Treaty which states the following: 
 “To promote consumer information and to protect their economic interests, for example by 
creating minimum standards on pre-contractual information in direct and distance selling, by 
increasing freedom of choice through rights of withdrawal, by establishing rules on the 
transparency and fairness of pre-formulated terms and guarantees, and by ensuring quality 
standards through mandatory rules on compensation and warranties” 
This approach became more obvious when the ECJ, in its famous tobacco-advertising 
judgement of 5 October 2000 decided to substantially limit the rather loose use of the internal 
market power for consumer protection legislation284. This discussion incited a deep debate 
among European legal scholars about whether there is a genuine EU competence in contract 
law in general and in consumer law in particular.      
 Thus, the Directives concerning consumer law have a protective purpose as also as the 
ECJ with its inspiration on a “pro-consumer attitude”. The contract law directives do not have 
a “horizontal direct effect”, that is they cannot create by themselves obligations against private 
parties, but they may nevertheless be used as a source for a “directive conforming 
interpretation” of national law, including in the pronouncements of the ECJ.  
                                                             
283 63 N. J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973). 
284 Federal Republic of Germany v European Parliament and Council of the European Union [2000] ECR I-8419 
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 The Directive with more impact in the standard form contracts is the Directive 
93/13/EEC on Unfair Contract Terms. This Directive is only concerned with “not individually 
negotiated terms”, for instance, terms within a consumer contract, which according to Article 3 
(2) have been drafted in advance and the consumer has therefore not been able to influence the 
substance of the term, particularly in the context of a pre-formulated standard contract. Also, 
the Directive’s unfairness test has been tightened to combine the reference to “good faith” as in 
the German Tradition, and the “imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations” as in French 
Law, per Article 3(1). There is no reference to the concept of “legitimate expectations”, 
otherwise used in EU law. Besides that, the Directive contains an Annex with an indicative, yet 
non-exhaustive, list of terms which may be regarded as unfair, Article 3 (3).  
 This Directive has not brought many changes to Member States contract law other than 
improving the consumer’s position on the market. However, with the Court’s insistence on the 
protective ambit of Directive 93/13/EEC, the judge is now able to raise ex officio the potential 
unfairness of the form clauses. Also, he must interpret and apply his national law in conformity 
with the Community Law.          
 Thus, this protection has the goal of reducing the disparities felt in the relation between 
consumers and businesses. Due to the fact that the consumers are practically the public, 
protecting them is acting according to the public interest. In Mohamed Aziz, the ECJ faced the 
social and societal dimension of the current economic crisis. This crisis reached many people 
across the Europe, and it was the ECJ’s duty to provide a solution for the problem of over-
indebted consumers. They did it by protecting them against the powerful institutions, namely 
banks that took advantage of the situation to inhumanly enrich themselves.  
 Far from everything that divides the US and the EU system, there are also some 
resemblances, specifically the public interest view that consumers ought to be protected more 
than the influential and powerful economic corporations. The consumers must be protected, but 
the economic entities must also feel some pressure to act in a fair and reasonable way, in a win-
win perspective for both parties. The negotiation and posterior acceptance of the contract must 
be just. And it must be for both parties. The solution is to balance the inequality between both.   
 
4.5. Public interest or Constitutional settlement? 
 In the context of contracts of adhesion or standard form contracts, the main objective of 
both the public interest doctrine and the constitutionalization of private law is the protection of 
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the consumer.           
 The question then is whether is preferable to resort to doctrines of public interest or to 
the constitutional settlement. The public interest doctrine is a relief doctrine, based on the 
general interest of the public. The problem is that this doctrine depends on a high number of 
individuals harmed by the same “evil”.        
 The constitutional settlement, on the contrary, would have constitutional principles 
inserted on private relationships.       
 However, one must admit that the principles guiding the public interest may be very 
similar to the constitutional principles. After all, they are the highest principles in any given 
society. Constitutional values have intrinsic to them principles such as fairness and democracy. 
It is obvious that the rules of private law are themselves interpreted in the light of this same 
principles. The only difference is that the constitutional settlement would permit this values, or 
rights to be also binding on individuals, and not only used by them against the State. 
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